Abstract

The Russo-Ukrainian War, which had erupted in 2014, was further escalated on February 24, 2022, when Russia launched an all-out invasion of Ukraine. In order to preserve Russia’s national security and punish the Ukrainian government for the ethnic crimes it committed against the Russian ethnicity in Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin personally supervises this concentrated operation. This paper deals with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and links it to the Taiwan issue, which may, but is very unlikely, turn into a second Ukrainian. The study is mainly based on secondary sources since this topic is still recent and there is not much literature yet. The study concluded that the Sinoc-Taiwanese reality is different geographically, politically and legally from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, and the paper strongly suggests that we may witness in the coming years the reunification of Taiwan.

Keywords: Russo-Ukrainian War; China; Taiwan; East Asia; NATO; National Security

Introduction

As part of its post-Cold War European security structure, Russia began a military campaign against Ukraine on 24 February 2022; it also annexed Crimea and another Russo-Ukrainian War happened in 2014. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia displayed signs of collaboration with the West, such as joining the NATO Partnership for Peace and the NATO–Russia Council. In exchange for the transfer of its Soviet-made nuclear weapons to Russia in 1994, Ukraine signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Russia’s actions against Ukraine have had significant economic and diplomatic ramifications.

Recently political analysts and military strategists raised the issue of Taiwan, and if a scenario similar to Russo-Ukrainian War may happen. This paper aims to discover and explore China-Taiwan and predicts its future. The Taiwanese issue is one of the most controversial in the world today. In late 1949, the CPC defeated the Chinese Nationalist (KMT) parties on the mainland, ushering in a new era. Taiwan, a Chinese province, provided a shelter for the KMT and its leadership when they left the People’s Republic of China (PRC). One of the key goals of China’s communist revolution was to “liberate all China and overthrow the Chiang dynasty.”

As a result, the CPC wanted Taiwan free of KMT rule. Taiwan’s KMT was also keen to counterattack and recapture territory lost during the Cultural Revolution. So the revolution spread over the Taiwan Strait, causing high tensions and brutal confrontation between the two sides, each seeking to acquire the other forcibly. For almost two decades, no major
military conflict happened due to both internal and foreign factors, such as the PRC’s engagement in the Korean War and the US deployment of its Seventh Fleet to Taiwan Strait. Up until the 1970s, both factions claimed to be China’s sole legitimate government and planned to capture control of the other. Their rhetoric shifted somewhat, focusing on reunion rather than military confrontation and intimidation. After Taiwan was removed as China’s UN representative, the PRC restored diplomatic relations with the US, Japan, and other governments, further isolating Taiwan from the international community.

The signing of the three Joint Communiqués and the passing of the Taiwan Relations Act by the US Congress ushered in a new era of peaceful coexistence and competition. It seems that both sides were striving toward a peaceful resolution and eventual reunification; even though Beijing claimed that it would never give up the possibility of capturing Taiwan by force. A series of unofficial meetings and conversations between the two administrations followed, paving the way for more formal discussions aiming at a long-term solution.

On the other side, official PRC-ROC connections did not improve, but grassroots ties grew significantly. Increased economic activity, cultural exchanges, Taiwanese trips to the mainland and people-to-people diplomacy has shaped and defined existing and future PRC-ROC ties for decades. Changes have occurred on both sides of the Strait since the end of the Cold War. All of these elements combined produce a new set of conditions.

In the previous century, the First and Second World Wars lasted four and six years, respectively. After nearly 50 years, the Cold War came to an end. Toward the end of the 1990s, a UN peacekeeping force reunited Germany, and both Koreas joined the UN. All of these events show that many previously insurmountable issues have been overcome. We are encouraged to believe that the half-century-old Taiwan issue will always be resolved. We must consider the anticipated future developments of the Taiwan issue, as well as the numerous conceivable conclusions and the most likely one. The study examines the circumstances that led to the current situation and recent developments that may have a significant impact on the Taiwan issue in the near future.

Policymakers in the US, EU, and NATO must comprehend the Russian government’s intentions and decisions while dealing with the Ukraine crisis and future post-Soviet issues. The Russian minority presence in Central and Eastern European NATO countries is a serious issue for concern. The situation has refocused attention on NATO’s capacity to sustain collective defence. The Allies have acknowledged Russia’s strong revisionism.

