
Reviewed by Thomas Steinbuch

Brobjer’s book is research into the question of the EH to UAW relationship. With impeccable scholarship, the book sets to rights a fact that has not come to proper acknowledgement in later Nietzsche studies, and that is that Nietzsche wrote EH to be the introduction to The Revaluation of All Values; he wrote a Hauptwerk and EH is the introduction to it and EH was not written as merely instrumental in paving the way for it. Regrettably, Daniel Conway recently repeated the instrumentalist thesis in his editor’s introduction to his collection of essays on The Antichrist, (2019). Brobjer’s sections on chapters 2, 3 and 4 documenting that EH is the introduction to UAW are superb; 4.3 on “Destiny” and UAW is most impressive. I agree with everything he says in section 4.4.

My critical review must begin with Brobjer’s exegesis of the opening of Wise/1, because of the implications for the interpretation of why Nietzsche was in the position to make the revaluation:

Nietzsche begins the book and this first chapter, where he gives an idealized description of himself and his psychology, conventionally by briefly mentioning his parents and claims that “this twofold provenance” has formed his life – making him both decadent and anti-decadent, (loc. 1349).

From Brobjer’s report on the opening of Wise/1 it can be inferred that he thinks that the doppelte Herkunft refers to Nietzsche’s parents’ psychology, one to each, by one a decadent by the other, anti-decadent. The brevity of Nietzsche’s mention of his parents is hardly to the point. The statement about his parents is within the scope of a riddle, and while there is mention of two parents in it, there is not mention of two psychologies from them. Sorting the riddle, we see that Nietzsche's second Herkunft has nothing to do with lineage from his mother.

Brobjer writes that Nietzsche's reference to his parents follows conventional autobiographical practice of writing about one’s parents’ psychology, but there are not two psychologies here. By making Nietzsche to be following a convention of presenting the

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2 The following review of Brobjer is a synopsis; the full version will appear in New Nietzsche Studies, general editor Babette Babich. No new critical work is in the full version; the difference is in my more complete exegesis of Wise/3 superseded, Wise/4 and the coda to Ariadne’s Lament from DD. The full version is at http://zust.academia.edu/ThomasSteinbuch.
psychology of each parent, Brobjer manages to ignore the import of the statement that death in the midst of life came to him from his father. He would make “still living and growing old as my mother” from the riddle a psychology so he can say Nietzsche is following convention in what he says about his psychology from his father, but that is an absurd reading. Also, the second Herkunft is not what Brobjer says: he has substituted “anti-decadent” for the original, „Anfang.“

In a variant title for EH we read the subtitle: „In media vita: Aufzeichnungen eines Dankbaren,“ (13, 24[2]). Brobjer knows the text (loc. 382). The Latin phrase also occurs in a variant title to BGE: In media vita: Selbstgespräche eines Psychologen,” (12, 2[65]), and is also the title of GS 324. Nietzsche is in the middle of life, still living and growing old and also still in death in life as was his father before him, yet happiness remains firmly in his grasp here at the time where second thoughts begin to appear, whence the reference to the temporal: “still living and growing old.” But because this is a problem for psychologists to solve, he presents it in a form of a riddle. The riddle, which references a uniqueness, is not composed between these as poles of his parents’ psychology, it is not: How can there be death (father’s psychology) in the midst of life (mother’s psychology)? Death in life is not unique idea and not riddlesome: the saying media vita in morte sumus, become Gregorian chant, was surely familiar to Nietzsche, (it is also the thought of Tennyson’s lament: “O death in life, the days that are no more”). But non-renunciation and gratitude for it are. The riddle is: How can enduring death-in-the-midst-of-life be a happiness/good fortune? The solution is in asking what “happiness” means. Nietzsche’s happiness/good fortune exists because for him (not Karl Ludwig Nietzsche) decadence has been a stimulus to life and on to Mehrleben, it did not just sit. This reading accords with the definition of happiness/good fortune as the feeling of power growing, of resistance overcome at AC/2, 170, 5-6, following upon the revaluation of what is “gut” and of what is “schlecht.” This first line about happiness is a revaluation, and Nietzsche introduces it here, as Brobjer, per his interest in the Z to UAW relationship, should have noticed, by way of contrasting his happiness to that of the townsfolk of Motley Cow, (4: 19, 30-31). Nietzsche’s happiness is by way of resistance, death in life in its meaning for him, having been overcome, and this is how he has been able to continue on in being grateful for his life of death-in-the-midst-of-life into the middle of his life. Gratitude is fait accompli in EH, pace Brobjer who, following Young thinks it is not (loc. 232). This point is important to the reading of the doppelte Herkunft. Nietzsche’s second Herkunft is not the provenance of a “psychology” of “still living and growing old,” his mother’s before him, now his and by which he is nevertheless an „Anfang“ (to restore the text, as it is not babbling), and only his first Herkunft refers to a provenance from psychology, his father’s psychology now his of life declined to the lowest rung, which is what “provenance of decadence” cashes out to mean. But then, what is the lineage from the second Herkunft? Was Nietzsche’s second provenance anti-decadence? What could Brobjer possibly mean by that?

