Turkish-Greek Relations and Irregular Migration at the Southeasternmost Borders of the EU: The 2020 Pazarkule Case

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Abstract

In late February 2020, Turkish authorities declared that they would not avoid refugees who wanted to exit to Europe as a result of which Edirne faced another, this time massive, refugee movement in its history. Eventually, the flocking of hundreds and thousands of desperate people for the purpose of crossing to the European Union (EU) turned into a situation in which Turkey, Greece as well as the European Union involved. This paper investigates the Pazarkule case by analysing foreign policy concerns of both Greece and Turkey. It holds this foreign policy-migration nexus behind Turkey’s as well as Greece’s policy responses and introduces a comparative study by analysing both Greek and Turkish official discourse and sources. This research argues that although Turkey’s and Greece’s refugee policy responses seem to be quite different, they actually have similar aims. That is, both countries use their strategic relations with the EU for their own foreign policy concerns by underlining their foremost importance for the Union in terms refugees trying to make their way to Europe.

Keywords: Greece; Turkey; EU; Pazarkule; Maritsa; refugee; foreign policy

Introduction

Edirne is the central city of Turkey’s Thrace region that has five border gates with both Bulgaria and Greece. Being located in the north-westernmost corner of Turkey, Edirne is widely called as “the door to Europe” for Turkey, the door which has always been important for different types of migrants, particularly for those coming from Balkan countries (Yaşar, 2009, İpek, 1999, Mazlum, 2007). Today, it emerges as one of the dense migratory spaces whenever the topic of migration arises as a salient issue in Turkey.

While Edirne remained an important city for migrants using the Balkan route negotiations between Turkey and the European Union (EU) in the post-Cold War era has added a new role to this town: Deterring irregular migrants from reaching Europe. This border protection role was boosted by the 2002 Readmission Protocol between Greece and Turkey (İkizoglu Erensu & Kaşlı, 2016:533). Since Greece erected a fence, more migrants try to enter Europe through the Evros River (Meriç) on the border between Greece and Turkey. This route is quite dangerous and paved the way for several deaths (IOM, 2019). According to UNHCR data, 5,982 persons arrived in Greece through the Greek-Turkish land border of Evros in 2020 compared to a total of 14,887 in 2019 (Asylumineurope, 2021). Moreover, this route is mainly criticized by for on-going push-backs. According to Turkish Foreign Ministry, “total of 25,404 irregular migrants were pushed back to Turkey by Greece in the first ten months of

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2019, up from 11,867 migrants in 2018” (Hürriyetdailynews, 2019; Yıldız, 2020). So today, The city of Edirne and its wider region along the Maritsa River is an important departure location for those who want to exit to Europe (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006; İçduygu & Toktas, 2002; Gökalp Aras, 2013; Lindvall, 2015).

All in all, just as in the past, Edirne has never lost its popularity and appeal as an important city for the routes of immigrants. Therefore, it is an important point for Turkey, Greece as well as the EU regarding issues of migration. Its significance actually increased when Turkey became a host country for four million Syrian refugees, as many of them aimed to pass through to Europe. The main focus of the EU countries is frequently diverted to this city whenever high flows of refugees attempt to enter Europe. When the German Chancellor 10 Angela Merkel welcomed refugees from Syria, approximately 3 thousands of them wanted to come to Edirne in 2015. They all wanted to pass through border gates and reach Europe. But, they were intercepted by Turkish officers and sent back to the cities they came from (Zeray, 2015; Alioğlu Çakmak, 2018: 41-42). This time in 2020, Turkish officers declared they would not stop refugees who wish to pass to Europe. Thus, EU countries, first and foremost Greece, started facing thousands of migrants coming over Turkey’s Pazarkule border for the purpose of crossing the border and enter Greece from the Kastanies Border point.