This paper examines the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and its potential relationship to the Taiwan issue. The author argues that the situation in Taiwan is different from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and suggests that Taiwan may see reunification in the near future. The study is based on secondary sources and is one of the first to address this recent event. The main argument of this paper is that the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which was orchestrated by President Vladimir Putin to preserve Russia’s national security and punish Ukraine for alleged ethnic crimes, is potentially linked to the Taiwan issue. The study, which is based on secondary sources, concludes that the Sino-Taiwanese reality differs significantly.
from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict in terms of geography, politics, and legal issues. The paper suggests that the possibility of reunification for Taiwan in the coming years is unlikely.

This paper establishes its relevance in relation to the wider literature on the subject by providing appropriate references to previous studies on the Russo-Ukrainian War and the Taiwan issue. The paper situates its analysis within the existing discourse on these topics and provides a unique perspective by linking the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 to the Taiwan issue. It also acknowledges that the topic is still recent and that there is limited literature available, which justifies the use of secondary sources in the study. The paper’s conclusion that the Sino-Taiwanese reality is different from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and its suggestion that reunification in Taiwan may be unlikely in the coming years, adds to the ongoing conversation on these issues and provides valuable insight.

**Literature Review & Theoretical Overview**

In a nutshell, the powerful do what they can, while the weak must bear the brunt of their plight (Bosworth, 1993). This idea is shown by Russia’s use of hybrid warfare against its weaker sovereign neighbour. A classical realist must first understand human nature and the universe of competing interests or power conflicts in order to handle this issue. A human conflict can be brought on by a number of different factors.

Thomas Hobbes outlined three in his book Leviathan, published in 1651 (Hobbes, 2013: 79-80). Humanity is at war because of the anarchic international order in which all countries find themselves, a phrase that matches the situation. After citing fear, honor, and interest, Thucydides concludes that war is motivated by these three factors (Fleming, 2009). Sparta launched war on Athens in 431 B.C. out of “fear of their authority rising,” according to him (Ibid., 43, 49).

According to historian Martin Wight, every aggressor has a rationale for their actions. Fear is the driving force behind international politics because it is based on a logical anticipation of future damage. Because every power is concerned about its own safety, and the safety of the majority of powers is in risk (Wight, 1978: 138-9). Anarchy and the concept of security are the bedrock of structural realism. The neoclassical realism of International results may be explained by looking at the anarchic structure of state relations and how states are attempting to stay alive in it, just as classical realism.

Since the system is the fundamental analytical unit, Neorealism is challenged for its inability to predict individual state behaviour. The void is filled with nostalgia. Neoclassical realism, according to Jeffrey Taliaferro, forecasts governments’ grand plans, military doctrines, foreign economic policy, alliance preferences, and crisis behaviour in the long run. Instead of just structural variables, neoclassical realism includes explanatory elements at the unit level. Different results, including worldwide ramifications and particular state actions, are the focus of their explanations.

Defending and offensive realism are the two approaches of state survival in an anarchic environment. In an anarchic international system, it is not obvious if states are trying to increase their authority or retain it. Offensive realism’s basic assumption is that states aim to expand and strengthen their power regardless of whether or not they are under attack (Labs, 1997: 5). Eric Labs makes a distinction between state growth that is automated and state growth that is manual (Ibid. 12). When governments are given the opportunity to gain relative
power cheaply and easily, they expand automatically, but when nations intentionally pursue hegemony, as Nazi Germany attempted to do in Europe during WWII, they expand manually” (Ibid). It is “logical and sensible” for an anarchic international system to encourage “each bit of progress,” according to Labs (Ibid). Stronger governments, he argues, are more likely than weaker ones to seek out new territories for growth. No one knows why certain states have an automatic or manual tendency to expand their borders.

Defensive realism holds that states must preserve the status quo if they are to endure. As long as the status quo is threatened, the anarchic international system promotes countries to thrive (Labs, 1997: 9-11). Increasing the security of one state, according to Robert Jervis, usually results in a decline in the security of other states. It is possible for two countries to engage in security-seeking measures and end up spiralling into mutual animosity or violence, adds Taliaferro. Governments frequently support expansionist policies on the mistaken belief that aggression is the only way to guarantee national security. Because Russia would be safer in the event of a more Eastern-oriented Ukrainian state, defensive realism claimed that intervention in Ukraine would benefit Russia.

It is said that defensive and offensive realists both struggle to explain why some states choose stability while others desire greater relative power. An aggressive realist and defensive realist synthesis is sought, as is an integration of neoclassicism with neorealism. Revisionist and status quo interests are connected to unit-level variables. Revisionist nations, on the other hand, seek to “undermine the established order in order to obtain power and prestige inside the system,” according to Schweller’s analysis. Growth in non-security areas outweighs war’s costs (Schweller, 1997: 24). According to Schweller, nations are like jungle animals, with varying degrees of support for the status quo. Revisionist nations are represented by wolves, foxes, and jackals, whereas those that support the status quo are represented by lions, Owls, and Hawks (Ibid. 84-9).