Nietzsche’s inheritance statement from his father is recognizable today as referencing epigenetics. Karl Ludwig Nietzsche suffered from a brain disease, probably tuberculosis meningitis or a brain tumor. The disease was in its late stages at the time of Nietzsche’s conception; Nietzsche was 4 years and 10 months when Karl Ludwig Nietzsche died. Karl Ludwig Nietzsche suffered a psychological breakdown about a year before his death, which had to have been a traumatic experience. Traumatic mental life could have been occurring earlier, and trauma could have become encoded on his epigenome and the
coding passed to Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s inheritance statement about his father, the direct statement at 264, 1-10; 269, 9-11; 271, 4-6 that he inherited decadence from him, the indirect statement in Wise/3 superseded that he did not inherit life from him (so not such brief mention after all!), can be read today as referring to a mood disorder associated with an epigenetic code and transmitted by epigenetic mechanisms. The associated mood disorder was ressentiment/embitterment mood disorder. Something in the inheritance had to be sui generis, but something had to be universal. It would make biological sense if the psycho-trauma to Karl Ludwig Nietzsche caused further and reinforcing regulation to a more widely distributed profile of encoded trauma being conserved by epigenetic mechanisms and they could have overlapped, and that could have been how decline to the lowest rung, even while being universal, became Nietzsche’s personal focus.

Brobjer’s statement of Nietzsche’s doppelte Herkunft does not report on the left half of Nietzsche’s sentence and is showing only the right half of it and there he has substituted “anti-decadent” for the original, „Anfang.“ Three-fourths are missing from his report. On the left side Nietzsche says that he is, as it were, from the highest and lowest rung on the ladder of life. Is the highest rung unreported on because it is merely self-idealizing? But lowest rung is not so, and is that why Brobjer does not report on it, as the pairing undermines his “self-idealizing” filter? And anyway, Nietzsche did not say that he was on the highest rung on the ladder of life; he is speaking of his opposition to decadence and that it is the highest opposition to it. Brobjer is not doing his readers a favor by sanitizing Nietzsche.

Lowest rung/decendent and Anfang reference an opposition of evolution, not a logic of decadence and anti-decadence (we do not hear about the uniqueness descriptor “lowest” from Brobjer). Behind his substitution seems to be a trajectory to exegesis of 266, 4-13 where Nietzsche explains why he is in the position to make the revaluation: Brobjer’s reading is that it is because he is anti-decadent by the second Herkunft, decadent by the first. Well, Nietzsche identifies himself as being the opposite of the decadent in Wise/2, himself as the wohlerathner Mensch, 267, 26-28, and unless that is the meaning Brobjer is using for “anti-decadent” it must mean something of his own, but if it is and “anti-decadent” means being the opposite of the decadent of Wise/2 as a wohlerathner Mensch, this then is his Herkunft from his mother, and that then means Brobjer is leaving it that Nietzsche can generate the new values having inherited being a wohlerathner Mensch from his mother, and so we must ask why didn’t she. Nietzsche’s statement of being an Anfang up from the decline of life to the lowest rung goes far beyond his thought of being a wohlerathner Mensch.

