Technical Object, Baby Mimesis, and Affective Scaffolding

Maria A. Impedovo1

Abstract

Posthumanism perspectives see the relationship between humans and technology in inter-connected ways exploring cognition, perception, and awareness co-developmental implications with technology. This article focuses on the interplay between technical objects and the baby niche of development. Two main concepts will guide the discussion: posthuman mimesis and the affective dimension as a possible regulative mediator for object-subject relationships. The broad research question is: How do babies deal with increasingly complex technology daily? Which regulative role does mimesis and affective scaffolding play in regulating babies—technical objects relationship? Considering the two main concepts of baby mimesis and affective scaffolding, I discuss two examples of two babies (one boy and one girl of about 1 year old) via a naturalistic observation of babies interacting with the smartphone. The baby’s niche becomes a mimetic and affective space where the interaction is enacted. The article questions the relationship with the technological in a subject and object dialectic in a time of digital, social, technological, and economic significative transformation.

Keywords: Technology; Screen; Baby; Mimesis; Affective Scaffolding

Introduction

Human ways of living in the Anthropocene, the interactions with drones, big data, artificial intelligence, and robots open new ethical issues and raise new questions related and challenges, like genetic privacy, technological addiction, environmental sustainability, power and equity. The cumulative complexity of today technologies brings out some general reflections on the implications for current and future human development. Posthuman theorists consider that the notion of “the human” requires urgent redefinition (Hayles, 2008) and open broader and interdisciplinary reflections. Posthumanist perspectives allow seeing the relationship between humans and technology in inter-connected ways exploring cognition, perception, and awareness attentive to co-developmental implications with technology. Digital revolution developments are interpreted as externalization, understood as an extension of our body’s capacities through technology (Leroi-Gourhan, 1993). Simultaneously, there is a complementary reflection based on tracking the internalization or incorporation of technology. The medium or techno-prosthesis tends to be integrated into the human body: the organs of our body (e.g., our retinas or our skin) could also become “quasi-prostheses,” namely as kinds of adjunct components of technological artefacts. This mix is headed toward an indefinite cyborg entity (Ferrando, 2013).

Current and emergent technology is oriented to develop practical applications and model human cognition simultaneously. In that case, technology is reshaping the micro-ecologies of

1 Maria A. Impedovo, Aix-Marseille University- ADEF, France. E-mail: aimpedovo@gmail.com.
developing, becoming a part of it. For example, social robotics is an exciting field to observe educational and social transformation (Hasse, 2020). Considering that social robots have a physical body, new possible social and material reconfiguration interactions emerge into the robots’ interactions. At the same time, social robotics is conceived as a testing platform for theoretical models of human cognitive abilities. So, emergent technologies—like virtual reality, augmented reality or robotics, have potential impacts and enable reconfiguration of social interaction in everyday situations.

The following paper focuses on the interplay between technical objects and the baby niche of development. Contemporary babies are already immersed from birth in a material culture whose objects are part of everyday activities (Impedovo & Tebet, 2019). However, how they interact with it is still under exploration (Gillen & Kucirkova, 2018). Two main concepts will guide the discussion: posthuman mimesis and the affective dimension of mimesis as a possible regulative mediator for the object and subject relationship. Invoked initially to define humans as the “most imitative” animals in classical antiquity, mimesis (imitation) has recently come to the centre of theoretical debates in interdisciplinary perspectives (Lawtoo, 2019), including now posthuman studies. The broad research question is: How do babies deal with increasingly complex technology daily? Which regulative role have mimesis and affective scaffolding regulated babies—technical objects relationship? The study goes into the direction to question the relationship with the technological in a subject and object dialectic in a time of digital, social, technological, and economic significative transformation.

The technical objects will be discussed in the first sections, focusing on Simondon and individualization. Considering the relevant role of smartphones or the touching screen of a digital tablet in the development niches, we develop the idea of the baby as mimetic and the possible role of posthuman mimesis on the mediation with technology, with a specific focus on the haptic mimesis for Meaning-making. To stress the emotional side of these interactions, we also introduce the concept of affective scaffolding as a further regulator. Considering the two main concepts of posthuman mimesis and affective scaffolding, two examples are proposed by a naturalistic observation of babies interacting with technologies.