During the Pazarkule case, many commentators pointed out the foreign policy concerns of the countries to shape their refugee policies, mainly emphasising Turkish struggle in Syria (Ahmad, 2020; Mandıracı, 2020; Oxford Analytica, 2020). This article holds this foreign policy-migration nexus behind Turkey’s decision to let refugees exit to Europe. Moreover, it also highlights the concerns of Greece and introduces a comparative study which utilizes both Greek and Turkish sources. Hence, this inquiry contributes to the literature by showing how the refugee question was understood, interpreted and displayed by both Turkish and Greek authorities. The study argues that although Turkey’s and Greece’s refugee policy responses seem different, these two countries have similar concerns which reflect that they perceive refugee question as part of their foreign policy. Therefore, both countries use their strategic relations with the EU to achieve their foreign policy goals by underlining their foremost importance for the Union. While Turkey indicates its struggle in Syria and EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016, Greece emphasises its geographic position for Union’s external border protection. All in all, this comparative approach provides an understanding with respect to similarities and differences of Pazarkule case parties’ policies.

For, the purpose of this study a “structured and focused comparison” is applied. George and McKeown (1985: 41) state that this method is suitable for “a comparison of two or more cases and is "focused" insofar as the researcher deals selectively with only those aspects of each case that are believed to be relevant to the research objectives and data requirements of the study”. Moreover, the analysis here asks theoretically relevant questions and conducts small research studies, which are all perfectly appropriate for a structured, focused approach.
comparision. As aptly put, the researcher should collect the same information from carefully selected units (King et al., 1994:45). Using this method, the general research questions indicate the research objectives and they ask for each case under study. A systematic “comparison and cumulation” are achieved by using standardised data collection. Due to it being a focused inquiry, only limited aspects of the cases are scrutinised (George et al., 2005: 215). The main source of data elaborated for this analysis is composed of discourses of top-level officials delivered through media and social media. In particular, tweets of officials were mainly utilized for the purpose of this study. It becomes clear that Twitter turned out to be a rich source for discovering Greek authorities’ initial reactions, responses and concerns. Turkish authorities also used some other media sources - web of Presidency of Republic in particular - to deliver their messages. For both cases data was collected for the same period of time in state languages of each country.

The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections. In the following part, the paper presents theoretical background of migration-foreign policy nexus. Afterwards, the analysis part is devoted to show Greek and Turkish authorities’ declarations during the Pazarkule case. Here, similarities and differences of both countries’ approaches, by giving particular importance on the relations with the EU, are assessed. In the conclusion part, the foreign policy-migration nexus is critically discussed and some reflections of this tendency on refugees’ lives are pointed out.

**Theoretical Background: International Migration as a Tool of Foreign Policy Aspirations**

Migration is a topic of research which has relations with several aspects of state politics. One part of studies deals with domestic policy concerns behind policy responses towards foreigners within the country (Hawkins, 1988). The other part focuses on how international migration is in relation with foreign policy priorities of countries (Greenhill, 2010; Hammerstad, 2012; Mitchell, 1989, 1992; Tucker, 2019). In fact, even though it seems a domestic one per se, it is highly difficult to make a sharp domestic and foreign policy division as migration is a transnational topic. In this regard, it is aptly posited that “the extralegal crossing of people from one country to another usually affects international relations between those governments” (Jacobsen, 1996: 662).

The importance of foreign policy considerations in the making of migration policy has been addressed in the existing literature for a long period of time. Even in the Cold War era, when a strict high politics-low politics distinction had been regarded, considerable studies were devoted to explore theoretical models to understand the complex links between migration policies and foreign policy considerations of states. Particularly, US immigration policies and their foreign policy link were scrutinised by notable scholars (Loescher & Scanlan, 1984; Miller & Papademetriou, 1983). Teitelbaum is one of the pioneering scholars for pointing towards the salience of a foreign policy-migration nexus. He does not perceive immigration policies as “foreign policies” but regards them as connected. In this respect, he has pointed to three main types of interconnections between foreign policy decisions and international migration: foreign policy as it affects international migration, international migration as tools of foreign policy and foreign policy impacts of past migration (Teitelbaum, 1984).

