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The Laws of Manu and Nietzsche’s “Attainable Perfection”

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“Theologically speaking - listen closely, for I rarely speak as a theologian - it was God himself who at the end of his days work lay down as a serpent under the tree of knowledge: thus he recuperated from being God. - He had made everything too beautiful. - The devil is merely the leisure of God on that seventh day.” (Ecce Homo, “Beyond Good and Evil,” § 2)

Nietzsche's views on the Laws of Manu are widely considered some of his most controversial. Even among those who express a supportive view of Nietzschean philosophy tend to shy away or outright ignore his apparent praise for the laws responsible for the caste system in India. It is strange enough that Nietzsche would ever comment on the caste system and weirder still is that these comments on the Laws of Manu seem to be one of the only overt examples of Nietzsche’s political philosophy. It might be akin to contemporary readers of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* suddenly getting goosebumps and chills of terror as they discover the conclusive section of ‘Observing Reason’ where Hegel devotes time and effort to discussing the defunct science of phrenology.

These are not examples of weird antiquarian views from a time lost to the ages concealed deep within the confines of unpublished notebooks in scribbled passages that were never intended to be published. Nietzsche places the most cogent remarks on the Laws of Manu square within two of his published monographs; *Twilight of the Idols* and *Anti-Christ*.

Towards the end of his productive writing years he did have exchanges with his publishers that perhaps they should hold off publishing these later texts for a few more years. Plus, some have claimed that Nietzsche’s interpretation of the Laws of Manu most likely relied on a flawed translation offered by Max Müller.² To be honest, who cares if its a correct interpretation of the Laws of Manu or not? Even if the statements are factually inaccurate, the statements Nietzsche makes are important because they are based on mistakes.

We can learn about Nietzsche’s philosophy because of what is implied in his mistaken interpretations. In other words, to borrow an adage repeated throughout Nietzsche’s work: truth is a kind of error. We can often learn more from mistakes, not as a way of correcting

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² Koenraad Elst: *Manu as a Weapon against Egalitarianism*. Nietzsche and Hindu Political Philosophy, in: Siemens, Herman W. / Roodt, Vasti (Hg.): *Nietzsche, Power and Politics. Rethinking Nietzsche’s Legacy for Political Thought*, Berlin / New York 2008, 543–582.



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to gather “veridical” truth as if there is an object to discover, but rather, because after all, if God is dead and to take it a step further ala Foucault: why not simply state that God never existed? Then, we must remain firm in our understanding that the Laws of Manu are a phantasmagoria that binds its subjects to a myth, just like any other myth that takes itself seriously and has forgotten it is an illusion as such. If a shared quality of politics and religion, for Nietzsche, seem to be the hunting and trapping of subjects, then the Laws of Manu consist of an extraordinarily convincing illusion rendered “real” because, as Nietzsche credits Manu, the laws reflected the laws of nature:

“The order of castes, the supreme, the dominant law, is merely the sanction of a natural order, a natural lawfulness of the first rank, over which no arbitrariness, no ‘modern idea’ has any power... the order of castes... is necessary for the preservation of society, to make possible the higher and the highest types.” (AC § 57)

Nevertheless, Nietzsche was consistent in maintaining his position that the strongest, and therefore the creators of virtues, are the ones who say “yes” to life and affirm their actions as based in natural instincts rather than the resentment. In the spirit of the Law of Manu the most admirable thing in the caste system is that it exposes the anti-nature of all unhealthy moral systems.

As close readers of Nietzsche we must bear in mind that Nietzsche never openly advocates violence. Especially not in these delicate passages in his work. He threads the needle very carefully so as to avoid the implication of advocating violence towards the chandala. However, the implication is clear that the ethos of Christianity has borrowed heavily from the chandala ethos of caring towards the dead rather than towards the living. Where the chandala were cast into sickness by the upper-castes who Nietzsche claims limited the access to drinking water to that which existed at the mouth of a swamp, there is a sense that Christianity tries to clean off the dirtiness of those in the swamp through the extension of its power/knowledge into the realm of psychology: where right at the beginning of *Genealogy of Morality* we see Nietzsche critiquing English Psychology, which Nietzsche anthropomorphizes the psychologist as: “old, cold, boring frogs crawling around men and hopping into them as if they were in their element, namely a *swamp*.” (GM First Essay § 1)

Nietzsche's views on the Laws of Manu appear primarily in the last productive writing years of his life. Nietzsche does make some mention of Manu in *Genealogy of Morality* and his earlier writings. If we focus primarily on the last texts that he wrote in his final brilliant flurry of publications in 1888-89 it appears as though Nietzsche makes a transition from a critique of slave-morality to a critique which he broadly encapsulates in the conceptual influence of the chandala. This is not a small shift in language, but in my reading of Nietzsche, the shift towards a critique of the chandala is a significant and major shift in the Nietzschean oeuvre. It marks a broadening of Nietzsche's critical approach to religious hegemony. Rather than focus on Christianity as a causal force initiating the slave's revolt, you wind up with a critique that stretches back much farther into history, and spanning across the Silk Road across the “Indu River” where Christianity is posited as an appropriation from Brahmanism which cast the handlers of the dead (the chandala) into the swamp. Chandala were later understood to be the “untouchables”; the lowest caste, who were carriers of diseases and thusly untouchable, because their main job consisted of cremating the dead and casting the ashes into the Ganges River for safe passage into the



next life. Clearly, the casting of the psychologist as the character of a frog crawling around patient's in the swamp is an analogy to the profession of psychologist as doing the work of a Christian-chandala - abiding safe travels by offering therapeutic, safe passage out of the swamp. Cleaning up the dirtiness of the soul among those cast into the procrustean bed of the swamp and thusly handlers of 'mental illness' are those whose main customers are the chandala.

In his writings about the Laws of Manu, we see that he views politics as a lower class of "physiology" where the kings are merely the "guardian arm of the intellectuals", and politics must remain subordinate to the higher calling of intellectual freedom among those who are among the highest ability to do so, and that this is not a call for "racial eugenics" but a call for a meritocracy that builds the "double wall" necessary to create a focused environment with conscious attention on intellectual pursuits.

Rather than mere public utility, which is what happens when "politics" subordinates intellectuals to the will of the state. Nietzsche inverts Plato's view on the Philosopher Kings. Rather than the philosopher taking a subordinate role to the leaders of the political system, the political system must serve as a subordinate role in the service of the intellectuals. It seems rather condescending, however, Nietzsche appears to be saying that the freedom of ideas can only flourish if the philosophers are barricaded from the chandala. Therefore, the goal of education as a way of "lifting the chandala out of the swamp" always lowers the discourse to its most basic levels.

Had this ever actually occurred, something like Nazism would have never happened. Which means that the linking of Nietzsche to Nazism is absurd, even in the context of his most daring statements about the Laws of Manu.