Technical Objects

Artefacts condense the signs of the historical and cultural context in which they are created. They are continuously recreated, making the culture a system of accumulation where we join (Impedovo, Andreucci & Ginestić, 2015). The “revolution” introduced by Vygotsky (1978) was to break the behaviourism chain, which considered the direct connection between Subject and Object. Indeed, the artefact was introduced as a mediating element, even a psychological tool, more oriented to expanding the scope of psychological processes and making cognitive development possible. The interaction between people and tools forces the use of the artefacts, leading to a reciprocal influence—in the slow and cumulative technological development of humanity at work (Di Gironimo, 2011):

It is not only the subjects that do something with the things; the Things also do something with the subjects. To make it clear that, on the one hand—in line with the objectification concept—human subjectivity and agency are materialized in the object. On the other hand, the materiality of the object can release an independent power and efficacy, propose to conceptualize the created objects as materialized action (Schraube, 2009, 300).
Recently, the material culture has received new attention from the mainstream traditions, reconsidering the necessity to re-turn on critical theoretical reflections. The dualism that splits the cognitive and the social domains into two separate developments is more and more questioned, evoking a new unity. Overcoming a duality as human and nonhuman actors, we find a nature-culture (Latour, 2003) in a continuous negotiation. Philosophers like Merleau-Ponty stress the idea of experience as a relational nexus between a subject and the world. The experiences are unfolding, and not can be conceptualized as an a priori:

The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject that is nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world that the subject itself projects (Merleau-Ponty, 2002[1962], 499-500).

We can see how recent discussions tend to go from a unified perspective: “objects emerge in the relations rather than having proprieties sui generis” (Suchman, 2005, 381). Enactivist theories invoke the role of the practical engagement of an actor with the world as fundamental to the experience. The enactivist perspective emphasizes an organism’s dynamic, autopoietic self-organization relative to the environment. The auto-poietic process of embodied self-organization is embedded into the situational environment with which the organism is engaged (Thompson & Varela, 2001). Different significant contributions are developed concerning expanding the perspectives beyond a duality between subject and reality. Under distributed cognition theory, while carrying out an activity, people project structures of intentionality onto the context, which thus becomes an integral part of human thought and action (Hollan et al., 2000). However, tensions and ambiguities still exist in understanding the individual and collective articulation (Wrbouschek & Slunecko, 2021).

**Simondon: technical object and individualization**

Interesting reflections about the interaction between technical objects and subjects were developed in the French thinker Simondon, deeply influenced by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Also, some influences of Bergson and Deleuze could be retraced. His more cited work is *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects* (1958). The attention on the technical objects becomes interesting in the French discussion for a more conscious relationship with the expanding technological development, bringing out the importance of establishing sense-making processes and problem-solving based on technical knowledge to allow people to make more informed choices regarding technological issues. An object is characterized as technical from the moment it brings a technique. In other words, a technical object brings an action that is traditionally effective and with a considerable physical effect. The material nature of the object integrates a human intention of manufacture, carrying the goal for which it was designed. Simondon, today, is still well considered in the French Accademia discussion about technological education. For example, the reflections are further elaborated by the French researcher Beguin & Rabardel (2000) with the theory of instrumental genesis: the instrument is constructed through an instrumental genesis, a process of appropriation during which a bilateral relationship between the tool and the subject is established.

Simondon’s acclaimed work on the technical object is followed by a second work titled *Individuation in Light of the Notions of Form and Information* (1964). Only recently, the individualization theory acquired more acclamation in the English literature—indeed, this second book was translated into English recently in 2020. The central topic is the ontogenesis process by which a particular individual emerges relative to their associated milieu. The
process of becoming becomes a relational emergent phenomenon: individuality is the always preliminary and never entirely achievable result of a process of individuation. The individualization is an open process of transformation, situating the individual in its presumed full concreteness. The creative forces drive the individualization process in a strong material emphasis. Simondon’s term for the unfolding being is the individual, where ongoing trajectories contribute to a potential being sui generis. This stage is a lived experience full of sensitivity but also of tension that wishes to be resolved:

Individuation must therefore be thought of as a partial and relative resolution manifested in a system that contains latent potentials and harbours a specific incompatibility with itself, an incompatibility due at once to forces in tension as well as to the impossibility of interaction between terms of extremely disparate dimensions. (Simondon, 1964, 300)

This citation shows that the double articulation between preindividual and individual leads to a new configuration. There is an impossible separation between the individual and the environment in the base. He reports the example of the production of a brick as not a synthesis of two opposing and distinct elements: the form is always already implicated in the refinement of the clay, and the clay is always already involved in the mould. Like the brick and the clay-mould relation, the individuated being and environment are always already paired to one another. At the same time, the milieu itself also becomes into being as it is associated with the individuated being. Simondon articulated the human experience through psychic and collective individuation.