According to Frederick Schuman, countries may pursue divergent goals for the following reasons: As soon as a state is humiliated, impeded or oppressed by a particular statue, it will want to replace it. It’s possible that people in satiated states appear to be “pacific.” Nations that are unsatisfied want to redistribute territory and power. When a state rejects these goals, it seems “aggressive” and lacking in love for peace (Frederick, 1948: 378-9).

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Putin labelled it “the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the century,” as recently as 2005. Defence realism Stephen Walt thinks that governments are concerned about security and will go to great lengths to protect their most important interests, especially those that are near to home. International law is often flaunted by big nations along their path. [Even when it’s just defensive], the struggle for dominance among major nations is never-ending” (Walt, 2014). American officials failed to discern between Western supremacy and its promotion, according to Walt.

When anti-government demonstrators in Kiev demanded doughnuts from US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland in December 2013, he used that as evidence (Ibid). While John McCain and Chris Murphy were in Ukraine, McCain told an anti-government crowd that he was there to support their “righteous cause” and that Ukraine’s “destiny belongs to Europe” (McCain, 2013). Putin claimed the Russian intervention was designed to improve security. If Ukraine joins NATO, this is not a joke but a real threat to the entire southern Russian region (Putin, 2014).
According to aggressive neorealist John Mearsheimer, Russian aggression against Ukraine was sparked by NATO and EU expansion and Western support for the pro-democracy Euromaidan movement (Mearsheimer, 2014). It was easy to foresee Putin’s reaction. Since “the West had been pressing into Russia’s backyard and compromising its major strategic interests,” he claims, it’s hardly surprising. In the words of Henry Kissinger, “Putin is a genuine strategist—on the basis of Russian history.” His understanding of American culture and psychology is limited. Americans also don’t do very well when it comes to understanding Russian history and psychology (Kissinger, 214).

Kissinger, Mearsheimer, and Walt argue that understanding Russia’s history and ambitions may help explain Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Tsarist and Soviet Russia both had areas of Russian influence. Great Game was played for influence in Caucasus, Iran, and Central Asia by the Russian Empire and the British Empire during most of the nineteenth century (Trenin, 2009). There had previously been two Afghan wars fought by the British, according to R.R. Palmer, Joel Colton, and Lloyd Kramer (Palmer et al. 2002: 648). In the 1870s, an Anglo-Russian deal gave Afghanistan a long tongue of land, dividing the Indian and Russian empires by 20 miles, which was ceded to Afghanistan.

Following another treaty between the two countries, British and Russian control of the Persian Empire was further divided in 1907. Post-Soviet Russia is engaged in a power struggle reminiscent of the tsarist and Soviet eras of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Dmitri Trenin believes Russia’s current goal is to become a full-fledged world power, one of a few of more or less equal actors in the twenty-first century global order. This view sees Russia’s ancient imperial regions as a source of power and protection against other superpowers at the same time (Ibid. 4). As Dmitri Medvedev described it when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, instead of establishing spheres of influence, Russia intended to maintain “special interest” zones (Kramer, 2008).

Realists have been chastised for failing to take into account the inner workings of governments. Realism is correct in emphasizing power, interests and coalition building […] but is incorrect in seeing just states as the irreducible atoms of power and interest to be appraised, argues Jack Snyder (1991). Russia’s decision to intervene in Ukraine may be better understood by looking at the internal dynamics of Russian politics. “In the calculations of national leaders, home pressures often transcend international ones,” says Snyder. He argues the NATO and EU expansion argument cannot explain Russia’s collaboration with the West from 2009 to 2012, while he served as U.S. Ambassador.

The only thing that could account for both outcomes is NATO expansion. It’s about what’s changed, which is Russian politics, that’s the actual story. In order to mobilize his followers and discredit the opposition, Putin recast the United States as an opponent. In order to retain his domestic legitimacy, Putin relied on the US as an adversary. The image of Putin as a cool, skilled KGB man has served him well, according to Stephen Sestanovich. The Ukraine crisis, on the other hand, demonstrated a new method to making decisions. The actions of Putin, motivated by self-interest, put Russia’s national interests at risk (Jureńczyk, 2022).