Yet, this is not necessarily a break with his earlier work, but an extension of it. As I argue here, a point that many scholars of Nietzsche's work seem to miss is that in his later work Nietzsche drops the use of the term slave's-revolt and slave-morality in favor of the use of *chandala*. Why is this? Notably the *Anti-Christian* and *Twilight of the Idols*. This later turn is indicative of the more pronounced appearance of the Laws of Manu, rather than merely talking vaguely of "castes" as he does in his much more widely read and discussed earlier writings, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, and *Beyond Good and Evil*, as a way of extending his earlier critiques into realms of political theology beyond the purview of Christianity. Pointing out the origins of a Christian metaphysics as borrowed from earlier Brahmanist practices from antiquity. The Laws of Manu were also one of the first ancient sanskrit texts to be translated into english. These laws were also instrumental for the constructing of Hindu Law codes used by the East India Company in their administered control of territories in India.³

The key takeaways are that Nietzsche was probably aware that the Laws of Manu were being utilized for colonial purposes. His view was that the *Übermensch* would be able to push through and exert an incredible will to power to still transvalue values even within such oppressive contexts. Plus, for us reading the work of Nietzsche in the post-colonial/de-colonial era, the understanding that Nietzsche challenges us to grapple with is the idea that colonial constructs may derive the basis of their power from cultural traditions

³ Donald Davis (2010), *The Spirit of Hindu Law*, Cambridge University Press, pp 13–16, 166–179.

immanent within the cultural history of the colonial subjects themselves. It was not that the British were telling the subjects “Be like us!” it was a trick of power to gain hegemony via the mythical revisiting of oppressive identity politics from within the historical legacy of Brahmanist traditions. To borrow from the words of Georges Bataille in discussing the historical allure of fascism: “it is easier to restore than it is to create.” A hegemonic power might simply placate the colonial “difference” via exoticism that then restores oppressive traditions within the past of the subjects that the colonial power seeks to dominate. Machiavelli makes this point in the Prince as well. It is virtually impossible for a conquering army to reshape cultures and traditions that have been around for centuries. Better still is for the conquering leaders to revive traditions from the past, keep the cultures in tact, and simply extract taxes and resources as necessary.

In no small way this is precisely what is at stake in the will to power of the *Übermensch*. The Laws of Manu, which serve as the fatalist laws of nature, unquestionable, would pose no barrier for the will to power of the *Übermensch*, even that would be thrown off as a yoke cast aside. What is fascinating is that for Nietzsche, the Laws of Manu are actually more honest than the Chandala-tendencies in other slave-moralities like Christianity. This is because in the Laws of Manu there is at least an honest observation that people are not made equally. There is no false delusion of the equality among unequals. At least the Laws of Manu clearly creates a hierarchy that posits the genealogy of Brahmanist castes as being separated out from those of the chandala, whose desire for “Freedom” waters everything down willy nilly into a lukewarm mediocrity.

These are dangerous subjects because it appears as though Nietzsche is favoring a position of eugenics, however, the basic idea expressed here is that the genealogy of breeding will create stronger intellects and stronger and stronger guardians, which can only occur by pairing the best with the best, and through a society that allocates resources to the best and brightest rather than compassionate alms for the poor so as to redistribute from the strong to the weak (a con-game of chandala, the christian compassionate ethos of pity and compassion). Is this the entire story insofar as what Nietzsche intended? If it is, should we perhaps revise some of these points in lieu of the dangers of eugenics and social darwinism? Remember, Nietzsche does not want to forward a morality of the “procrustean bed” where the rules are a one-sized fits all set of generalizations (II, Raids § 43) . One of Nietzsche’s only reflections on Darwinian evolution occurs in proximity to the writings on the Laws of Manu, and it is a critique of Darwin, in fact, I would argue that this proximity actually reveals Nietzsche’s incredible admiration towards the chandala (much like Marx’s admiration of the bourgeoisie); to pull off such a generational manipulation is incredible. Nietzsche writes that the opposite of the Darwinian maxim of the survival of the fittest, in fact:

“Species do not grow more perfect: the weak become the masters of the strong, again and again - because they are the great majority, and also cleverer... Darwin forgot intelligence (*geist*) (that’s English for you!), the weak have more intelligence... One has to need intelligence in order to get intelligence - one loses it if one no longer needs it. Anyone who has strength gets rid of intelligence (“Let it go!” they think today in Germany, “the Reich will still be ours”...) By intelligence, as you can see, I understand caution, patience, stealth, deception,



great self-control, and all ‘mimicry’ (a large part of so-called virtue belongs in the last category).” (II, Raids § 14)

What is lacking in physical strength of the weak, evolves into intelligence as a way of overcoming the weaknesses in physical power. As intelligence increases it also saps strength from the body, not just by resources developing in the form of intellectual capacity, but by creating intellectual mediation between instinct and intellect. “All healthy morality, is ruled by an instinct of life...” whereas, “Anti-natural morality, that is, almost every morality that has been taught, honored, and preached up to now, instead turns precisely against the instincts of life - it is a sometimes hidden, sometimes loud and bold, condemnation of these instincts.” (II, Anti-Nature § 4); where the point being that the chandala, who cannot exert physical power, must make up for this by utilizing their intelligence to lure in “those natures who need La Trappe,” (II, Anti-Nature § 2); whereas the *Urbemensch* would not fall into those traps and find ways to exert the will voluntarily and freely. The Laws of Manu may serve as a compromise in the later Nietzsche who starts to claim that the *urbemensch*, who in this case manifest in the mind of Nietzsche as the Brahman caste, must have a “double-barricade” against the chandala provided by the guardians who protect the creative intellect from the evolutionary weak-intelligence of those who wish to drain strength through the construction of moral-traps.

In a passage in his *Will to Power* notebooks, possibly written in November 1887 - March 1888, during the time he is writing *Anti-Christian*, Nietzsche is disturbed by the lack of cultural reflection: “European culture has been moving as toward a catastrophe, with a tortured tension that is growing from decade to decade; restlessly, violently, headlong, like a river that wants to reach the end, that no longer reflects, that is afraid to reflect.” (WP § 2)

It sounds diametrically opposed to what he writes in the *Anti-Christian* regarding the Laws of Manu, where Nietzsche seems to describe the attainable perfection of the caste system to reach its summit when the instincts of the highest intellectuals reach a perfect automatism. Then, why would we want to reflect? It is because, caught in the snares of the anti-nature-moral systems of Christianity, the process of reflection is akin to “animal taming” whereby the Devil is cast as an evil-beast with each of us and the serpent cast as the wicked creature associated with the moral allegories surrounding original sin. Christian belief systems set up morality as apparatuses of capture that force the moral disciplinary power against one’s own natural instincts. Which means, the “animal taming” method of disciplinary power never gains efficacy as a teaching tool at all, except among those whose proclivities are already gravitating towards self-hatred and unworthiness. Nietzsche casts a vast net upon all of the folks in this category and simply calls them “the botched” or the “chandala” – those who are among the joyless.

If the agency behind Christian ethics descends from God, and in Nietzsche’s joke, which he openly appropriates from Stendhal is that God’s only flaw is that he never existed. Therefore, the Laws of Manu are implemented, as much of Vedic moral law was (up to and including many forms of Buddhist Philosophy) as an attainable perfection here on earth as something within the power of humans to create, rather than Gods. Therefore, Nietzsche’s positive appraisal of the Laws of Manu was not intended to propagate the actual caste system as it actually exists in India. Even though Nietzsche says he is expressing a realism that is intentional, that would be a repugnant thesis. In some regards,

Nietzsche is talking about an internal will to power. For those who express an inner intellectual greatness the higher physiological types need to create their own 'double barrier' for focused intentions, production, and solitary attention, of say giving grant money to intellectuals in the humanities or creating colleges for the sole purpose of research without the burden of teaching.