This author brings new reflections, and it is particularly interesting to analyze the babies’ relations in the development environment. For this, analyzing the baby in the daily life environment, always fuller of technical objects, means going into the shell of the individualization process:

The newborn cannot distinguish between himself and his environment; slowly, specific areas, for instance, those connected with eating, take on a specific character, became more and more differentiated; the parts of his own body became differentiated from each other, and the rest of the world; social relations develop and became differentiated; needs, emotions, language go through a similar process of differentiation (Lewin, 1942, 226).

In this strict correlation between babies and the environment, the development niche became a crescent level of technological accumulation. The niche—made of persons, animals and objects—is gradually discovered by the active engagement of babies, which started to give meaning to themselves and the other humans and objects. The babies unfold and create meaning-making of them and the environment mutually with the objects, resulting from a possible intra-action between the bodies acting in the niche. In the following, we develop the idea of the baby as mimetic and the possible role of baby mimesis on the mediation with technology.

**Baby mimesis into the technological niche**

In the following, we explore mimesis’s role in this agentic and mutual process of mean-making with the technical objects into the development niche. Indeed, in classical antiquity, humans were invoked as the “most imitative” animals:
Imitation is inherent in man from infancy (and in this man differs from the other animals in being the most inclined to imitate and in obtaining by imitation the fundamental notions). In obtaining by imitation the fundamental notions ... all derive pleasure from imitations ... we are naturally possessed of the capacity to imitate’ (Aristotle, 4, 1448b 5-10).

The centrality of imitation in newborns has been investigated since the 1970s (Hurley & Chater, 2005). Andrew Meltzoff (2009) shows how the ability to emulate is found at birth—recording it after 42 minutes. Considering this, Byrne (2005) express that “imitation is magic.” Tomasello (2003) shows the imitation that does not refer to any immediate advantage.

This factor would explain the shift where imitation is the social and not the individual, although the two dimensions inexorably interact. One possible definition is: “Imitation is designated in all the instances when infants show the same behaviour a model has performed in front of them, and as a consequence of the particular action the model has performed (and not as a consequence of any other behaviour)” (Paulus, 2011, 850). Considering the development studies, babies are made to learn, through imitation, what the culture requires of them (Bruner, 1966).

Today, humanities, social sciences, and neurosciences question mimesis (imitation) for theoretical debates. The role of mimicry, identification, contagion, and mirror neurons in the formation of subjectivity shows the topic’s new interest today. For example, Lawtoo (2019; 2020) promotes a transdisciplinary “mimetic turn” developing a new perspective on homo mimeticus. He introduces three concepts:

- **mimetic pathos**, considering the humans are open to a plurality of mimetic effects that include but are not limited to desire;
- **mimetic unconscious**, where imitation often takes place involuntarily, automatically, below conscious awareness and is in this immanent and embodied sense un-conscious;
- **or as hypermimesis in the digital age**, as a simulation with the power to retroact, via a feedback loop, on a homo mimetics that is already posthuman

The evolution of technologies gradually shapes the interaction between humans and technical objects. One evident example is the smartphone and the touching screen of a digital tablet. The exchange becomes an embodied interaction. For this, we focus on haptic mimesis for mean-making with screens.

### Haptic mimesis for mean-making

Adopting the “intuitionism haptocentrism” (Derrida, 2000), haptic is a word that could be privileged to tactile since it does not oppose two sense organs. Still, it suggests that the eye can itself have this, not optical function (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980, 614). It could be considered a form of imitation that does not require visual/cognitive mediation and operates unconsciously. Haptic mimesis explores the babies’ mediation with the technical object, particularly the interaction with screens.
Between the technology, touch technologies are in dialectical discussion with the visual paradigm. Parisi (2020) refers to a “tactile modernity” since the 19th century: indeed, today’s touch technologies provide an authentic form of embodied experience against the visual paradigm. The notion of interface refers to bringing heterogeneous environments into contact. The interface, as a surface, is touched and, considering the content and the sensory and emotional activation, touch. Touching is here considered “between” of the interface as the “stretching out [distension] and distance opened by the singular as such, as its spacing of meaning” (Nancy, 2000, 5; Nancy, & Lawtoo, 2021). The notion of interface refers to translation operations of bringing heterogeneous environments into contact. It evokes both communication and the transformative processes necessary for successful transmission (Levy, 1990, 199). In this perspective, interfaces do not “overlap”; they are interconnected, and they condition the message, the information transmitted the interaction; they translate and induce new uses and meanings. The philosopher Nancy (2008, 87) developed an interesting perspective about touching as contact and reduced distances: “Tact isn’t concentrated, as does Cartesian touch the privilege of an immediacy that would fuse all senses and sense. Touching, to begin with is also local, modal, fractal.” The experience of touch involves a sensation of something, which belongs to a particular field: “it is a thought subordinated to a certain field, and this is what is called a sense” (Merleau-Ponty & Smith, 1962, 251-252). Contact is beyond fullness and emptiness, connection and disconnection, extended to the social and affective around, as well expressed in this classic example of the relationship between the blind man and the stick: The blind man’s stick has ceased to be an object for him, and is no longer perceived for itself; its point has become an area of sensitivity, extending the scope and active radius of touch, and providing a parallel to sight (Merleau-Ponty & Smith, 1962, 165).