Teitelbaum’s point has stayed valid after the Cold War as well and nations gained a certain degree of leverage by exploiting migrants (Teitelbaum, 1984). In line with Teitelbaum,
Mitchell (1989) also points out how migration policies serve to achieve foreign policy goals of states. Considering the blurring line between the domestic and international links of migration policies, this study underlines the importance of multi-level analysis, which explores migration related domestic policy making, foreign policy making and international relations.

Both Teitlebaum and Mitchell are important scholars indicating the upgrade of migration policies from low politics to high politics, which are the main concerns of foreign policies. Points and arguments they had raised in their studies became much more understandable in the post-Cold War era; countries strategically continued to use migration as tools for their foreign policy aspirations. Several case studies in different regions continued to assert the link between the migration and foreign policy links. Hammerstad (2012) examines the African case and does show a correlation between domestic policy responses to the immigration influx and South Africa’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. Mahler (2000: 198) argues that “transnational flows of people serve the interests of nation-states as much or more than they undermine them”. Drawing on different case studies and his own research on El Salvador, the research highlights the role of migration to structure diplomacy. In line with Mahler’s point, Paoletti focuses on Libya and demonstrates how migration and border policies are important levers for this country to enact diplomacy with its neighbour countries (Paoletti, 2011). In addition to nation-state analysis, the migration topic is also found in studies scrutinising international organisations, particularly EU external policies (Geddes, 2009; Lavenex, 2006). In this regard, scholars emphasise the relations of the EU with non-EU member countries as well as their agreements. Therefore, these studies also show the “blurring distinction between domestic and foreign policy” (Geddes, 2009: 9).

When we come to the Turkish case, there is also increasing scholarly attention to explore the importance of the foreign policy aspect taking a role in formation of migration policy. As it has been an immigration country since its foundation, this topic has always occupied an important place in foreign policy making and Tolay (2012) considers this in her research. Focusing on a twenty-year period, her study demonstrates the change in Turkish asylum policies for the sake of achieving her foreign policy goals. Particularly, the emergence of the EU as an influential partner of Turkey since the end of the Cold War have considerable reflections on this country’s migration policies. Here, Tolay highlights instrumental and symbolical usage of migration policies in order to pressure accession negotiations with the union as well as showing country’s commitment to the EU project and its demand to develop good relations (Tolay, 2012:137). Özerim (2018) is also one of those who considers that Turkey instrumentalises migration policies in order to achieve some foreign policy aspirations. He focuses on specific periods to conduct his analysis. By comparing two different periods, namely Motherland Party (MP) government defined under the term ‘model country’ and Justice and Development Party (JDP) government after 2009, the author shows similarities between the migration policies of the two eras in Turkish political history. Intense usage of migration issue, specifically through asylum and migration, visa and emigrant, co-ethnic and kinship policies, involvement of regional conflicts, strengthening economic and cultural ties with the countries and expanding the countries’ influence in other countries come to the forefront in both eras. The finding of foreign policy influence on migration policies of Turkey is also confirmed by another comparative analysis conducted by Gökalp Aras & Şahin Mencutek’s research on mass refugee influx with a focus on Syrians. Having conducted process tracing, the authors explain Turkey’s policy change from open-door to securitisation towards Syrians by indicating changes in Turkish foreign policy orientations. Altıok &
Tosun’s study (2019) also deals with policy responses of Turkey towards Syrian refugees, but this time a comparative analysis is conducted by examining policies towards Iraqi refugees (1989–1991) as well. Just as in the previous literature, this study also finds that foreign policy strategies play a significant role when Turkey faces mass migration flows.