This emanation of a "telos" from the law, rather than from the metaphysics of an invisible spiritual force that has never been proven to exist, ironically, gives spiritual power back to the people, yet, through the most rigid and strict prohibitions, and by tearing away any delusions of equality of abilities deserving of an equality of rights. Nietzsche writes: "the separation of the three types is necessary to the maintenance of society, and to the evolution of higher types, and the highest types - inequality of rights is essential to the existence of any rights at all." (AC § 57)

Three or Four Types of Caste?

In speaking of the Laws of Manu in *Anti-Christian*, Nietzsche reveals his thoughts that there are three clearly defined "physiological types" of a person. In *Twilight of the Idols* there are four, which seem to overlap as such. The highest is the intellectual/priestly caste. Second are those marked by muscular strength/a fighting race, then there are the farmers and merchants, and lastly those undistinguished who are the servants, the shudras. This last group are the chandala, those who handle the dead. In Brahmanist traditions these would amount to the cremators who burn the bodies in preparation for passage into the next cycle of rebirth in the cycle of samsara.

The question becomes, why must there be this distinguishing between the intellectual and the strong? It is a matter of time. To put time into physical exertion and the development of intellectual strength, then one neglects the development of the mind, and vice versa. The rarest are the intellectuals. Intellectuals are creators, and those who are not at liberty to play second. Nietzsche's wording indicates an amor-fati disposition to the intellectual life. It is not chosen as if it were a calling in the sense of someone pondering what career to pursue. "Neither Manu nor Plato nor Confucius, nor the Jewish and Christian teachers, have ever doubted their *right* to lie." (TI, Improve Humanity § 4) Because, as we know, truth is an illusion we have forgotten is such, the stories and myths that are now taken by true believers as factual, were known by the originators of these myths to be one among many narrative storytelling techniques. Whereas, the weak set traps for the strong, the "criminal type is the type of strong human being under unfavorable conditions, a strong human being who has been made sick." (TI, Raids § 45) Which is the technique of the Laws of Manu, to cast the chandala-enemies of the strong, into a state of sickness. Methods of creating sickness included only allowing the chandala to drink from waters at the entryway to swamps and in puddles created by animal hooves.

Nietzsche has crossed a line. Where the intellectuals are the ones most likely to feel the tug of resentment from the mediocre chandala because the priest has been taken as the lowest type, dealing with the dirty, the sickly, the unclean and nurturing the resentment of the powerless (TI, Raids § 45). Chandalas were the caretakers of the dead performing cremation rituals and dumping the bodies into the Ganges. Nietzsche warns that when the resentment of the chandalas gains ascendancy, the intellectuals can be distracted by "further experimentation (and) the continuation of that state in which values are fluent,



and are tested, chosen and criticized ad nauseum.” (AC § 57) Not knowing what differentiates great art, and true intellectual pathbreaking work, the tools of intellectual artistry in the hands of the chandalas will reduce culture to “art for art’s sake,” philosophy to sophistry, and flippant sorts of nonsensical attitudes that reveal deeper symptoms of cultural decadence creeping in. Christianity is the revaluation of values of rising-power, and becomes a triumph of the values of the poor, the lowly, the oppressed, the miserable, the vengeance as a religion of love. (II, Improve Humanity § 4) It captures the strong in the snare of having to pity the weak, and thusly dirties the spirit of those who were outside of the swamp. Rather than draining the swamp - resentment drags the strong into the swamp.

Seeing that Nietzsche places a secondary status upon the physically strong types, it becomes apparent that many superficial readings of Nietzsche mistakenly interpret the *Übermensch* as if Nietzsche were forwarding a form of racial eugenics. Many tend to think of the *Übermensch* along the lines of the physically strong, and yet, we see Nietzsche describing the “intellectuals” as the *Übermensch* and the physically strong as merely the guardians, the police, the military, akin to something like the guardians as written about in Plato’s *Republic*. Nietzsche emphasizes this point further by saying that “against this a double wall is set up” - the intellectuals must protect themselves from the mediocre and the king must be the “highest form of warrior, judge and preserver of the law,” whereby the guardians “constitute the executive arm of the intellectuals” an obvious inversion of the philosopher kings in Plato’s *Republic*, whose philosophy serves to advise and whisper sweet nothings into the ears of kings.

In Nietzsche, the Kings are typically military leaders, commanders in chief, and nothing more. These Kings are protectors not to be revered whereas the intellectuals are to be held up in the highest esteem. One can presume that rampant anti-intellectualism and flaunting of patriotic zeal towards military veterans is akin to resentment of the sort “My concept of freedom - sometimes the value of a thing lies not in what we get from it, but what we pay for it, what it costs us.” (II, Raids § 38) Service, sacrifice, and trauma endured bonds the soldier to the social institution for which one has sacrificed, and this is called “freedom.” Nietzsche considers the guardians little more than that, as the brute muscular force necessary to produce the double-barrier that protects the intellectuals who do the true creative work. The political figureheads in the state will not know what to do with the intellectual creativity of the intellectuals and can only really serve as a public utility for the majority, capable only of being “intelligent machines,” a problem made worse when the herd-instinct of the democratic political system is completely unleashed, then one must presume that the double-barrier between intellectuals and the political system must be of paramount importance to a flourishing society.

If a unifying movement of history towards a cumulative telos (or, teleoi, multiple telos) is to occur towards an end, Nietzsche’s challenge is to accept a greater truth, that there is no telos that we as humans can rely on from unproven spiritual forces (except perhaps our own human imagination, II, What the Germans are Lacking § 3, where Nietzsche criticizes the “de-spiritualizing forces of the science industry”) - and there is no rationale to our existence beneath the appearance of forms. By applauding the Laws of Manu, there is an admission that the telos is in the hands of humans and not something referred to as “God,” which typically boils down to a personal identity, rather than an actual spiritual entity.