Another argument against state-level realism is the existence of a civilizational rift between Russian and Ukrainian national identities. “The civilizational fault line that divides Orthodox eastern Ukraine from Uniate western Ukraine” (Huntington, 1996: 37). To put it another way: for cultural reasons, a Ukrainian split would be more bloody but less bloody than a
Russia’s Intentions to Intervene in Ukraine

While many analysts assume Putin is Russia’s only decision-maker, this is not the reality (Bremmer & Charap, 2007: 83). We need to know who made the decision to intervene in Ukraine and who had an impact on it. While Weberian bureaucratic criteria such as what one knows are important, patrimonial criterion of who one knows is more important in filling government positions (Taylor, 2011: 27). The post-Soviet Russian bureaucracy, like the tsarist and Soviet bureaucracies, has been controlled by patrimonialism. Boris Yeltsin’s patronage structure allowed him to rise from obscurity in St. Petersburg in 1996 to Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Prime Minister, and then Interim President in 1999 (Ibid. 59).

The Russian president’s attention is being divided between the market-friendly liberals, the politically pragmatic technocrats, and the hard-line siloviki. Winston Churchill’s “bulldog fight under the carpet” analogy has been used to depict the Kremlin’s power conflicts among the Soviet elite. Many of Putin’s political appointments are siloviki since he is a product of both St. Petersburg and the intelligence apparatus (Ibid. 64). According to Bremmer and Charap, the siloviki clan is an “informal network of government officials and enterprises” that is based on common interests and views. There are many things they have in common, such as a strong state that dominates the economy, nationalization of vital industries like oil and gas, and support for Russian Orthodox nationalist ideas (Bremmer & Charap, 2007: 86).

It is also important to Russia’s siloviki, who believe that the United States and NATO are out to undermine Russian sovereignty and bring about its demise, that Russia recaptures its previous status as a global power, something that was lost during the Soviet period (Ibid). It is because Russia lacks conventional force projection capabilities that security analyst Pavel Baev recommends opportunism and pragmatism as essential elements of Russian foreign policy (Baev, 2004: 10). Vladimir Putin’s siloviki aren’t to blame for all of Russia’s current policies, according to Bremmer. “Putin, not his aides, makes the decisions.”

The rationale for a reality-based thinking assumes that governmental decision-makers are rational. To put it another way, when given a choice, actors want to reach a conclusion that maximizes the outcomes they desire (Walt, 1999: 10). It’s normal practice to look at possibilities, risks, costs, and benefits. For statesmen, “actual benefits like bases and ports, and intangible gains like pride and glory,” argues Fareed Zakaria, according to the Huffington Post (Zakaria, 1998: 20). The Russian oligarchs are always on the lookout for measures to restore their reputation and grandeur.

The research on Putin’s sanity is mixed. Alexander Motyl asserts that “no one understands Putin’s goals.” For reasons that aren’t fully understandable, it is probable that he will continue on his current course (Motyl, 2014). To Motyl, Putin is not an insane Eurasianist bent on ideological victory, as Lilia Shevtsova and Andrei Illarionov claim: It was a huge and amazing minor war that boosted Putin’s reputation among Russian hyper-nationalists, lost no lives, and occurred quickly and cheaply. Putin may argue that the price of becoming a rogue state was worth it for the sake of ‘Russian greatness’; while he agrees with the assessment that Putin is a “first-class strategist,” Mearsheimer disputes Merkel’s assertion that he is “in another universe” (Mearsheimer, 2014).
The activities of other statesmen shape the dynamic environment in which rational statesmen consider costs and benefits. The use of game theory in security studies is a key component in the application of formal rational choice theory. When the result of a choice is contingent on the actions of other participants, this collection of tools is useful. Russian leaders, like Vladimir Putin, are “satisficers” who “perpetually manipulate and gather power like masters of ‘positional chess,’” waiting for the right opportunity to strike (Rosefielde, 2014: 41).

In chess, the goal is to checkmate your opponent by making a succession of clever moves. The Russian president, on the other hand, is an expert in the martial art of judo, not chess. In Judo, quick thinking is critical. Judi Karate is an art form that involves analyzing an opponent, finding weaknesses in their body and causing them to fall to the ground. A judo winner does not need to be physically larger or stronger than their opponent, but rather quicker and shrewder in their approach to the fight (Marten, 2015: 191-2). On the other hand, others argue that Putin’s decision to intervene in Ukraine was driven more by a sense of dilemma than strategic consideration. Vladimir Putin has a reputation for limiting the alternatives and leaving just one answer for challenging issues (Hansen, 2015: 153).