Brobjer directs us to a variant subtitle for EH: “Notes of One Who is Multifarious,” 13, 24[3] to explain what Nietzsche means by saying he is a position to re-evaluate all values, at 266, 4-13, (loc. 1338). But 13, 24[3] specifies in what ways Nietzsche is multifarious: there is a skills set of six competencies, and one is at a loss to figure out which in the set Nietzsche thought was decadent and which anti-decadent, assuming Brobjer’s substitution, much less which is decadence and which the Anfang, the actual second half of the doppelte Herkunft on the right side. That all the hats of competency are to be found in EH is true, but there is no indication from the set that Nietzsche was thinking about them in regard to the revaluation.
Brobjer also cites the early subtitle to EH at 13, 24[1] about “knowing a thing or two more” as answering how Nietzsche was generating the revaluation. But 13, 24[1] is introduced by the variant epigraph at 13, 23[14] where Nietzsche writes that a Mehr of life came from his will to life, that it is a “creation” (Schöpfung), “a true complement,” (eine wirklliche Zuthat). The “more” that Nietzsche knows is the more of having lived more than anyone, he knows more in the way of evolving himself, but that is not what Brobjer means by “anti-decadent.” In Brobjer’s reconstructions, Nietzsche could revalue values because he was the opposite of a decadent/wohlgerathner Mensch of Wise/2, and because he was multifarious at 13, 24[3], and because he knew a thing or two more at 13, 24[1], but these re-directions just push the question around to various locations and explain nothing. They can be seen to mean different things from each other when they are read in their respective contexts.

We learn about Nietzsche’s second Herkunft in Wise 3/final, discredited by Brobjer for its “many obvious signs of mental instability,” (loc. 1378) – whatever that means – referenced there as lineage from “collecting, saving and hoarding-up.” This thought is developed at TI/Skirmishes/44, same language, (145, 5), and the editors direct us to it, (Kommentar, 473). There we read that the higher nature is called into being by the main line when “tension in the masses becomes too great” and even the “least provocation” is sufficient to call forth “the genius,” “the deed,” the great destiny in general. The words are in quotes, suggesting they are not these an sich. Nietzsche reports in Wise/4 that pity intruded on his great destiny, which terrible destiny he traces to his lineage from collecting, saving and hoarding-up, his second Herkunft, (14, 497-499). And we learn in AC/7 that pity intends to cross the law of development, which is the law of selection (173, 10 11), so in intruding on his great destiny per his second Herkunft he understood pity to be undermining his evolutionary development. His second Herkunft is evolutionary and united with his Herkunft from the lowest rung, and by this he is an Anfang.

The thinking of TI/Skirmishes/44 is not just an exercise contra Carlyle but is theoretical thinking in evolutionary biology. It has the main feature of non-Darwinian theory: evolution is not occurring in the main line but off it, and evolution occurs rapidly. This point is clear in Wise 3/final. Succession conserves hostility to the appearance of the higher nature, it conserves a psychopathology of hypervigilance on the lookout for it with the intent to repress consciousness of it, the “pre-established disharmonia” (as if). Something’s being in succession is this conservation. Nietzsche was working with a psychology of renunciation of will to power and, on the opposite end, psychology as developed by it. He was working with the paired ideas of evolutionary stasis in the main line and of a sudden external emergence into it. The psychology of hostility to the will of life conserved vs. the will of life to become more in/as emergent new psychology grounds the distinction of stasis vs. evolving life. His discussion of bestowing pity vs. the psychology of remaining master, and of aggrievement at being wronged vs. bearing a heavy guilt are two cases in point.