Each generation passes through the river Lethe (the river of forgetting) and washes away the memories of each previous generation, history is not cyclical, but an eternal return to that which has been forgotten. A repetition of the same problems, and if we take the long view of history, we might see the exhaustion of the “long waste of strength, the agony of the ‘in vain’ insecurity,” (WP§12) the lack of any deeper meaning that arises, what did all those lives lost in the name of growing the Greek, Roman, Ottoman, Egyptian, German, Chinese empires result in besides needless death? All of those empires are washed away and even in the midst of all this hustle and bustle restlessly, violently, headlong towards a perceived good end, “one realizes that becoming aims at nothing and achieves nothing,” (WP§12)

“The whole labor of the ancient world gone for naught: I have no word to describe the feelings that such an enormity arouses in me. And, considering the fact that its labor was merely preparatory, that with adamant self-consciousness it laid only the foundations for a work to go on for thousands of years, the whole meaning of antiquity disappears! ... To what end the Greeks? To what end the Romans?” (AC§59) to be usurped by the “saintly anarchism” of Christianity which upended the “prerequisites of a learned culture...” of which, all the methods were there that were “longest opposed by habit and laziness,” and one must presume that Nietzsche misses a point here, that if the Christians led by Paul, unknown to themselves, appropriating from the chandala to appropriate the symbol of God on the cross into a crystallization of all the “secret seditions” into “all the fruits of anarchist intrigues in the empire... into one immense power,” which upends the methodical gathering of cultured society into the storm clouds of anarchistic unplanned mediocrity, would laziness and anarchistic impulsivity win out in the end anyway? And, is not this Nietzsche’s point all along? The disciplined work required to build a culture towards the telos of a superior form of human requires a level of grit that the “sirocco”-religious belief that God’s warmth shines equally upon the botched and the exceptional, will always ruin the strong. Civilizations that take on a compassionate vision of Christ will eventually come to ruin through impulsivity that never develops into higher forms. Nietzsche also gives us examples of alternative views of Christ as a conceptual persona who represents something other than the compassionate Christ, an Anti-Christ of vitriol, anger, and resentment whose presence Nietzsche cites entirely within the context of the New Testament. Nietzsche understood the narcissism at the heart of humanist standards of truth when he writes: “At bottom, human beings mirror themselves in things; they consider anything beautiful if it casts their image back to them.” (TI, Raids of an Untimely Man, § 19)

To think that there is a cyclical nature to these rising and falling empires is absurdly tied to the idea that there is a collective historical memory out of which each successive generation builds new knowledge upon. This is patently absurd, because there is no inborn knowledge carried on from previous generations, as in say, the absurdity of Kierkegaard’s “hereditary sin” as something passed on from generation to generation in his book *The Concept of Anxiety*.

There is no accumulated collective knowledge as in the sense of Nous, or Absolute Mind, or accrued inscriptions of prior dharma on the atman in some forms of vedic metaphysics of the soul. Each generation is washed of the memories through experiential learning from the previous generation; and the ‘eternal recurrence’ is the recurrence of the same, not that



each individual is reborn to live the same exact life over and over again, but that each life is lived without any mnemonic inborn habit - the culture produces 'instincts' which appear natural. At least, by touting the Laws of Manu, Nietzsche is embracing a love of fate in the toughest, most honest way possible, we are ensnared by systems of power that condition our instincts and pattern our habits of behavior and thought. All systems do that, especially the ones like Christianity which tells us we are 'free unique individuals' - there is a system of anarchical patterning of instincts in the least way, which leads to the dumbing down of the entire culture into the most mediocre forms of culture.

Each new birth starts from the same active-forgetfulness, only now, we are inscribed with 'learning' - and, history bears down on us like a nightmare, as if there was some propriety towards history that we are supposed to carry in our hearts? When according to Nietzsche's radical interpretation, Jesus was a "saintly-anarchist" (AC § 27) with the courage of a lion, whose work has now been domesticated into zoe; covered, concealed, and demoted to a Chandala-religion embraced by the "botched" (AC § 2), among those responsible for the disposal of corpses - whereas Jesus anarchically said, "let the dead bury the dead," his greatest fans turned out to be those who deny life and whose calling is "out of place among exceptional men, whose instincts which belong to them stand as much opposed to aristocracy as to anarchy." (AC § 57)

"The very word "Christianity" is a misunderstanding, at bottom, there was only one Christian and he died on the cross." (AC § 39) - again, focus on Nietzsche utilization of 'understanding', and 'at bottom' indicating a grounding in the individual personage of Jesus which cannot be reproduced. Also, when Jesus dies on the cross, there is no Church at that point, there are no "sanghas"; there is no guarantee of a messianic return, because the book of Revelations would be written almost a century later, he dies alone as the inscription on his crucifix bears the stain of his crime which as we learn in John 19:19, bears the inscription of the crime to which he was put to death: "Here is Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews." Nietzsche sees in Jesus "a political criminal... the proof of which is to be found in the inscription that was put upon the cross." (AC § 27)

In addition, there has been plenty of research coming forth that says "Yashua" (i.e. Jesus), a very common name among the Jewish peasants at the time, may not have been an actual personage, but as Nietzsche suspected, a literary invention designed by the Romans to fend off one of the major threats to the political hegemony of its empire - the Jews. What better way to fend off the political counter-hegemony of the Jewish religion than to make up stories about the arrival of their awaited Messiah? This was clearly a failed attempt at appropriation.⁴

Here is where Nietzsche is interesting, and clearly has an influence on a wide variety of philosophical work that has been created afterwards. He is not interested in the historical philology of understanding how traditions became what they are now, as if there is some objective aspect of human nature that "Christianity" discovers. The kernel of Christianity is the conditioning of the "Chandala" into instinctually, reflexively reacting "what is precisely the opposite of a heroic struggle," "in the inability to be an enemy," the "glad tidings" of the "eternal life" have been discovered as immanent within our soul. We must go back to Nietzsche's previous writings and re-read passages from, say the preface to

⁴ Bart Erhman has forwarded this thesis in many of his well researched books.

Genealogy of Morality where Nietzsche begins with “We are unknown to ourselves...” (GM preface), rather than read this as a jovial Platonic “care of the self” where we discover our immanent, individuality as carved out by a special place in the eyes of God, we have to understand this as Nietzsche launching a critique on the very concept of a self as merely a construction of instinctual reflexes containing no deeper truths, there is no ‘essence’ to oneself with which one can discover the truth about oneself. In reality, the self is nothingness concealed, and the true self-mastery derives from creating the self as if one were the “saintly anarchist” rather than the process-template-one-sized fits all “Christianity” of a paint-by-numbers way to understand beauty in life.

The problem with the whole of the “Gospels” is that “punishment and guilt are lacking, there is no reward or transcendent notion of heaven, “Sin” as separation between humans and God is abolished, and “Eternal bliss is not merely promised, nor is it bound up with conditions: it is conceived as the only reality - what remains consists of signs useful in speaking of it.” (AC§33) This creates a “delusion of personal holiness” (AC § 44) that has a fatal influence on politics by making politics “sick with a lack of courage” (AC§43) because now, in the aftermath of every individual Chandala-soul being told that they are a special ego, around which the entire cosmos pivots, every mediocre person thinks they are equal to every other person, “every individual may lay claim to eternal importance; that insignificant bigots and the three-fourths insane may assume that the laws of nature are constantly suspended on their behalf it is impossible to lavish too much contempt upon such as magnification of every sort of selfishness to infinity, to insolence.” (AC§ 43)

At least in the Laws of Manu, there are clear castes that creates a “double barricade” for the exceptional to excel as experts on topics like beauty, art, law, and the major questions of politics like what constitutes the progress towards which the ship of state should be navigated. Nietzsche’s thesis is a tough pill to swallow in a western society where ideological structures of power echo the virtues of democracy ad nauseum. What should the best state strive towards? For Nietzsche, it should be the highest intellectual creativity, and that would only occur by creating the double barricade against the weakening impulses of the lower castes, and by viewing the state honestly, as nothing more than a guardian arm of the intellectual caste. When the guardians and the mediocre are held in the highest esteem what society winds up with is a society run by a slave-morality, which Nietzsche most clearly defines in the *Genealogy of Morality*, which is also one of the first places where we start to see his references to “castes.” Slaves’ revolt empowers those whose morality constructs an “opposing, external world” and who need “physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all.” (GM §10)

Nietzsche writes, “The superior caste” (in this case, it is obvious that he means the Brahmins, the intellectuals who are the best and brightest) “have the most perfect privileges of the few; it stands for happiness, for beauty, for everything good upon earth. Only the most intellectual of men have the right to beauty, to the beautiful, only in them can goodness escape being weakness.” (AC § 57) The intellectuals know what to do with beauty, and how to appreciate it, rather than throw it away, waste it, become violent towards it, and bring it down into the muck with the dead. Hence, the ‘evil’-satanist who alleges that he is somehow going against the taboos of Christian morality by transgressing the vision of the meek, lamblike Christian follower, is only replicating the violence inherent within the Christ-narrative, elided by their own biased censored view of the Gospels.