The link between mimesis and touch is fascinating in the infants and babies’ interactions with the objects, like when their verbal expression is still not fully developed. This gives us the opportunities to stress the non-visual dimension of mimesis, what Nancy calls “methexis.” The link between mimesis and touch is possible to retry also through the reflections of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe (1981), attentive to the “plastic” constitution of the subject (see Lawtoo, 2017) that resonates with the Simondon example of clay and the plasticity of mimesis it entails.

The specifically haptic dimension of new technologies could be evidence for babies active in their process of mean-making. By mimesis is active when they finally have a screen in their hand. The screen could be a space of action to test, understand, and conquer—in the identical way of the physical room of the living room, where they move all-around to discover in full detail. The active exploration is done by pointing, zooming and expanding with the fingers on the screen. So, new technologies’ species of the haptic dimension see the link with the research on mirror neurons now central to posthuman studies (Rizzolatti et al., 1996). To stress the emotional side of these interactions, we also introduce the concept of affective scaffolding as a further regulator.

**Affective scaffolding for the emotional regulation**

We introduce the notion of “affective scaffolding” here adopted as a possible mediator for the emotional side of interaction with the technology. The concept was proposed by Griffiths and Scarantino (2005) in the paper “Emotions in the wild” to understand emotions as both social and intersubjective phenomena. It is proposed as an example of “situated affectivity”:
the environment influences and is influenced by the unfolding of emotions, constantly reframing the relationships and offering action possibilities in the form of emotions. Affective scaffoldings are those resources that contribute to affective regulation if integrated into structured and repeated interaction practices. Here is adopted the definition of Candiotto and Dreon (2021, 3), “Affective scaffolding is a unique hermeneutical tool that plays a fundamental role in drawing attention to the continuous and recursive interactions with the environment shaping affectivity.”

Krueger (2015) proposes three distinctions:

- the embodied affective scaffoldings; in which the affective experience is regulated by a range of physical processes distributed throughout our bodies, like digestion;
- social, affective scaffoldings, in which socially distributed feedback loops regulate the affective dynamics of individuals and groups like family dinner;
- and material affective scaffoldings, in which affectivity is regulated by the material culture that is made up of particular objects and environments like a wedding dress.

The affective habit incorporation is detected primarily in the body. Recently, Candiotto and Dreon (2021) stressed the role of habits in the affective scaffolding to shape the interactions. Considering the two main concepts of mimesis and affective scaffolding, two examples are proposed by a naturalistic observation of babies interacting with technologies.

**Two illustrative examples**

The following sections consider two natural observations collected in a familiar setting. A 1-year-old baby (Mark) is with her mother and 65-year-old grandmother in the first case. In the second case, the 14 months-old baby (Nina) is in the house with her 65-year-old grandmother and a five-year-old brother. In both cases, the babies were still in a pre-linguistic phase.

A non-anthropocentric methodology is proposed, linking sense-making to the contextualized experience of the body-environment system (Hultman & Lenz Taguchi, 2010). The connections and interdependencies of semiotic and material action could offer mimetic and affective regulation access.

**Mark: Haptic mimesis and affective regulation in action**

Going inside the niche of infant development with new technology and technical objects, a great example of an object suitable for children’s technological and technical development is the smartphone. Daily, we experience the baby’s intention to touch and desire the caregivers’ phone, with scientific literature focused on parental interaction (Knitter & Zemp, 2020).