On March 18, 2014, Putin declared, “Russia found itself in a predicament it could not recover from.” When the spring is fully compressed, it will snap violently back. “Stay in mind.” A Russian invasion of Crimea appeared to be a desperate act, rather than a move to extend Russian territory, according to Michael Rühle, a German political scientist. Losses appeared more important than wins,” he said (Rühle, 2015: 82). We can better understand Russia’s motivations for participating in Ukraine if we use prospect theory. Putin and his siloviki were more willing to take risks because they were afraid of losing their geopolitical and economic interests in Ukraine, as well as possible domestic political support. Many Russian politicians, including Vladimir Putin, bemoan Russia’s decline as a global force.

**Historical Background to the Current “China-Taiwan” Reality**

Understanding Taiwan’s current global political stance necessitates a prior understanding of how it arrived at that place. As a result of the Chinese revolution of 1949, the Kuomintang retreated to Taiwan, where it remains today. Despite their small size, Taiwan and the Kuomintang were acknowledged as China’s official representatives. With the United States, a founding member of the United Nations, Taiwan has signed a treaty to safeguard itself from external threats (i.e. the Chinese in this case). Throughout the world, support for Taiwan decreased when the Cold War ended and the Soviet-Sino split occurred.

US backing for a separate Taiwanese state was altered by Nixon’s 1972 visit to China, in which he spoke with Chinese leaders (Dun, 2004). Reunification attempts by the Kuomintang strengthened Taiwan’s cultural and political relations with China. The Kuomintang claimed to have brought numerous Chinese artefacts with it when it sought to annex Taiwan back to China. Minnan’s original vernacular has been displaced and mainland Chinese political power has been increased as a result of the Communist Party’s efforts to become Mandarin China’s official language. So in Taiwan there are people who are both Chinese and Taiwanese, and others who long for their own country.

It was assumed that Taiwan’s reunification with China would be a long-term political issue based on China’s democratic political changes and the consent of Taiwan. China was expected to guarantee that everything was in place for a smooth and consensual reunion, according to
the scenario (Ibid). Taiwan’s rejection of reunification was publicly affirmed by Lee in 1996. Because of this, China cancelled Taiwan’s second-track discussions. China conducted missile tests near Taiwan during Taiwan’s presidential campaign in an attempt to deter citizens from voting for Lee Myung-bak (Abidde, 2022).

In 2000, Chen Shui-bian, a member of the Democratic Progressive Party, took political leadership of Taiwan, advancing the island’s political aspirations toward independence. During his tenure, tensions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait rose. During his 14th term in office, Chen served as president. While running for president, Tim Culpan held two acrimonious referenda on China’s alleged threat to Taiwan’s sovereignty, he claimed. The government of Chen also rewrote the textbooks to portray China as a foreign country. Taiwanese identity was moulded by these small-scale measures. There was a shift in Taiwanese perceptions regarding China and Taiwan as well as the relationship between the two (Chen, 2022).

Consequently, Lee and Chen were essential in creating a unique political and social identity for Taiwan that was separate from that of the People’s Republic. However, the Kuomintang won the presidential election in 2008, and Ma Ying-jeou, the party’s candidate, took office (Bultrini, 2022). He maintained the cross-strait ties even while pushing for Taiwan’s independence. Ma’s vision included a shared market and direct transit links to Mainland China. DPP President Tsai Ing-wen considers that maintaining strong relations with China is important, but she realizes the necessity for Taiwan to diversify its economic reliance (Hsieh & Skelton, 2017: 105-13). Amidst the political wrangling with China, residents began to question their identity. As a result of the fact that generations have had changing political governments, the situation is more complicated. The elder generation may still have the feel of belonging to the motherland China (One China).

**The Situation of Taiwan after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine**

Political and military analysts have raised questions about the reunification of Taiwan and the possibility of a Chinese military invasion of Taiwan in conjunction with the Russian military campaign against Ukraine. Some portrayed that Taiwan is in danger of being annexed by China in a blitzkrieg, while the world watches with alarm the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Chan, 2022).

Vladimir Putin’s announcement of a military operation in Donbass on Thursday, February 24, woke the world and the Ukrainians up to what was happening in Ukraine, but Russia’s conduct of military operations reveals that Russia’s military objective extends far beyond the borders of the separatist region. An attack by Russians extended up to the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv. The Russian attack on Ukraine has enormous negative repercussions that go far beyond the borders of Ukraine and Russia and into Europe as a whole (Keegan & Churchman, 2022).