Nietzsche shows, (AC §45) that there is a seething hatred concealed in the image of Christ as the “peacemaker” - he was quite the “saintly anarchist” whose teachings would have had him banished to Siberia (AC § 27) In other words, Jesus would have been right at home as a political prisoner, a “Hyperborean” in the land of ice and snow, where Jesus would have been a Hyperborean, toughening himself as a prisoner of the state. Jesus is re-envisioned as a warrior who finds salvation in Valhalla.

The Laws of Manu and the Creation of a New “Hyperboreans”

Nietzsche’s vision of the caste system as one of his ideal political systems, strips away the fantasies offered by the noble lie of free-will and upward mobility views on the Laws of Manu, that his . It is better to be brutally honest about the traps “we” find ourselves in, and deal with it honestly, even loving our fate, rather than retreat into escapist fictions of ‘free-choice’ as the reason why poor are poor, weak are weak, and wealthy are wealthy. If the wealthy are wealthy as a result of free-choice, they can be admired and even emulated as the one and only virtuous ideal.

Not many scholars of Nietzsche’s philosophy have dared to confront Nietzsche’s seemingly bizarre admiration with the Laws of Manu. One particularly bad reading of this aporia is offered by Dorothy Figuera in an essay, “Aryan Aristocrats and *Urbemensch*: Nietzsche’s Reading of the Laws of Manu,”⁵ Nietzsche is signaling that he wants to be read as a new mythmaker. This is clear when he immediately reveals who he welcomes as his audience, “Let us look each other in the face. We are Hyperboreans... neither by land nor by water will you find the road to the Hyperboreans.” (AC § 1). Immediately indicating a camaraderie among his readers, to escape to a mythical Hyperborean land of Eden, as to surmise that this place has been lost to history, because it never actually existed in the first place, except in the minds of myth-makers who maintain their ability to imagine other worlds. We should not read Nietzsche as truly signaling a project of racial eugenics. It is crucial to notice that at no place in Nietzsche’s writings does he ever argue in favor of ending anyone else’s life, and he always converses as an agonist with competitive and playful intentions.

The new “Hyperboreans” are those who remain aloof, in the mountains, softly screaming in exile away from the “Catholic lunatic asylum as the ultimate ideal,” which has resulted in “The whole world as a madhouse.” (AC § 51), since the myth of original sin tells the story of human nature as a-priori flawed, morality becomes an “anti-nature” where humans must rebuke their instincts in order to be saved, henceforth, each human is mad until proven sane. Nietzsche’s intention is to escape and think peacefully away from the madding crowd that has internalized a Christian ethos even in its alleged atheism. In doing this, he imagines the perfect society as the one that posits its highest goal as the creation of *Urbemensch*, Hyperborean-Giants with exceptional talents, these are mythical ideas, because remember that truth is a kind of error, and all approaches to reality contain an element of phantasmagorical myth.

⁵ Dorothy Figuera. “Aryan Aristocrats and *Urbemensch*: Nietzsche’s Reading of the Laws of Manu,” *The Comparatist*, volume 23, May 1999, pg. 5-20.

“We” Hyperboreans against the “Sirocco”

“We”, the Hyperboreans that Nietzsche invites us to be at the outset of Anti-Christ, “we sickened on lazy peace, cowardly compromise, the whole virtuous dirtiness of the modern Yay and Nay.” Clearly, a derisive criticism of utilitarian sedentary democracy and dare I say, ‘consumerism’ as symptomatic of exactly the kind of ‘do as thou wilt’ attitudes that brings Christian wrath upon some vague a-political social construct they call “secular humanism” (i.e. capitalist consumerist ‘democracy’ devoid of any political context).

The Hyperboreans serve as a political contrast to the chandalas who blow in the warm breeze with not firm and tough beliefs in anything: “We” Hyperboreans versus the tolerant of all idiocy, the understanding of every mediocre idea, the warm-breeze of the tropic-winds, the “sirocco” tempts all of us in to ‘go with the flow’ so to speak, and institutional Christianity is susceptible to watering down the asperity and harshness of tone necessary to conquer and do great things into a compassionate warm friendliness, even with those who lack the intelligence of truly understand the vision of the creative genius.

I think Nietzsche’s use of the Laws of Manu are to promote the caste system as a style of barricading the best and brightest from the weak, the mediocre, and the chandala whose slave morality might infect the will to power of the intellectual caste. He never says to do harm to the lower castes, and when philosophers take quotes out of context they mistakenly miss the depth of Nietzsche’s writing style. For example, a quote such as this one from *Twilight of the Idols* § 45, Raids of an Untimely Man:

“The criminal type is the type of the strong human being under unfavorable conditions, a strong human being who has been made sick...” clearly referencing what he would later clarify as his second physiological type, the guardians. In this case, the guardians are drawn down by the mediocre, who in this case are the chandala whose resentment for not being useful, they are “not perceived as beneficial, as useful - that chandala feeling of not counting as equal, but of being excluded, unworthy, a source of impurity. All such natures have a subterranean tint to their thoughts and deeds; with them, everything turns paler than with those on whose existence daylight shines.” (TI, Raids, § 45) since moral values are about power, the only device by which the chandala/mediocre can cast their power upon the strong is through the apparatuses of capture - the imaginary narratives of metaphysical revenge exacted by God. Hence, the intellectuals must be protected from these soporific moral allegories in order to pursue beauty, happiness, joy, and retain an existence whose daylight still shines.