Greece is another country which perceive migration increasingly as part of foreign policy although literature dealing with this relation is relatively scarce for this country. Mylonas & Žilović (2019) investigate policies towards different ethnic returnee groups and they indicate the relationship between country foreign policy interests and policies towards these groups. This study shows that Greece aims to preserve the Greek minority in Albania in order to use as a strategic leverage for its inter state relations with neighbours. However, it welcomes the Greek communities from the former Soviet Union and elaborates integration policy towards them to deal with country’s demographic problem with sensitive border areas, particularly in Thrace (2019: 624). While Mylonas & Žilović’s study provides an important understanding regarding the role of foreign policy relations in shaping policies towards new comers, Tsardanidias (2007) takes the matter other way around and questions how migration affects Greek foreign policy agenda. By focusing on primarily on the field of irregular migration, it shows that migration movements have an effect on this country’s relation with Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan regions. In this regard, Tsardanidias also points how Greece uses this strategic tool to achieve its foreign policy goals (2007:153).

Taken all abovementioned cases into account, it is not new to see migration as a means of foreign policy. It is true for the Pazarkule case that many concerns, such as economic reasons, political aspirations, societal reasons and public opinion behind both Turkey and Greece’s decisions might be counted. However, this paper concentrates on how foreign policy goals affect countries’ treatment towards migrants in the case of Pazarkule crisis and the commonalities between Greek and Turkish case. In that sense we relied upon Teitelbaum’s second point and claim that refugee policies of these countries should not be considered without taking into account their foreign considerations; in fact these policies are entered as foreign policy tools. This study argues that these two countries’ relations with the EU and their expectations from this organisation affect their approach to migrants and two countries have quite similar expectations.

**The very first days of the Pazarkule case: Recrimination**

The most important incident in the sequence of Pazarkule case occurred when 34 Turkish soldiers were killed and several were wounded in Syria’s Idlib province on 27 February 2020 by Syrian regime forces (Knecht, 2020). In a short period of time, Turkish representatives explained the policy shift from hosting refugees to not to stop them by saying Turkey “no longer able to hold refugees” (Dw, 2020; Çoban, 2020; Ünay 2020). President Erdogan’s Communications Director Fahrettin Altun underlined that Turkey “had not received enough support in hosting millions of Syrian refugees” (BBCNews, 2020) and that the country showed the intention not to stop refugees who wanted to go to Europe. Following on, the Turkish authorities started to declare about thousands of refugees heading towards Edirne for the Pazarkule Border. On 28th of February 2020 the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hami Aksoy made a similar statement emphasizing that the flow of asylum seekers and migrants moving towards the Turkey’s Western borders was likely to increase in the light of recent developments in Idlib (MFA, 2020).
When large number of refugees arrived nearby Pazarkule, the Greek government led by Kostas Mitsotakis alarmed all state mechanisms, the Greek Armed forced first and foremost, about an immediate action; fortification of Greece’s land border with Turkey. With an official statement dating to the 28th of February, the Greek Prime Minister called for an urgent meeting with higher representatives from ministries so as to discuss the recent refugee issue with Turkey and how to tackle it. They immediately decided to strengthen the physical borders vis a vis any flow of refugees from Pazarkule and all along the Maritsa River that constitutes the official borderline of Greece with Turkey. Afterwards, Greek authorities immediately started to deliver messages which blame Turkey for letting illegal border passings. For this sake, it is useful to underline that many of them preferred social media platforms, Twitter and Facebook in particular, so as to let people know about their initial reactions about what was happening at Pazarkule.

The very first tweet of the Greek Prime Minister indicating the initial reaction of Greece on the primary matter of concern of this research had a crystal clear message of “illegality”, a term that would prolong as of this day:

“Significant numbers of migrants and refugees have gathered in large groups at the Greek-Turkish land border and have attempted to enter the country illegally. I want to be clear: no legal entries into Greece will be tolerated. We are increasing our border security” (Mitsotakis, 2020b. Also see Mitsotakis, 2020a).

