Genişletilmiş Bilincin Olanağı Üzerine

Argun Abrek Canbolat

Abstract

Bu çalışmada, genişletilmiş zihnin olası olup olmadığı araştırılmaktadır. Bunu yaparken hem genişletilmiş zihin tezine hem de genişletilmiş bilinç tezine değinilmektedir. Genişletilmiş zihin tezinin ele alınmasının nedeni, genişletilmiş zihin tezi ile olan yakın ilişkisidir. İlk bölüm, dolayısıyla, genişletilmiş zihin tezini ele alırken, özellikle “denklik ilkesi”nin, bazı düşünce deneyleri ve bu deneylerin tez ile olan alakalarının ve “algı-eylem” bağlılığının üzerinde durmaktadır. İkinci bölümde ise Andy Clark’ın genişletilmiş zihin tezine karşı çıkışları, Victor Loughlin’in ve Karina Vold’un tezi destekleyen önerilerine de odaklanarak ele alınmaktadır. Öyle görünmektedir ki, Andy Clark ve paralel olarak da David Chalmers tarafından bilinç süreçlerinin hızı baz alınarak yapılan öneriler, Vold’un da dediği gibi, yanlıştır. Loughlin ve Vold’un argümanları ve düşünce deneyleri ışığında denebilir ki, genişletilmiş zihin tezi artık daha olası görünmektedir. David Chalmers tarafından “direktlik” üzerinden bilincin içselliğini destekleyen bir argüman geliştirilmiş olsa da, hâlâ, Chalmers’ın da kabul ettiği üzere, bu tür bir direktlik için yeter koşullar belirlenmiş değildir. Bu makalenin amacı, söz konusu tartışmaları eleştirel bir bakış açısı ile ele alarak Türkçe literatüre katkıda bulunmaktır.

Abstract in English      

On The Possibility of Extended Consciousness

In this paper, I aim to analyse the answers to the question about whether extended consciousness is possible. To this end, I examine both the extended mind thesis and the extended consciousness thesis. The extended mind thesis is analysed as it is important to understand the extended consciousness thesis within the framework of this paper. The first part deals with the extended mind thesis and places special emphasis on the ‘parity principle’, some thought experiments (and their relation to the thesis) and ‘perception-action’ dependence. In the second part, I examine the extended consciousness thesis by looking at Andy Clark’s responses to such a thesis and focusing on the recent discussions prompted by Victor Loughlin’s and Karina Vold’s accounts. It seems that the original refutation by Andy Clark and David Chalmers, centring on the speed of conscious processes, is misleading, as Vold objected. Following the arguments and thought experiments of Loughlin and Vold, it can be said that the thesis of extended consciousness seems more plausible than was the case before. Although there is now a special emphasis on ‘directness’, as a criterion to account for the consciousness internalism of Chalmers, it can still be said that, as Chalmers also state, no sufficient condition is represented for such directness. The aim of this paper is to contribute to corresponding Turkish literature by highlighting the recent discussions concerning the extended consciousness thesis.

Keywords

extended consciousness; extended mind; cognition; parity argument; perception-action

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