The unitary composite for Nietzsche was: lowest rung/decadent and Anfang, the first Herkunft from succession as his father, the second Herkunft from life-evolving and he from it as an emergence. He is these “at the same time” (zugleich). By his second Herkunft, in unity with the first, he is an Anfang who can bring about an evolutionary advance up from life’s decline; he knows both and he is both. So, the point of Nietzsche’s statement of inheritance from his father is that it carried the decline, even to its lowest point, and that

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by his second Herkunft as an emergence in unity with the first, he alone can make the values revaluation, which is directive of evolving out of the historical decline of life in a biological sense. Nietzsche’s fundamental insight regarding our developmental situation is that a culture of ressentiment that is lebensfeindlich is acting to run crosswise to our evolution. That is why there is stasis in the main line. Evolution is by way of the second Herkunft off the main line. Nietzsche anticipated Gould and Eldredge’s theory of punctuated equilibrium (1972). Whatever Nietzsche is accounting, a one-off (lowest rung of decline) or a general theory of evolutionary development, his discovery of the unity of these two streams of the doppelte Herkunft contains remarkable insight about how our evolution is happening. His second Herkunft reverses.

My second point in defense of Wise 3/final is that behind Nietzsche’s narrative about his not being related to his mother and sister, Cosima as being his equal, about the “nonsense” belief of the Pope regarding degrees of kinship, about Wilhelm II – his nobility disdained – the pre-established disharmonia, being an ungeheuer Atavismus, that “Caesar or [maybe even] Alexander” (to follow Sarah Kofman’s reading) could have been his father, etc. is the myth of Dionysus’s victory over King Pentheus, which Nietzsche knew from Euripides’s The Bacchae, in a retelling to involve the Triumph of Dionysus and Ariadne. The coda to Ariadne’s Lament and the letters to Meta von Salis and Cosima Wagner of January 3rd are extensions of it. Nietzsche is having the Pope arrested because he denies that the higher nature comes as an emergence, just like Agavé denying the epiphanic appearance of Dionysus, insisting that the only way the higher nature can appear is as traceable in succession – self-serving enough for the Pope to believe as the foremost representative of the Apostolic succession. It is in this mocking light that we should read Nietzsche’s letters from January 4th to Cardinal Mariana and Umberto I about requesting a visit to the Pope (KSB 8: 1254, 1255). Both are signed “The Crucified” and were sent to troll the Pope as himself, Nietzsche, is the true higher nature by his second Herkunft. Nietzsche/Dionysus has taken possession of his realm and he is having Bismarck and Stöcker, an anti-Semitic advisor to Wilhelm I, shot, (KSB 8: 1239). The order of things upheld by Agavé and Pentheus is the same order Nietzsche is representing being upheld by his mother and sister by denying that his higher nature comes from his second Herkunft.

Nietzsche says that it is a Lästerung on his divinity to say that he is related to his mother and sister, just as Agavé slanders Dionysus’s divinity by denying that Zeus was his father and insisting that Semele was trying to hide her wanton ways by saying so and died struck by lightning, her unborn child too, as a punishment for blasphemy. Agavé subjects Pentheus to sparagmos, mistaking him for a lion to follow how Dionysus does not recognize him as his cousin, and just so, Nietzsche does not recognize he is related to his mother and sister. Nietzsche says that a “Dionysus head” is being brought to him, (269, 6-7), and this is a reference to the decapitation of Pentheus as Head of State and sacred omophagia, as Agavé brings the head of Pentheus back to Thebes for such. Brobjer failed to identify this as an allusion to the sacred victory over Pentheus and the representation of it in omophagia. At note 16 to loc. 1382, he cites his research to show that the reference is not to a postcard, to solidify his opinion that Wise 3/final is a wahnsinnschrift. But the key figure is Cosima Wagner. Nietzsche denies that he is related to his mother and sister and states that Cosima is more closely related to him than any woman, an implication of saying that Richard Wagner is more closely related to him than any man, scoped with the operator:
“not to say a word too few,” so it must be that “saying a word too few” is saying Cosima is more closely related than any woman and leaving it at that. But why say so?