While responses from Greek authorities on their Twitter accounts dating 28 February 2020 were about “Pazarkule”, the Turkish authorities’ tweets were primarily about recent causalities in Idlib. In other words, priority for the Turkish side was Idlib and authorities were indicating their frustration for not to receive support in their cause. Recalling President Erdogan’s statements: “Turkey will never back down on its rightful fight. It will never let the blood of its martyrs go unavenged. It will not forget any treason” (Erdogan, 2020a). When Turkish officials started to indicate “refugee case”, the main topic was Idlib per se but their statements were associated with the EU. It was once more repeated from the highest level of the Turkish state that in case countries of the EU wanted to resolve refugee-related matters of the Union with Turkey, then, it was imperative to support Turkey’s efforts for humanitarian solution in Syria (Erdogan, 2020b).

As the aforementioned statements indicate, the Turkish authorities perceived and portrayed the refugee issue as part of security policies of the country. Similarly, Greek officials also overtly interpreted the Pazarkule case as part of their national security concern. For the Greek government, the Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister and Government Spokesperson Stelios Petsas cleared out that this situation turned out to be an “active, serious, unusual and asymmetric threat” to the national security of Greece, not an issue of immigration. After the conclusion of the extraordinary meeting with higher representatives from ministries, three decisions were pointed out: fortification of police and armed forces at all land and sea borders, temporary suspension of providing asylum to those illegally entering the country and their immediate return to their countries of origin and demand from Frontex the deployment of its RABIT team for protection of EU’s external borders (Greek Government, 2020c).

So as to discourage the illegal crossings, Greece also sent two text messages to those international cellular phone numbers located near the borderline around Pazarkule warning them not to cross Greek borders and security level was at maximum along the river. (To Vima, Migration Letters)
2020). Furthermore, Greek armed forces provided loud announcements in Arabic, Urdu, Persian and Bengali languages that the Greek border was closed and they couldn’t enter the country (Capital.gr, 2020). Seeking to curb this flow at least for some time, Mitsotakis declared that Greece revoked the Article 78.3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) would not accept any new asylum applications for one-month time (Mitsotakis, 2020c). This step fired up the already-increased tension between Turkey and Greece. Turkish authorities severely criticised Greece’s decision to suspend asylum applications. The Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu (2020a) underscored that this was not only against the 1951 Geneva Convention and the EU refugee law but also it was “completely unlawful” and “shameful”.

Analysing the responses of both sides from the very first day of arrival of irregular migrants to the Pazarkule border area, it becomes blatant that both Greece and Turkey chose to engage in mutual recrimination of delivering false information with respect to events at the borderline. They repeatedly accused each other of putting refugees’ lives at risk. In this regard, Turkey blamed Greece for inhumane treatment towards refugees and claimed that the Greek police used quite fierce methods to clear refugees out of its border zone:

"Greece does not protect the borders of the European Union, to the contrary, disgracefully tramples on the very principles and values this Union was built upon, by treating the migrants coming to its gates as enemies instead of human beings by using gas, bullets and pesticides on them without sparing women and children…” (MFA, 2020a).

Moreover, Turkish authorities expressed their concerns particularly about pushbacks. Accordingly, Soylu argued that 4,900 migrants were pushed back by Greece (Daily Sabah, 2020). He added that the inhumane policies of Greece towards irregular migrants trying to cross the Maritsa River reached at such a level that some of the refugees lost their lives due to pushbacks of Greek forces. According to the statements of Soylu:

“Greece, which killed 1 more refugee and wounded 5 more refugees at Pazarkule at 11 today, continues to violate international rules and violate human rights because Europe is spoiling this country. If Turkey had done one in a million of the same act, both Europe and employees of Europe in Turkey would have stood up” (Soylu, 2020b).

With respect to inhuman treatments, Soylu expressed to take some measures one of which was to settle 1000 members of the Turkish Special Police Force along the line of the Maritsa River so as to prevent any Greek attempt of pushbacks (CNNTURK, 2020). On the 6th of March, the first group of these forces started to patrol all along the river targeting to prevent any pushback attempts from the Greek side (Demirci, 2020).