In fact, he promotes his version of the caste system, even though it is set up as a pyramid structure, with the mediocre on the bottom, and these consist of the largest numbers of people, “Everyone enjoys the privileges that accord with his state of existence. Let us not underestimate the privileges of the mediocre.” (AC § 57) We all just need to be honest about our skills, talents, and rather than exude jealousy, and revenge on those who are exceptional at what they do, those of us who can or cannot do something should relish and admire the accomplishments of the truly greatest among us. It is obvious that Nietzsche is describing a meritocracy formed on the basis of will to power, those who are the best, will rise to the top of the social pyramid through their sheer will, whether there is a caste system or not, but to accord the most rights and privileges to those who cannot do the best, is to lead the society down the road to cultural and social decadence. Hence,



the will to power of those at the top of the pyramid is not an easy cake-walk as Nietzsche explains, “Life is always harder as it mounts to the heights - the cold increases, responsibility increases.” (AC § 57) Yet, the mediocre also benefit from the accomplishments of the highest Brahmins, precisely because the most talented and brightest are in a position to navigate through the “coldest” and most treacherous intellectual expeditions necessary to make inroads into new discoveries that benefit everyone. Hence, “we Hyperboreans” are those who are of the toughest, most Stoically inclined of “life’s military school,” (TI § 8) so to speak, where the will to power is actually enacted by those who “regard a difficult task as a privilege,” and to whom it is “a recreation to play with burdens that would crush all others...” (AC § 57) What happens when the brightest intellectuals are no longer up to the task? Or, worse, when the intellectuals are so infected with a slave-morality of self-doubt and has to explain its utility, its grounds, its casuistical antecedents, thusly indicating that the mediocre “intelligent machines” whose life revolves around a functional calling, a public utility, and a resentment towards happiness and beauty (ala the Christian-sickness towards life) - the descent into “dialectics” implies that the chandala are starting to win.

This is an internal struggle and it is also casting no delusions about the ways that society creates arbitrary lines of demarcation that foster in-group biases and marginal otherness. Simply being honest about the way that the strong are necessary as guardians, and the mediocre should not be cast into superior roles, and in what may appear to the contemporary mind as the most controversial statement, is actually a truth painfully hidden in plain sight: “the inequality of rights is essential to the existence of any rights at all.” (AC § 57) I have written about this in my work on Nietzsche and Sport, not everyone has the ability of an *Übermensch* athlete, and we would be deluded to think that every person is equal in ability to that of a Michael Jordan, for example. When I was writing about sports, the philosophical positions were intended for an expansive application, and one of the most nefarious problems that Nietzsche sees with “democracy” is that it gives voice to the resentment of the mediocre chandala character whose delusions, encrusted over centuries of Egyptianized patterns of belief, is a true-believer in the equality of perspectives, that all opinions are equal, no matter how absurd, no matter if it derives from an expert in the field or an armchair amateur.

Nietzsche writes an allusion to Montesquieu’s theory of “political climate”⁶ by saying: “The tolerance and largeness of the heart that ‘forgives’⁷ everything because it ‘understands’⁸ everything is a sirocco⁹ to us. Rather live amid the ice than among modern virtues and other such south-winds!” (AC § 1) It is really not about race or eugenics, as much as it’s about political ideologies deriving from climate. Living in “sirocco” produces a soporific idleness. “We” must choose the icy winds of the northern frost - because it awakens! Where Socrates preferred the sting of the Gadfly to awaken the horse of Athens, Nietzsche addresses his readers as potential comrades up to the task of willing themselves as *Übermenschen*, must choose to take the tougher road up the pyramid so that we may see for miles and prevent ourselves from becoming Last Men (i.e. decadent, lazy, mediocre, and meek, compassionate, weak-willed and soft). If you think of the metaphysical systems that developed in the Northern regions of Europe, these were not always peace loving mythos - the idea of Valhalla for example, the hall of souls of honored warriors killed in battle, is exemplary of this heroic warrior archetype of the “strong” that Nietzsche contrasts with the wishy-washy compassion based “practical sympathy for the botched

and the weak.”; the most harmful fallout from Christian hegemony. (AC § 2) which he does not want to fall into a habitual rut of a sort of decadent aristocracy that emerges when Christianity becomes ascendant in combination with capitalism and democracy, however, the greatest societies would never make their intellectuals beholden to the guardians - that is the fascism of daily life.

This is why Nietzsche saw a horrifying version of Christianity in secular form creeping in via the categorical imperative, because when paired with the popularized enthusiasm towards representative forms of government, you wind up with a secular infinity that tells subjects: “think as freely as you like, just as long as you obey!” the paradox of sirocco warmth and compassion creeping in is that it blankets resistance via “compassion” while the warm winds maintain a political, social, and economic homeostasis.

Laws of Manu and Amor Fati

There are some bad readings of Nietzsche that miss these ironic aspects in his work, especially when it comes to his views on one of the most controversial aspects of his moral philosophy, his admiration of the Laws of Manu. It appears strange for someone as brilliant as Nietzsche to praise the texts that gave rise to the caste system. Having originated from the Aryans (i.e. now the Iranians) who allegedly and by some accounts constructed the Laws of Manu as a way to trap the lower classes in a system of morality based on the fatalism of samsara, or cyclical rebirth into a particular caste as repayment of karmic debt accrued from a previous life. If someone was ‘bad’ in a previous life, they would be reborn among the lower castes, say the Untouchables. If someone was ‘good’ in a previous life, they would ascend to the higher castes in the next life, say the Brahmin caste. Since the caste system was based on the karma police (i.e. the cosmic Justice System of some mythical Godhead, Brahman, or Krishna, etc.) it would be the most prideful, egotistical thing for a peon among the lower castes to truly question the will of the Gods.

Therefore, the Laws of Manu created the perfect functional wheel of moral ‘amor fati’, or love of fate, because if you were to question the process of rebirth you would appear blasphemous against, not just the laws of the political system, but the cosmic laws of nature themselves which placed you where you are in the cosmic order, and since these forces are invisible there is no way to truly prove one way or another that the caste system is based on the scales of a cosmic Justice System, and vice versa. Therefore, any attempt to undermine the caste system would throw the entire social and political system into a comic

⁶ Montesquieu. *Spirit of the Laws*. Part 3, Book 14, “Laws and their relation to the Nature of Climate.” - again, political geography fell out of favor because of its use by the Nazi Party, however, we should not make the ad hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy (“after this, therefore because of this”) - there are all sorts of theories like these that were of use to Romantic Nationalists in the eighteenth and nineteenth century that fell out of favor in association with fascism in the latter portion of the twentieth century, but “we” should also remain diligent in understanding that the ideology of National Socialism was the ideology of appropriation, to take from ecological movements (as Murray Bookchin points out), and socialist worker movements, and the temptation today is to cancel all aspects of any and all ideologies that even catch a whiff of national socialism, as if to purify oneself of the ideology of racial purity by washing our hands.

⁷ Notice “for-gives” rather than “for-gets” as the Christian way to utilize history as caritas/charity, submission, humility, which Nietzsche is correct to see as yet another form of slave-morality creeping into all aspects of life, this bizarre secular humanist ‘do as thou wilt’ of free-will ‘yay or nay’ IS afterworldiness. Despisers of life who ‘live and let live’ so to speak because there is nothing to will when all life is destined by “God.”

⁸ Literally ‘understand’ as a being-‘standing beneath’ a greater Being (i.e. “God”); Christians ‘for-give’ the non-believers of their ignorance of the transcendental a-priori ‘Truth’ that they believe Jesus Christ brought to the world.