Nietzsche says that his mother and sister inflict a bloody wound on him in his highest moments, that these are moments of his greatest vulnerability and that is why they pick them. He reports a scouring hypervigilance on the lookout for his highest moments as if pre-established, which, of course, it is not. Both mother and sister are zeroed in, and he is considering them in mother/daughter succession, as with the other lines of succession in the section. In this connection, the editors direct us to his letter to Meta von Salis of the time in which Nietzsche reports that on his birthday his sister wrote him that he wanted to become “famous” and, with scorn, that “it will be a lovely riff-raff” who believe in him, (14, 499). The editors also direct us to a variant to the close E.H/Books/Z/5, 342, 19-32, (14, 497-499) regarding the pre-established disharmonia, and earlier variants of it (beginning with „ich berühre…” where it is a general psychological observation, not just about his mother and sister. The narrative is the same, he is struck at in his highest moments precisely when he is also defenseless, and this is unheimlichste. The pre-established disharmonia of his mother and sister (heritable psychology, mother to daughter) out of resentment, uncannily can identify his great destiny as given by his second Herkunft, even though deaf and blind to it, and try to repress his consciousness of it in his vulnerable moments. Being “vulnerable” means that he is liable to believing his sister’s reductive personalizations; why else would she say such things if not thinking to get him to believe them? They are intended to confuse his consciousness of his second Herkunft, his consciousness of himself as evolving, so as to disrupt the evolutionary leap he is taking per their agenda of denying the reality of evolution. The attack uses personalization to negate the development: he refractory by it, the attack by reduction of it. Enter Cosima.

At this time, Nietzsche re-titled the poem from “The Magician” from part IV of Z to Ariadne’s Lament and added the coda in DD. Dionysus says that Ariadne has little ears, clever ears, in which to tuck a clever word. Babette Babich has recently written a very interesting paper on this point, noting that long asses’s ears are associated with listening to gossip, calumny and slander. Nietzsche says that the belief that he is related to his mother and sister is a Lästerung on his divine/noble nature. Just as Agavé slanders Dionysus as not the true son of Zeus, they too deny his great destiny as given by his descent from the second Herkunft, but they are canaille to say so, and say so because they are so. With her little ears, Cosima is disinclined to listen to their slander, and, as she is more closely related to him than they are, herself the vornehmste Natur from the Herkunft of collecting, saving and hoarding-up, it is obvious who he should believe. It is a Lästerung to say that blood kinship is real and that his sister knows him best in saying that his highest moments are really self-promoting self-deceptions, that his only and true Herkunft sets him in world of the canaille who think such things. But Cosima knows they are real because she is more closely related as from his second Herkunft as well. Nonsense? Why? From a unity of life perspective, all selves of evolving life must be related in the oneness of the emerging speciation on which we are converging. This is the meaning of Nietzsche’s declarations of

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Footnote:

3 Babette Babich, “N’s Ariadne: On Asses’s Ears in Botticelli/Dürer – and Poussin’s Bacchanal” Open Philosophy, 2022; 5: 570-605, De Gruyter. I am happy to acknowledge my indebtedness to this paper.
omnipersonhood from this time. Nietzsche is reporting a sympathetic understanding coming with the relatedness.

In the coda, Dionysus identifies for Ariadne that her inner tortures are a labyrinth, and Nietzsche/Dionysus knows this because of the shared *Herkunft* of collecting, saving and hoarding-up; he knows it is the same thing, a Dionysian labyrinth such as his own. He describes his labyrinth in *Wise/4* as compulsively disparaging others as bears, buffoons, etc., in acts of *ressentiment*, but he found his way out by the discipline of remaining unprepared. A rhyming rule of heart is his thread as he tells himself over and over: ”*ich muss unvorbereitet sein, um meiner Herr zu sein,*“ “(269, 24). If he keeps going, the bears become tamed and the buffoons become mannered, and *ressentiment*/decadence is revealed to have been a stimulus to *Mehrleben*. It is because he is related to her that Dionysus can recognize that Ariadne too is in a labyrinth that opens out to *Mehrleben*.