The argument of Turkish authorities with respect to Greece’s inhumane treatment towards refugees was sharply denied by Greek officials. The Deputy Minister stated that a video showing fatality on the border was merely “fake news”. Therefore, people, Greek users of social media in particular, should be cautious and refrain from “furthering the Turkish propaganda” while sharing news and updates from their accounts about migration issues between Greece and Turkey (Petsas, 2020b). He would continue blaming Turkish forces for accompanying to illegal crossing of migrants from the Maritsa river as well as fabricating and
dispersing fake news targeting Greece. Even he argued that some of those immigrants had been freed from prisons and brought to the border by the Turkish police (Petsas 2020c). Also, Notis Mitarakis, the Minister of Migration and Asylum, warned that this curb of flow of people across the land border of the Evros region would likely increase the number of those who would try to reach Greece via the Aegean Sea, a phenomenon that had already been heard from Turkish authorities (Mitarakis, 2020b). He also underlined that those who had already managed to cross and applied to asylum would probably be rejected since they didn’t depict any attempt to free themselves from threat; Turkey had been a safe country for them (Mitarakis, 2020c).

From this comparative understanding of the research, it becomes obvious that numbering of refugees piling up at Pazarkule turned into another topic of controversy between the two countries. While refugees continued pouring to the borderline along Maritsa, the Greek and Turkish authorities declared completely different statistics regarding the number of those who managed to pass the border. On the 1st of March the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs tweeted that the number of those prevented from entering Greece all along the Maritsa River had been 10,000 and 75 of those who achieved to cross hadn’t got any connection with Idlib (Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020). The very next day the Turkish Ministry of Interior would declare a number more than ten times greater than the one expressed by Greek officials by stating that 117,677 migrants had already crossed the land border and entered Greece (Soylu, 2020c).

Along with criticizing the neighbouring Turkey, Mitarakis (2020d) overtly complained about policies of the previous Greek government headed by Alexis Tsipras that failed to protect borders of the country effectively as a result of which one million irregular migrants had managed to reach Greece. Similarly, Petsas (2020a) made one step further and blamed Tsipras for attacking the Mitsotakis government by reproducing Turkish propaganda in Greece’s struggle against “asymmetric threat” from the Turkey, thus acting as Erdogan’s “Trojan Horse” on Greek soil. Both statements stated above indicate that the criticism of Tsipras on how Greece was dealing with issues of the Pazarkule case was immediately correlated with Turkey and President Erdogan.

In a very short period of time, the Pazarkule case paved the escalation of bilateral confrontation between Turkey and Greece. Yet, this was actually not an issue between the two neighbouring countries. In this respect, both sides aptly indicated the EU from the very first day of the case as being the part of the conflict. It is clear that both countries decision makers were aware of that migration was an important topic for the EU agenda and the importance of this topic had increased when the Syrian mass migration started in 2011. In fact, in 2015, the influx of Syrian refugees towards the Europe alarmed the Union and paved the way for practical and political problems for EU countries (Nas, 2019). That being the case, both Greece and Turkey showed their expectations from the Union as a part of their foreign policy concerns in this event of case at Pazarkule, as it is elaborated below in detail.

**Dyadic or Triadic nexus?**

While the Pazarkule case seemed to happen between Turkey and Greece, the EU was actually one of the main parties from the very first day. As the seriousness of this case became fully apparent with the advent of dozens to the border point of Pazarkule, both sides
tried to highlight the EU aspect. By doing so, both Greece and Turkey had different expectations from the EU although primary points they raised were completely different.

Syrian refugee influx to Turkey started in 2011 with 252 persons, then the number of refugees increased day by day (AFAD, 2014). In 2015, when the war in Syria escalated, more Syrians fled their country and European countries started to call this as "refugee crisis". According to Kale, "after 2015, the EU member states specifically felt threatened and frightened by security concerns" (Kale, 2017: 71). When the Idlib case occurred and Turkey was faced with another wave of refugee influx, the memories of 2015 were still vivid. In this regard, expectations from the EU regarding Turkey’s struggle in Syria and burden sharing in the field of migration were declared by the key Turkish decision makers. In this regard, Altun clearly underscored that the EU failed to comply with promises it had given so that Turkey had no option other than diverting its attention from stopping the flow of refugees to Europe and rather tackle the influx of people from Idlib (Gulftimes, 2020). With the same token, Presidential Spokesperson İbrahim Kalın’s striking declaration became even sharper during the case at Pazarkule reminding the Union that it had to share the burden and not turn blind eye on increasing number of Syrian refugees in Turkey (Kalın, 2020). According to Mandıracı, high-level Brussels-Ankara talks started because EU had fear of a repeat of the 2015-2016 migration crisis (Mandıracı, 2020).