In Figure 1, the baby Mark performs and imitates the adult gesture of touching the screen. The interaction, mechanical between the 1-year-old baby and the iPhone, is regulated to the grandmother.

**Figure 1 (a, b,c,d).** The 1- years-old baby with a smartphone
In Figures 1a and b, the baby Mark performs the gesture of touching the smartphone screen in a kind of haptic imitation of adult touching. The interaction between the baby and the smartphone is by the grandmother. She is watching the baby’s actions inexpressive, but suddenly she interrupts the baby’s free explorative actions. Her reaction is due mainly to the concern of Mark’s mother. In Figure 1c, the grandmother is solicited to the baby’s mother apprehension near to them, which is driving so cannot intervene directly but ask to check the baby actions (Mother: “look to the baby!” The grandmother replies: “Now I give him another object in his hand like this.”) After some seconds, finally, she decided to take off the mobile phone from the baby’s hand, as in Figure 1d (“to grandma, give it to me!”), eliciting a reaction of annoyance from the child at the change.

These illustrative examples show the possible baby’s individuation regulated by mimes and affective scaffolding. The recurrent pattern between mimes and affective scaffolding is stressed in the following second illustrative example of Nina.
Nina: Circularity between haptic mimesis and affective regulation

Nina interacts with the smartphone on the grandmother’s legs in this episode. The grandmother and Nina’s brother are watching a cartoon on television. The transcription of the sequence is in Table 1, and the pictures inside:

Table 1. The 14 months-old babies with the smartphone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Body and the screen position</th>
<th>Linguistic exchange</th>
<th>Figure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00:03</td>
<td>Nina touches the screen alone</td>
<td>GM watch the television</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00:11</td>
<td>Nina scrolls the news and touches the screen</td>
<td>Brother: “Is this evening that Santa Claus will come?”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GM: “In the night. Tomorrow morning.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00:45</td>
<td>Nina calls for attention without moving her to look</td>
<td>GM: “What do you want to see?”</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>from the screen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00:47</td>
<td>Nina scrolls through the post</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint attention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00:49</td>
<td>Grandmother puts her hand on the screen, and Nina</td>
<td>GM: “Ale?”</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>looks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00:50</td>
<td>Nina moves her finger in the air; joint attention,</td>
<td>GM: “The princess of Spain teaches us how to wear hats.”</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>grandmother scrolls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01:09</td>
<td>Grandmother continues to scroll</td>
<td>Brother talks watching the TV screen about the movie</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01:26</td>
<td>Nina put down her finger on grandmother's hand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GM, reading on the smartphone the news: “That little girl has had a malformation since she was born. Gianluca shows her daughter that she will be operated on for the first time.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01:45</td>
<td>Nina took the phone from her grandmother’s hand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The grandmother puts her hand below to protect the phone. The grandmother moves to watch the TV screen.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01:46</td>
<td>Grandmother moves to watch the TV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01:47</td>
<td>Nina scrolls the posts news. The grandmother puts her hand below to protect the phone. The grandmother moves to watch the TV screen.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02:07</td>
<td>Nina calls for the attention of the grandmother</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nina: “ehhhh.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02:09</td>
<td>Grandmother kisses the baby forehead</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02:11</td>
<td>She watches the grandmother. The grandmother turns to see the TV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this example, we can grasp the circularity between haptic mimesis and affective regulation. The redundancy to touch the smartphone as mimetic actions are alternate with an affective interaction with the caregiver. Here is the possible model as a recursive patter between mimesis and effective regulation:

- Babies’ free exploration of the technical object, acting haptic mimesis.
- The intersubjective interactions calling, opening the haptic mimesis with the affective scaffolding;
- Join attention for mutual interactions on the technical object;
- Model activities on the technical object by the caregiver.
In this niche, the interaction between the grandmother, Nina, and the smartphone screen opens onto the external social and technological environment, as shown by the screen television watched by the brother. Indeed, the brothers recall the grandmother’s attention verbally (and Nina) involved them in watching the movie. At the brother verbal call, Nina reacts quickly with a sound as a reply to him and look at the screen television, which asks the attention of all.

A multiactivity is in the act in the social and technical niche: the grandmother focus is equally distributed between the two grandsons and the two screens of smartphone and television; the brother to the television screen and the grandmother directly and Nina indirectly; the Nina to directly the smartphone and grandmother and, as second focus, on the television screen and brother. Banby mimesis and affective regulation are acted on the different levels of the socio-technical network.