⁹ Sirocco is a warm wind that blows in from the Tropics to the North, it slows down, warms, comforts, and in Nietzsche’s correct view, weakens the will.



anarchy, and Nietzsche is correct to point out, that even up to and including modern times, the lower classes with nothing to lose, are the ones most desperately clinging to what little they have, and therefore are equally afraid of the “aristocracy and anarchy.” Of their political overlords who are a constant point of resentment and vengeful slave-morality projected upon them, with the idea that ‘they will get their just deserts!’ out of jealousy of their freedom and the powerlessness of the lower castes, they can be manipulated between a resentment towards the aristocracy, which they are separate from and feel alienated towards, and the fear of losing a grip on any social order, especially when the cosmic order is rendered social and political through the alleged permanency of the cosmic justice system coursing through the caste system itself, any disruption in the political system renders the cosmic system ‘anarchical’ as well, and therefore the lower castes cling to the religious and political system with exceptional desperation, even though and especially when the system does not serve any rational sort of self-interest on their part.

As Nietzsche tells us, the people most anchored to the caste system are the ones with the least to gain from its enactment. In his description of the perfect system in *The Anti-Christ*, There are three classes and in descending order these are the intellectuals (i.e. the Brahmins), the guardians, and the merchants, whether or not this is accurate is really not the point, and whether or not it is a correct description of the Laws of Manu is also not necessarily the point. What is interesting about what Nietzsche does, is he finds a way to take the moral principles of a system of governance widely considered to be the worst form of cosmic nihilism and shows that this system is actually the greatest way to keep things orderly and disciplined, when he says: “it is exceptional for breeding a particular race and type!” (II § 7:3) and again, it is not necessary to see if what he says about the Laws of Manu are accurate or not, they most certainly are not historically accurate in any useful ethnological sense, the way that Nietzsche describes it here is as a sort of political phantasmagoria, as a useful myth for political utopian thinking that is vastly different than a ‘veridical’ correspondence between correct and incorrect interpretations of the Laws of Manu. This is because his narratives regarding the text itself vary in subtle ways depending on the context. In *Twilight of the Idols* he claims there are four types of race that it tries to breed, the priestly race, fighting race (i.e. the guardians), the merchants and farmers, and the servants, with no mention of the untouchables. Nietzsche’s reading of the Laws of Manu is not an honest reading of Ancient Vedic Law in any serious sense, if anything it is an evocation of a return to the class system detailed by Plato through the mouthpiece of Socrates in the Republic. Where you see Plato’s society cut into three classes: producers, guardians, and philosopher kings. If anything, Plato may have appropriated these ideas from the Laws of Manu as the Greeks were in contact with Asian cultures.

“Anti-Christ” as Christian, all too Christian

A close reading of these first few passages already renders the Nietzschean “Anti-Christ” as something other than mirroring the Christian compassion mythos. He is not espousing a kinder-gentler version of the Devil that mirrors the peace-making image of Jesus in the form of a good-intentioned “Devil” whose good-will has been misinterpreted. We are not supposed to have sympathy for the Devil, so to speak. We are however, boldly shown a version of Christ that is anti-compassion, full of vitriol and wrath. Nietzsche painstakingly cites sources from within the Gospels, throughout the Anti-Christ(ian), to show the readers the concealed version of Jesus, the Garden of Eden myth, and performs an

exegesis of Christ-conceptual personae that might seem strange to the vision of Jesus as meek, mild lamb of God, rather seeing the Lion of Judah, the repressed interpretation that ultimately links Jesus with his moral doppelganger - the Devil

Perhaps this is why Judas seals Jesus' fate with a kiss, compassion, affection, the caress of a friend is what leads the virtuous down the path to ruin. The treachery of Judas-conceptual personae, even among the disciples, shows that Jesus was within a Machiavellian game where his enemies were closer!

I chose this quote from *Ecce Homo* for two reasons. Firstly, you see Nietzsche speaking "theologically" which he rarely does, and this is a sardonic take on a subject that is typically taken far too seriously, the subject of "God" as an actual entity, rather than a literary construct. Secondly, Nietzsche never mentions his book the Anti-Christ(ian) in *Ecce Homo* because although he finished writing the book, it was held back by his publisher and was technically not available to the public until after Nietzsche went totally mute for the last eleven years of his life, a decade long stasis of mutely staring into the abyss must have been the most apt way for such an active mind that for so long had created lightning thoughts, to be stuck in mental stasis must have been torturous for such an immensely talented genius such as Nietzsche, as it would have been for anyone, but unlike Beethoven whose deafness did not encumber his ability to compose, Nietzsche's organ of creativity was his brain. This quote in *Ecce Homo* gives us one of the last glimpses into the mind of Nietzsche on the topic of "theology" at the time of writing the Anti-Christ(ian) text.

What we should infer from this quotation is something that is often undervalued in the writings of Nietzsche, which is the fact that his writings on "God" are often laden with satirical approaches to fictions that are forgotten as such. In the context of the Church, the issue of original sin seems to be a matter of settled theology, not to be viewed with humor, it is the heart and form of the Christian faith, which at its core is a faith that forms its center around the experience of moral debt. A debt that was accrued in the Garden of Eden, only to be repaid through taking Christ as Savior.

An absurdly condescending debt that is alleged by the Judeo-Christian faith traditions to apply universally as a "Weltanschauung" or "worldview," and we know from Nietzsche's perspectives on Epicurus in relation to Plato that a universalizing "worldview" is a face seeking after itself, through resentment of some other who is receiving greater fame and fortune. (BGE § 9) and you can see this in Nietzsche's summation of the Eden myth, in a matter of a paragraph, he affirms the omnipotence of God by seeing the serpent as an avatar of God's resentment towards his own power. God has the power to create a perfect world here on earth, and is ashamed to do so! It was too blissful in the Garden, even for God, and by creating man as a creature tempted into sin, also reveals the breadth of the power of God in the statement that God created humans in the image of God; the Garden was so enjoyable even God had to back off and balance it out by resting and allowing sin to enter into the world.

For other reasons, original sin is really about this heart and form of Christian experience into the morality of debt repayment through virtuous behavior, and this experience occurs at the libidinal level, in the deepest secrets of identity construction. Nietzsche is also telling his readers that he is not a philosopher of categorical imperatives, principles, and designations of correct and incorrect behavior. A belief in harmony and moral-balance had



become a sickness, according to Nietzsche, in western ethics since the Apollo Lyceus all the way through to the Tübingen Theology of Kant, Schelling, and Hegel, that emphasized harmony and balance as the resolution of truth into a dialectical synthesis of apperception. All perception is synthesized into a ubiquitous assimilation in this “sickly” continuation of the ethics of balance and harmony, and the decadence of the dialectic as the sign of a culture in decline.

In the Anti-Christ(ian) you see Nietzsche calling his project an “overturning of priestly classes” and this means he is patently against any dialectical thinking. Instead, he is a smasher of all philosophy as propositional logic, merely dialoguing and talking in the talk. Nietzsche embodied a lived critique via affects, spurs, jolts of inspiration, surges of energy, as thoughts raced through his mind as a bolt of thunder in the clouds, which due to his blurry vision later in life and painful migraines, would only allow brief intervals of productive writing time during the course of a day. Nietzsche could also meditate on a passage he wanted to write. Using the time effectively, he would rethink his meditations throughout the time when he was in such pain as to make writing prohibitive. Nietzsche’s philosophy was not created out of dialectical propositional sparring, but the fencing with texts, which he would later admit were impediments to his own creative process. Eventually, in the Anti-Christ(ian) text, you see Nietzsche fully committing to a philosophy of difference contra a philosophy of dialectics. Power becomes about asserting contrary spaces. You see uses of “anti” “contra” and “against” throughout his writings of this era, and not in a dialectical synthesis with the subject to find common ground, but through the exegesis of the textual heart and form of Christian religion.