Apparently, Turkish authorities claimed that they hadn’t received a positive response from the EU in two main areas. First, the EU discouraged Turkey in the operation Spring Peace by claiming this operation would lead a new wave of IDPs and refugees with a potential to increase security threats linked to ISIL/Daesh (Stanicek, 2019). In this regard, Erdogan’s demand had been related Turkey’s presence in Syria: “If European countries want to solve the problem, then they need to support the political and humanitarian solutions proposed by Turkey in Syria” (Hürriyetdailynews, 2020). Second, Turkish authorities argued that the EU did not fulfil the 2016 Statement that stipulated the EU’s payment of six billion Euros to Turkey for hosting Syrian refugees. Erdogan complained that the EU failed to stick to requirements of the Agreement and meet those expectations of Turkey for a fair sharing of burden and responsibilities regarding Syrian refugees in Turkey (Erdogan, 2020c). In the very first days of the case, Turkish officials pointed the EU rather than specifically mentioning Greece. President Erdogan (2020b) stated as follows:

“……Every European country that closes its borders to refugees and seeks to send them back by beating them or sinking their boats or even by shooting them is violating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”

When it comes to Greece, it seems that it prioritized the EU than tackling the Pazarkule case at bilateral level with Turkey. Arrival of the top leaders of the EU in a couple of days after the eruption of case at Pazarkule to the Kastanies Border Point and their common press conference on 4 March 2020 in this small border village was a clear and robust message of the EU not only to Turkey but to Greeks, Europeans and to the whole world: Greece was not alone in the struggle regarding any kind of individual or collective crossing of irregular migrants not only at the Pazarkule-Kastanies Border region but across all land and sea borders.
of the country with Turkey. Put it differently, the EU was in full solidarity and determination with Greece’s struggle to protect its own and external borders of the Union.\(^7\)

For the purpose of this research, it is useful to underline that the Greek Minister of Migration and Asylum defined this visit from the highest representative level of the EU as a display of “active support” of the Union to Greece that hadn’t happened before. For him, Greece demanded endorsement from the EU. Nevertheless, it also moved independently by fortifying its borders. Regardless of any increase in EU support, the responsibility to safeguard its borders was an issue belonging to Greece first and foremost (Mitarakis, 2020; Mitarakis, 2020c). Mitsotakis would also highlight this triangular relation on this particular case and provide a clear message to its eastern neighbour: If Turkey wanted the re-evaluation the EU-Turkey deal, then, she needed to evacuate those people from the Evros Border line first, stop encouraging them from entry to Greece and accept back those who had already crossed the borders. (Mitsotakis, 2020d).

Debates and reciprocal statements of Turkish and Greek officials about the case we analysed here in detail would fade away from mid-March and onwards by declaration of the first death case based on Covid 19 pandemic in Greece on 12th of March, 2020. Similarly, almost a week later the first Covid-19 case would be reported in Turkey as well. From that time and onwards, officials of both countries would in fact keep referring to what had happened at the Kastanies-Pazarkule Border earlier but with lesser emphasis since the pandemic would constitute to be the number one topic at the Greek and Turkish public opinion, politics and media.