**Discussion and conclusion**

This article has tried to deal with the topic in the mimetic turn in posthuman studies: the role of baby mimesis constitutive of interactions with touch screens that no longer operate on the traditional model of mimesis as visual representation, but, rather, with an embodied posthuman mimesis that generates haptic and affective processes internal to babies’ individuation. This liminal analysis started by observing changes in the relationship between babies and screens. Many examples are possible in the daily life observation of baby life in their context: home, the ear, the day-care, or in the nature still the technical and technological dimension is quickly found.

The first and second illustrative examples show, between the many possible examples of babies’ interaction with technologies- that the developmental niche is embedded in a social and cultural environment that shapes the interactive meaning-making dynamic. The two examples show that what was (mimetically) produced through the intra-action of the two bodies (screen and baby) is open to affective scaffolding to be regulated. The intersubjectivity - also with nonhumans - became enactive (Fuchs & De Jaegher, 2009) based on the coordinated moment-to-moment interaction of embodied agents and the agents’ experience of this process. So, new rhizomatic possibilities and human-tech hybridity (Duus et al., 2018) are recursively shaped between babies, technical objects and social interactions. Retaking the metaphor of the brick and the clay-mould relation proposed by Simondon (1964), the milieu itself is transformed, adapted. Simondon conceives brick-making as a meeting between two’ heterogeneous domains. A mediation is retraced between the two-converging series of becoming between the object and the subject: the intra-action is mutually active. This is a mimetic figuration Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe calls “typography.” Since its origins go back to Plato, this genealogy is constitutive of the mimetic turn or re-turn now informing the mimetic turn as well. Here, it is stressed how the niche itself becomes a mimetic and affective space where the interaction is enacted. That mimesis is not only about representation or hyperreal simulation but also about mimetic enactment. The two are related via hypermimetic loops. The link between mimesis and individuation could be helpful to explore better the exploration and mean-making of the babies in their specialized niche.

As we have seen, the affective activation is expressed and regulated by the interaction with the caregivers. The affective side of the babies and technologies interaction is stressed with affective scaffolding, which the caregivers could initiate, like when the grandmother removed
the screen to Mark because of “too much” exposition to the magic smartphone. The affective activation could be requested activity by the babies, like Nina that search the grandmother “caring” attention to continue her courageous exploration on the news scrolling: after a touch like a kiss, a look, or a verbal remark, she is ready to continue her bold autonomous exploration. However, we can also argue that the baby’s relation to the smartphone is already a mimetic relationship with simulations aiming to replace or supplement caregiver care. Indeed, if the babies desire the screen is also because embedded the projected desire of the caregiver to use it and care (too much!) about it—like in Figures 9 and 10 when the grandmother put her hand under the smartphone to protect the cell from the Nina. Also, the content of simulation and the senses they mobilize—touch but also sound—could enter in the play into the mimetic experiences. In Table 1-Figure 3, the grandmother asks Nina, “What do you want to see?” Then, she asks about “Ale?” referring to a cuisine video that Nina likes to see. And right after, the grandmother continued to something that interested her but shared aloud with her: “The princess of Spain teaches us how to wear hats.” The technologies, in this sense, can foster the caring process, embedding the caregivers’ affection and giving an attractive virtual recursive space were to act taught the mimetic process. This, of course, does not mean that technology can replace parenting in the process of individuation, if only because it misses the importance of embodiment (Hayles, 2000). Theoretically, the hidden point here is the reference to the desire. We can retrace the micro-genesis of the desire (Salvatore, 2016) in the background of Nina touching: she touches in a mimetic and noncognitive unconscious (Lawtoo, 2013).

As a starting point for further reflection, we can observe how the screen started to be incorporated in the body techno-prosthesis, as in some implemented skill devise. More, we stare to deal with the complete disappearance of the screen (Manovich, 2002). Consequently, we started to learn new modalities to interact with the invisible screen, like when we can open the hand for a “five” to activate the photo camera in some smartphones—a gesture that you cannot guess and recognize the first time if you are not aware of this technology. Yet, we can further ask: Which engagement about possible individualization, developmental, and learning differences due to the exposure and use of emergent technologies? Which haptic mimetics will be possible with a fully transparent and not visible screen? Which kind of emergent haptic mimesis literacy and affective scaffolding do we need to reduce possible gaps in the emergent technology interactions? In conclusion, considering the extended use of the baby’s interactions with emergent technology, the mimetic dimension is worthy of exploring to support and deal with future forms of digital inequality.

References


https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354310395990
https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354320943294