Cosima is Nietzsche’s equal and the *vornehmste Natur*, so also of lineage from collecting, saving and hoarding-up, Nietzsche’s second *Herkunft*. Nietzsche is retelling the victory of Dionysus against Pentheus as a co-regency of Dionysus and Ariadne over the order he, Pentheus, represents as the same order represented by Nietzsche’s mother and sister, considered in succession, and of the Pope and Wilhelm II, all with the common operative of a *Lästerung* that his second *Herkunft* does not exist. Cosima shelters Nietzsche from the *Lästerung* that he is not from the second *Herkunft* that, rather, like everyone else, he is *canaille*. Protected from reductive personalizations, needful because vulnerable to them and because mother and sister stand hypervigilant, consciousness of human evolution is first attained. And he, as Dionysus can instruct Ariadne that she is in a Dionysian labyrinth for her to thus become self-aware of this as well. By alliance in the Great Politics against it, the Triumph of Dionysus and Ariadne counters the pre-established disharmonia that would repress emergent self-consciousness of the great life with reductive personalizations. They counter the strategic psychology of the “small man” who finds any and all means to kill the great life and, knowing that he will never be engaged, he, the small man, becomes lord and master in deadly hostility against the will of life to evolve, (variant to *EH/Books/Z/5, 14, 497-499*). Brobjer states that Nietzsche “was certainly affected by mental confusion,” in his identification with Dionysus at this time, (loc. 2584) but *Wise 3/final* is philosophically coherent, and, as in the context of *Wise/1* to *Wise/5* and together with it, is Nietzsche’s final statement of his thinking.

Brobjer states that *Wise/3* superseded also adds nothing “substantive” to *Wise/1* (loc. 1377). The section contains Nietzsche’s statement that his privileges are explained by his having had the father he did, as we were about to learn about them in *Wise/4* and *Wise/5*. “Everything” about them is “explained” so, and above all, the privilege of the “lofty and delicate” world of *Z*, (14, 473 in the *Kommentar*). The explanation from his father is necessary for any understanding of *Z*, he says, and, as Brobjer is keen on the Z to UAW relationship (at 5.1), I am at a loss why he does not consider the sentence substantive to that question, as it puts Zarathustra's revaluations in context: the acquired privilege of being in the “world of lofty and delicate things” from his “foot beyond life,” *ressentiment* psychopathology of his father become his overcome, and he with that meaning, an evolving self to overhumanliness – surely “substantive.”

We should not jump to the conclusion that the explanation from his father of why he had the privileges he did is that his father had them before him and that now he, Friedrich
Nietzsche has them (thus to make Karl Ludwig Nietzsche the author of the revaluation first!). I will focus on Wise/5 and Nietzsche’s privileged right to bear a heavy guilt for another’s wrong to him, and ask how it is explained by his father (although Wise/4 is also in play). In the first sentence, (271, 1-3), Nietzsche writes about being the continuation of his father’s life, but the sentence is within a simile marker: continuation “as it were.” Looking at the continuation statement: Can the line be read to say that how he is the continuation of his father’s life refers to the point at which he is merely his father once again? Obviously not. Continuation of life of his father’s life implies that the background from him in play, his provenance from Wise/1, must be a biological inheritance from him, but relinquishing equal entitlement not to be wronged and blaming himself for the wrongdoing, as it controls his inherited mood disorder, is “as-it-were-continuation” of his life and an acquired characteristic.