China’s President Xi Jinping has said that Beijing will return Taiwan, which China considers an integral part of its territory. By any means necessary, to the Chinese sovereignty. Despite the United States and other Western countries support for Taiwan’s independence. Although the United States and Taiwan do not have diplomatic ties, Washington is required by law to provide Taiwan with self-defence weapons (Yeh & Chen, 2022).
During the past few years, China has increased its rhetoric about Taiwan, conducted extensive military exercises and over-flights, infiltrated the island’s airspace, and taken aggressive steps toward any country that maintains ties of any sort with Taiwan.

Military reconnaissance and surveillance are being stepped up in Taiwan, according to the presidential office’s statement last week. “The shared responsibility of all parties” is to maintain regional peace and stability (Smith, 2022).

It is imperative that all military units continue to monitor the situation in the Taiwan Strait, strengthen reconnaissance and joint observation in order to respond effectively to various signs and threats, and gradually increase the level of combat readiness in response to various situations.”

Immediately following Vladimir Putin’s announcement on February 21 that the two breakaway regions in Donbass had been officially recognized by the Russian government, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen formed a working group to monitor developments in Ukraine, and this was evident in Tsai’s own statements (Lo, 2022).

Even though Tsai said that Taiwan and Ukraine have fundamental differences in terms of geopolitics and traditional geography, she added that “in the face of foreign powers who intend to exploit the situation in Ukraine and affect morale of Taiwan’s society, all government units must strengthen their willingness to prevent the war of concepts and information disseminated by foreign powers and their accomplices on the local scene”.

**China’s Recent Stance on the Taiwan Issue**

According to Hua Chunying, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, the comparisons between Ukraine and Taiwan issues are inappropriate, noting that many began to mention Taiwan frequently following Ukraine’s emergence, but these people lack even the slightest understanding of Taiwan’s issues. The Chinese state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity have not been divided and cannot be divided, according to Chun, and this is the status quo with regard to the Taiwan issue.

Because Taiwan has always been an integral part of China’s territory, it cannot be separated from China’s sovereignty under international law or by treaty. According to Hua Chunying, stability on the island is dependent on the peaceful development of Beijing-Taipei ties, and not on Taiwan’s enlistment of other countries in the expectation of selling weaponry or obtaining military backing from them. By declaring that “Taiwan independence is a route to nowhere, and no one should misunderstand or appreciate it,” she concluded (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2022).

However, officials on Taiwan’s self-rulled island aren’t the only ones drawing analogies between their country and Ukraine. After the European Union’s inability to stop Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson threatened China to invade Taiwan in a speech to Parliament (Davidson, 2022).

Political analysts in both the West and the East are frequently drawing parallels between the Ukraine crisis and the Taiwan issue, which became more prevalent as the conflict heated up and Russia invaded Ukrainian land without Western sanctions being able to stop Vladimir Putin’s military campaign (Gotev, 2022).
China’s Position on Russia’s Campaign against Ukraine

The issue of Taiwan and the consequences of Russia’s incursion into Ukraine for the present international order both revolve around a similar topic. China’s duplicity will be exposed if it publicly and openly backs Russia, despite Beijing’s constant invocation of the motto “non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations.” Analysts and specialists have focused on this issue in particular since Putin recognized the independence of Donetsk (and later Luhansk) and then escalated following the beginning of Russia’s aggression against the Ukrainian government in the east.

Before the invasion began, Hua Chunying was bombarded with questions about whether Beijing would impose sanctions on Russia after Western countries announced sanctions against Moscow for recognizing the independence of the two separatist regions. “After more than 100 sanctions against Russia imposed by the United States since 2011, can we calmly debate whether the sanctions have solved the problem?” Because of US sanctions, has the world improved? Will the sanctions against Russia help Ukraine, or will Europe’s security improve as a result of the sanctions?”

While hoping that all parties involved will give it serious consideration, the diplomat emphasized that “every effort should be made to resolve this issue through dialogue and consultation. The Chinese government’s stance on Ukraine is unchanged and consistent with the country’s long-standing policy of promoting dialogue and consultations to resolve contentious regional issues. Although tensions in the Ukraine are rising, there is still hope for a peaceful resolution to the crisis (Miah & Sheppard, 2022).

While Beijing has refused to condemn Russian aggression in the country already, Taiwan says it will join “democratic countries in punishing Russia for its invasion of Ukraine,” despite Beijing’s denials to the contrary. Russians recent statements on Ukraine clearly show that history was heavily involved in preparing for Moscow’s decisions, and thus China’s claim that Taiwan is an integral part of its territory is similar to Russia’s logic. If Putin’s goals are fully achieved, the Russian invasion may have an impact on the decision made by the Chinese leadership, even though there are formal differences between Ukraine and Russia and China and Taiwan (Fink, 2022).