For the main purpose of this study, it is imperative to note that from the beginning of the controversy between the two countries at the Pazarkule-Kastanies Border unit as of this day, statements of many high ranking Greek officials outspoken about matters at the Greek-Turkish border have also included messages of mutual cooperation with Turkey. Nevertheless, almost all of them have overtly been refusing and condemning the then general attitude of the Turkish officials, the Turkish President first and foremost, which constituted an “asymmetrical threat” to Greece by using desperate people as “pawns” for Turkey’s own “geostategic purposes” so as to divert the attention of the Turkish people from Idlib to Pazarkule.\(^8\)

**Concluding Remarks**

After the first coronavirus case was discovered in Turkey, the gathering of thousands of irregular migrants around Pazarkule and its surroundings were re-evaluated by Turkish officials. On the 26\(^{th}\) of March, the region was completely evacuated and refugees were sent to other cities.\(^9\) However, Soylu’s statement a day after indicates that 27 March may not mean the end of this short, yet robust, story analysed here in detail. In other words, Edirne is still quite vulnerable to any new case in the triadic nexus of Turkey, Greece and the EU: “...nobody should feel comfortable about this. When this pandemic is over, we are not going to say no anybody who wants to go to Pazarkule” (Soylu, 2020d).

\(^7\) For the full statements of all four leaders, Charles Michel, Ursula von der Leyen, David Sassoli and Kostas Mitsotakis see Mitsotakis (2020).

\(^8\) For instance, see the statement of the Greek Spokesperson Stelios Petsas (2020). For a more recent reference by the Greek Minister of Migration and Asylum on 26 August 2020, see Mitarakis (2020a).

\(^9\) According to Ministry of Interior, 5800 refugees were sent to removal centres in 9 cities (Soylu, 2020d).
Following on from the literature showing the connections between foreign policy priorities and international migration, this paper indicated that both countries had foreign policy expectations which had great impact on their official responses towards refugees. In fact, as Tolay (2012:137) emphasised in her research “migration and foreign policy concerns have become closely entangled”, this is also valid for Greece where the literature taking foreign policy and Greece’s migration policy link remains limited. When we take a look at the key figures during the Pazarkule case, the most sensational declarations came from Soylu in Turkey, Mitsotakis and Mitarakis in Greece. Soylu, the Minister of Interior, was the highest authority who visited Edirne and delivered messages to counterparts while it was primarily the Greek Prime Minister and the Minister of Migration and Asylum for the Greek side visiting Kastanies. Their reciprocal statements, allegations and accusation on this particular case paved the way to understand better how both sides perceived and interpreted this particular case elaborated in this research.

Although, the Pazarkule event took place on the borderline between Greece and Turkey, the case had a multilateral feature more than a bilateral one. Both Greece and Turkey opted for internationalization of the issue and tried to convince the EU to meet their expectations. Greece and Turkey took a stand during the case which underscored their importance for the future of the EU. Both countries emphasised that the EU should deal with them and meet their expectations if a refugee movement inside the union is not demanded from Brussels. While Turkey expected concrete support from the EU over its struggle in Syria, Greek authorities demanded EU forces to protect its border and contain refugees outside of the Greek land. Nevertheless, the common point in their expectations from the EU was tacit financial expectations. Both Greece and Turkey gave signals regarding this matter by emphasising the importance of their geostrategic position for the EU. In this respect, Turkey emphasised the necessity of full implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement whilst Greece clearly expressed that the EU needs to support Greece as the gatekeeper of the EU in both political and economic ways. In order to achieve these foreign policy goals, both countries didn’t refrain from incriminating each other in terms of giving false information regarding the situation on the borderline.

In fact, the coronavirus pandemic did fade the hopes of refugees reaching the EU soil. Many of them were eventually sent to the cities they came from. However, as of June 2021, Greece hasn’t opened its Kastanies Border yet so any border crossing hasn’t been possible since March 2020. In fact, the Pazarkule case has once more shown that refugees are still one of those most vulnerable groups and foreign policy concerns of states come first when the migration issue is on their agenda. What’s more is that international agreements such as the 1951 Geneva Convention and European Human Rights Convention stay rather inefficient to motivate states to provide protection for those people. Thus, this case warns three parties that Turkey, Greece and the EU should collaborate more and find concrete solutions for those issues regarding migration.
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