The revaluation of Wise/5 repeats Z: I “The Adder’s Bite” and is written forward to introduce AC/57, which contains Nietzsche’s unmasking of the psychology of the socialists. The revaluation to the socialists, who think otherwise, is that “wrong lies not in unequal rights but in the assertion of equal rights” (244, 28-30); the assertion of equal rights is wrong action, the relinquishment of equal rights is right action. Why? The two senses of “wrong” are in play: “wrong” conventional assigned as non-recognition of equal rights, “wrong” revalued as not in unequal rights. AC/57 contains a reference to AC/2’s definitions of “gut” and “schlecht” and assigns asserting equal rights wrong action because it subverts the feeling of power, and relinquishment of asserting equal rights by blaming oneself for the wronging as right action because it increases it. Those meanings are cashed out in Wise/5: right action = increase of the feeling of power = the development of the acquired characteristic = Mehrleben. This statement of the revaluation of blaming oneself adds to Z: I “The Adder’s Bite” in the particular that the acquired characteristic is identified as from his inheritance from his father of life in decline, which then makes it a development of life. Brobjer glosses over this section.

In Wise/5, Nietzsche executed a reevaluating psychological discipline. The discipline is that he relinquishes his right to equal entitlement not to be wronged (which is the sense in which he does not “live among his equals,” (271, 7), and makes the wrongdoing to himself his fault, thus eliding the wrongdoing so that there is no object for “moral aggrievement” to work on, to make it whatever it is an sich. “Moral aggrievement” would otherwise play into his inherited psychology of resentiment/embitterment, come full to the fore by the wrongdoing, with the result that aliveness is burned up, as with the “affects of resentiment,” (section 6). Decadence has become a stimulus to Mehrleben in his being able to blame himself, so it is right action. This is his point in saying that a god come to earth should do nothing but wrong, taking on the guilt, not the punishment at 271, 30-32, which repeats Z: I “The Adder’s Bite,” (4: 88, 18-21); “god on earth” = “new noble”. A god on earth would find her/himself always already in the wrong to pro-actively elide all possibility of wrongdoing to her/himself, always a desideratum of the decadent, and so as master of resentiment. Nietzsche says bearing the guilt for the wrongdoing to him is a privilege (270, 26-27), explained, as are all, by having the father he did and, obviously, it did not come to him as something his father had before him. It is explained by him in this other way: the change is from life in himself at its lowest rung as inherited to the creation of life, addition of life, to Mehrleben, (“creation” and “addition” are at 13, 23[14]), by meliorating the inherited mood disorder. The characteristic is acquired and by it Nietzsche is an Anfang.
and Karl Ludwig Nietzsche its *causa materiae*. Nietzsche adds life to him (Karl Ludwig Nietzsche) as he is him in himself by evolving it from him, to become in himself a kind of do-over of his “too early death,” (“too early” makes the line elegiac). Always already blaming one’s innocence to be pro-active against being wronged and blaming the wrongdoer instead is a revaluation just, and only just, because by its mastery of active states of blameful *resentment*, it is the psychology of life evolving. *Pace* Würzbach, who downplayed Nietzsche’s friendship to Lamarckian Wilhelm Roux and tried to make him an early proponent of Weismann’s barrier, Nietzsche would seem to have believed that acquired characteristics are heritable, which would seem to be the idea underpinning the summary of how the Overhuman is to creatively emerge that we read in Z: 2 “On Redemption,” 4: 18-23.

Nietzsche says he alone can accomplish the revaluation. No one else has been both from the *Herkunft* of the decline of life to the lowest rung and also from the *Herkunft* of collecting, saving and hoarding-up to become an *Anfang* (this point resolves the apparent conflict with Destiny/7, 371, 26-28). Brobjer rejects Nietzsche’s claim that the values of the revaluation are *ab initio* with him, (loc. 2826). He sanitizes Nietzsche’s presentation of the psychology of his father calling it “following convention” to state it, and he ignores the concluding line of Wise/3 superseded where it is not being presented by way of following convention but because of its one-of-a-kind role; ditto the opening sentences about his father in Wise/4 and Wise/5, and we do not hear about his second *Herkunft* as from “collecting, saving and hoarding up” from Wise 3/final, left to think the second *Herkunft* refers to lineage from his mother’s psychology, the unpardonable scholarly lapse of Brobjer’s exegesis, deserving even of reproach, and he has suppressed the idea that Nietzsche was in any way an *Anfang*. I count the whole of Brobjer’s chapter 6 as misconceived.