To put it another way, Russia wants to keep NATO from annexing Ukraine and posing a direct threat to its borders, and China wants to keep NATO forces led by the United States far away from its regional surroundings. As the Ukrainian crisis unfolded, it became clear that the United States’ efforts to prevent Putin and Xi’s alliance had failed miserably. As a result, a confrontation between the United States, China and Russia has now become a fait accompli. This is why the crises in Taiwan and Ukraine are similar in nature.

Even if China does not give military backing to Russia, experts predict that China will continue to support Russia politically and economically following the invasion of Ukraine. For the second time in a week, the Chinese Foreign Ministry criticized the United States for “propagating incorrect information” and “stirring up tensions.” Since Russia’s attack on Ukraine began, China has not joined the Western condemnation of Russia, and China was the only country to vote no with Russia last month in an attempt to prevent the UN Security Council from meeting at the United States’ request to discuss the crowds. China has shown that it is a reliable ally.
Conclusion

Russia’s actions violated its own security guarantees to Ukraine in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 1997 Russo-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty. As a result of Russia’s actions, Western countries reacted angrily, resulting to Russia’s isolation and economic sanctions. The advantages Russia sought to gain from invading Ukraine outweighed the dangers at the time of the decision. Many Western leaders couldn’t have imagined a military invasion and seizure of a modern European state prior to Russia’s stunning hybrid warfare in Crimea.

It was considered that global politics had died in 1991, but lessons learnt from Russia’s actions have resurrected it today in Western countries. In the meantime, Ukraine was caught in a bind between the West and its Russian neighbour. The battle between the West and Russia for a pro-Western Ukrainian government and their aspirations to incorporate Ukraine into their respective institutional spheres weakened its geopolitical position (EU, NATO, or Eurasian Economic Union).

Neoclassical realism’s emphasis on system and domestic variables, as well as rationality based on projected utility maximizing, might explain Russia’s reasons for participating in Ukraine given this geopolitical environment and Ukraine’s post-Euromaidan reorientation. In order to provide a more persuasive and long-lasting explanation of what drives Russia’s leaders, neoclassical realism and prospect theory can be combined. Russian President Vladimir Putin sees his country’s interests as intertwined with those of the Soviet Union. Putin laments the demise of the Soviet Union. For him, Russia’s current domain is one of loss because of his inability to acknowledge its collapse.

Shefrin calls it “get-evenitis,” a strong aversion to losing. Both his neoclassical realism and his get-evenitis were on display in Putin’s recent moves. In J. M. Goldgeier and P. E. Tetlock’s study, those who are less focused on the world as it is and more willing to give weight to counterfactual worlds are more likely to support redistributive arguments on behalf of the underprivileged. In their minds, these kinds of claims are genuine attempts to recuperate harms inflicted by exploitative governments, not selfish or self-serving ones (Goldgeier & Tetlock, 2001: 85).

Vladimir Putin’s exploitation of the situation in Ukraine helped him to preserve his position of power at home. Adapting to the post-Soviet era was a crucial step in Putin’s development, as it allowed him to reconcile the world as it is with the world, he feels it should have been. Putin was more prepared to take chances in Ukraine because of his worldview and fear of losing. Putin used the naivete and fragility of Western leaders in order to gain the promised advantages for Russia without paying expensive costs. With Russia’s nonsensical threats to cut off Europe’s gas supply, Putin properly expected a limited economic sanctions response and a modest military response from the West. He was certain that Russia will be able to withstand even limited sanctions because of its massive financial resources.

Aside from Ukraine itself, Putin obtained control of the Black Sea Fleet port of Sevastopol and the region’s abundant natural resources through annexation. Because of this, Western institutions and their sway in Ukraine were hindered. The Kremlin promoted ethno-nationalism and Russian patriotism during its operations in Ukraine, especially the annexation of Crimea, by accusing the West of intervening in Ukraine with hypocrisy and defending...
Russia’s hybrid activities as a humanitarian operation to preserve ethnic Russians and speakers of Russian.

The early twentieth-century Chinese revolution was a major factor in the emergence of Taiwan. The PRC could have conquered Taiwan by force decades earlier if the US hadn’t sent the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait. That’s why it was so important for the US to be involved from the beginning. Throughout the years, the evolution of the Taiwan issue has served as the foundation of cross-Strait relations as well as a central subject in Sino-US relations. This means that any future resolution of the issue is likely to require their cooperation. It is impossible to predict the impact of three parties’ interactions on the Taiwan problem, but history and current trends can give some clues. Based on the Chinese reality, it is unreasonable for China to launch a military invasion of Taiwan, because such an act contradicts its political strategy and endangers its national and economic security.