I was at a loss reading Brobjer’s discussion of Nietzsche’s arguments against pity (loc. 3106 - 3141) because, although he is working from AC/7, he does not present Nietzsche’s main argument there on pity’s *lebensgefährlcher Charakter* (173, 6ff.), that pity runs crosswise to the law of development. And, although he is also working from Wise/4 to AC/7, he does not consider the text at 270, 15-27 where Nietzsche says that pity destructively intruded on him in three cases, which autobiographically introduces the critique of crossing the law of development in AC/7. Note that the first case is intrusion into his destiny, repeated in the variants to EH/Books/Z/5, (14, 497-499), and is an act of the pre-established disharmonia, the foundation of anti-developmental psychology in the human mind. The intrusion occurs at the moment of suffering from his terrible destiny, “an Ungeheurem meines Schicksals leide.” Pity tries to multiply that suffering to get him to give up on it. In the third case, the intrusion is into his privilege of a heavy guilt, his acquired characteristic we will learn of in Wise/5, nobler than blaming the wrongdoer, to multiply the suffering in it and get him to drop it and just go ahead and blame the wrongdoer: “poor man, don’t so blame yourself, for everything” to amplify. Pity tries to preserve what he knows should perish in himself, (*Untergange*) to evolve overhumanliness. Wise/4 270, 15-27 gives Nietzsche’s autobiographical introduction to AC/7’s evolutionary argument against pity, but Brobjer ignores it, and this in a work on the EH to UAW relationship as introduction!

In AC/7 we learn that pity is a “*Multiplikator*“ of misery and a” *Conservator* “of the miserable, keeping them in their misery (173, 28-30). It persuades to,, *Nichts*. The
“persuasion to Nichts” works by trying to make evolving that much more difficult by multiplying suffering already in it; it tries to multiply the suffering of his terrible destiny of being an Anfang up from the history of decline and make him abandon it and accept the futility of evolving. By multiplying suffering, pity increases ressentiment and life is burned up further and so weakened, and the will to life is over-matched. Nietzsche cites as Zarathustra’s proof of strength that he masters his temptation to pity the Higher Mensch. What is the temptation? What kind of strength? The temptation is not because pity is our natural inclination, as Brobjer has it, a downward inclination that weakens us; pity is the opposite of natural. The Higher Mensch is coming to grips with our weakness as a species, up one degree from ground zero at the lowest rung, and because her/his suffering is greatest, that is where the undermining effort is easiest and the temptation to do so sharpest. Zarathustra is no advocate of life if he can be tempted to the sin of undermining its development, as is his, and all our wont. Pity seeks to preserve what in ourselves is selected against, as is clear from the cases at 270, 25-27. If he can thwart the effort of the Higher Mensch for development, Zarathustra can hold on to the fantasy of escape from its exactions for himself, but in strength of life he remains master against this toughest test of ressentiment. Pity overcome is new psychology emergent from his second Herkunft. Brobjer’s idea is that Nietzsche's critique of pity is that he wants us to feel more joy and less suffering, but that point is actually not a revaluation of pity but a re-calibration of how much of a role we want it to have in our mental wellness scheme. Brobjer presents FW 338 on the point but I would dispute his reading as insupportable.

By the chicanery of ill-defined filters, waffly language, and by blindly ignoring them, Brobjer has managed to not come to grips with the texts that carry Nietzsche’s explanation of what the revaluation is: the path of our evolution up from life in decline in us and how Nietzsche is the Anfang, flat-out mis-reporting the statement of his second Herkunft. I can recommend only his scholarly argument that Nietzsche planned a Hauptwerk, UAW, and wrote EH to introduce it.