Contributions

As a result of Russia’s military involvement in Ukraine, the West has isolated and sanctioned the country. When it came to Syria, Vladimir Putin didn’t spend any time becoming involved in the crisis. The likely causes for Russia’s intervention in Syria are similar to the likely explanations for Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. Possible reasons include relieving Russia of its isolation by forcing the West to cooperate in resolving the war in Syria’s military operations and reaching a solution. There is a chance that Putin’s action was motivated by a desire to display Russia’s newly upgraded conventional military capabilities.

Most certainly, domestic issues impacted Putin’s decision-making. Putin’s popularity soared as a result of Russia’s efforts in Syria. Neoclassical realism may explain Russia’s involvement in Ukraine via the lens of prospect theory. In addition, the concept may be applied to Russia’s involvement in Syria. Western policymakers might benefit from thinking in terms of such a paradigm by anticipating Russian reasons to undermine the West’s strength, cohesiveness, and credibility while Putin is in power. It’s possible that Russia may take advantage of other countries and territories with Russian interests, such as Ukraine and Syria (as well as the Baltic and Caucasian republics, Belarus, Moldova, Central Asia, and the Arctic). It includes the political, economic, maritime, celestial, and cyber domains of the former Soviet Union.

A look of Taiwan’s role in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras sheds light on a wide range of global strategic issues. Amid fears that communism might expand after China’s entry into the Korean War in 1950, the United States sought to contain it. Meanwhile, the American military presence in the Taiwan Strait has served to hinder any Chinese military action. During the early phases of the Cold War, the enormous tensions between the two sides further divided them, with each side affiliated with either the East or the West camp. Because of this, cross-Strait relations experienced periods of animosity, military war and stalemate.

Nixon’s visit to Beijing and the Shanghai Joint Communiqué in 1971-72 marked a major triangular engagement between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China. There were less tensions and animosity between China and America when Sino-US relations eventually improved. However, Taiwan’s KMT had officially given up on regaining the mainland, and the CPC had pledged a peaceful reunification instead. As the East-West war cooled, cross-Strait relations loosened, with some individuals from both sides engaging. Since the 1980s, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have seen a significant shift.
The Berlin Wall came down, the communist regime toppled, and the Cold War came to an end at the turn of the decade.

Global peace and growth took hold as a result of these unexpected transitions of power. Internal changes in Taiwan and the PRC have accelerated as a result of this wide framework, making the Taiwan question even more complicated. However, policy toward one another has been re-evaluated by both sides. As a result, cross-Straits connections have never been stronger, and both sides appear to be working toward a settlement. However, the concerns remain unresolved and may reappear at some point. Both parties have benefited from the international community’s assistance when this has occurred.

The Taiwanese problem has evolved in a unique way. Most of these characteristics can be traced back to events in Chinese history or the country’s recent economic expansion. At first, the issue was driven more by political aspirations and ideologies than by economic or social concerns. Following a pause in the late 1970s and early 1980s when economic tendencies began to take precedence in both countries, a gradual easing of limitations on economic and cultural exchanges began. Increased dependence has been the result of their efforts to cultivate these connections, regardless of the reasons behind them.

Both China and Taiwan have benefited from the better relations. Taipei worries that they will put the island at greater risk because Beijing believes they would fuel political ambitions for reform and freedom on the mainland. Both sides are willing to promote stronger social, cultural, and economic ties since economic advantages increasingly outweigh political ones. These increasing contacts and reliance make it harder for the two parties to revert to animosity and conflict. There are still fears on both sides despite the favourable trend toward a final reunion or a peaceful solution.

People in Taiwan fear for their safety since the PRC would not give up its military option. Efforts to address the Taiwan issue have stalled because to Taiwan’s refusal to engage in political dialogue or formal relations. The DPP-led independence movement is gaining traction, making future Taiwanese politics more difficult to predict. As in the 1996 crisis, Beijing was outraged by these measures, which might lead to more cross-strait tensions. Taiwan’s independence movement could become a key focus of cross-Straits relations and a major roadblock to peaceful reunification.

Taiwan’s future will lie somewhere in the middle of the two extremes. That is to say, as in previous decades, a gradual compromise will be reached between the two sides. Assumption by Beijing and Taipei of their current positions, while Taiwan’s political isolation from the PRC would be maintained by the agreement, increased commercial and cultural contacts would take place. The necessity for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue will grow in a stable but competitive world, which might lead to a final reunification. An ultimate reunion between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan is likely to take just a few years or perhaps not a long time.

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