“God is refuted, but not the devil.”¹⁰

“Perhaps I am even envious of Stendhal? He took away from me the best atheistical joke that precisely I might have made: “God’s only excuse is that he does not exist.”

(EH “Why I am so Clever,” §3)

“What? Doesn’t this mean, to speak with the vulgar: God is refuted, but the devil is not?” On the contrary! On the contrary, my friends. And, the devil - who forces you to speak with the vulgar?” (BGE § 37)

‘Good’ and ‘Evil’ are not inscribed into the universe. Christian mythology creates a mirroring effect that creates a mutual involvement between Jesus and the Devil and God’s ethical complicity in creating the Devil. The erasure of “good” immediately effaces “evil” which serves as its inverse by definition. Evil is the Antithesis to Christ. The resentment

¹⁰ Unpublished Fragments: (Spring 1885 - Spring 1886), August-September 1885, translated with an afterword by Adrian Del Caro. pg. 182., same line is repeated again closer to the publication of BGE in Autumn 1885 - Spring 1886, “God is refuted, but not the devil.” pg. 285.

and the return of its repressed. Good is that which relies on its antithesis as an objective against which it exists at all, as resistance. If ethical systems take away the objective sense of good, then the drive towards evil will no longer exist. A person is reactively motivated if the sole motivation is to transgress the good, and the problem with Christianity is that it creates the “inability to be an enemy” (AC § 28); it takes away the obstacle of competition, the agonistic point of pressure that produces the stress necessary to push oneself to greater heights, and so you have to produce your own obstacles, create your own challenges. Nietzsche appears downtrodden, and remorseful about the homogenizing effects of Christian morality, which synthesizes all aspects of life to be nothing more than understanding the goodness of God. In addition, the open-endedness of anticipating the exact return of Christ, and the meek will inherit the earth, links the slave-morality to the belief in a hostile outside world (GM § 1:10) as all slave-moralities link a hostile external world with an objective sense of the cosmic law of morality. This means that any campaign to change the hostile external world, would also strip the “slaves” of their ownmost identity.¹¹

Which casts the Christian-Chandala in a permanent homeostasis of anticipation awaiting the return of the messiah, a return that will never happen. This means that the Christian culture cannot truly reach a point of total and complete exhaustion like the Greek and Roman Empires did; precisely because there is no mnemonic repetition of collective memory. Each life is an individual life. Each soul is a personal soul, a clay jar hand-crafted by God as if by an artisan, to be revered, cherished and saved, memorialized and entombed, even though the teachings of Jesus tell us “let the dead bury the dead,” the Christian faith is a resentment morality that allows “proud people to give of their riches... and to whom they can make sacrifices.” (AC§16) It allows wealthy people a morality of self-pity, which alleviates them of the guilt of being wealthy because they “tithes” to a figment of their imagination and feel as though they are doing something virtuous, which also allows them to remain wealthy.

It is obvious that by the time you read the passages (in AC § 45), Nietzsche has fully exposed the “Lion of Judah” as a conceptual personae totally devoid of the peacemaking Lamb, if anything Jesus is the violent, rageful crusader. Better for him that a millstone be hanged around his neck and cast into the bottom of the sea than he betray the faith of the young ones, it will be worse for the unbelievers on the day of reckoning than it was for the city of Sodom and Gomorrah, if your eye causes you to sin, pluck it out, and on and on and on with these polemical tirades. When there is a Church on every street corner, is it any wonder that the world has turned into a madhouse!

This wrathful madness becomes apparent upon closer examination of the ethics of the Old Testament. It does not take much to see that upon closer inspection that as one might critique the Laws of Manu for trapping people in the caste system, a slave-morality is also enshrined into the Ten Commandments. As we will see later, the Laws of Manu also.

These commandments conveniently create a list of rules, the first four of which stand to reveal the conceptual personae of Yashua as a narcissistic megalomaniac: 1. Have no Gods Before Me (one might add, as Slavoj Žižek does, that this is a sign of jealousy, with the key word “before”; what someone does on their own time is their own business, just do not

¹¹ Daniel Conway. *Nietzsche and the Political*. Routledge. Pg. 45.



make a mockery out of God by worshipping other Gods in the presence of the Lord. 2. Make no Graven images of God (God is “nous” impossible to mummify). 3. Do not take the Lord’s name in Vain (reputation matters!) 4. Keep the Sabbath Holy (preserve one day per week to revere a noumenal entity that has yet to reveal itself in physical form, what a waste of time!), not to mention the fact that the rules themselves are written in a purely reactive voice indicating a passive-power to the Almighty. The question becomes, if humans were created in the image of God, and God reigns with all-powerful control over every minutiae of the cosmos (ala Leibnizian “sufficient reason”), then why would these rules need to be written down at all?

The way that some Christians try to resolve this tension is by claiming that with the arrival of Jesus Christ as the Messiah, true believers in the salvation of Christ find motivation through a strict adherence to the Grace of their savior. Some claim that believers can fall in and out of Grace and if the true believer strays too far from the boundaries of salvational Grace they will lose their salvation. Obviously, any first year logic student who is forced to think about the three qualities of God: omniscient, omnipresent, and omnipotent; and to this you might add attributes of God such as: self-existent, eternal, pure-spirit, and omnibenevolent.

Even a cursory reading of the Bible after reading Nietzsche’s work reveals that this is fundamentally not the case, God does not show any of these attributes, unless readers are willing to see that beneath these attributes and qualities what is written about as “God” also possesses the qualities of historically constructed, temporal contingencies, laden with rage, vengeance, and a retributive sense of Justice (revenge for putting Jesus on the Cross is the Revelations act of Fire of Brimstone, etc.) God is not omnibenevolent. God as a Biblical character is a character motivated by resentment, God is a vengeful and reactive force.

Phantasm

Phantasm is one of the vital concepts in the Nietzschean oeuvre although the word itself never appears in any of Nietzsche’s work.¹² Rather than forwarding theses in the sense of pushing an argument based in propositional logic, a tradition in philosophy that spans at least as far back as the Platonic dialogues, most commonly you see Nietzsche giving off intensities and writing ‘experience books.’¹³ In the writing itself gives off sparks, pulsions, power and provokes an excitability in the reader. Phantasms are subterranean intensities buried deep in the subconscious that are undetectable to the surface levels of the conscious rational mind. Although Nietzsche posits a cogent critique of unreflective instinctual irrationalism¹⁴ Klossowski’s close reading of Nietzsche offers a reading of his work that is laden with circuits of “intensities, phantasms, simulacrum, and stereotypes” - which form a libidinal-economic process that conveys a psychic intensity of impulses. If God is dead, then meaning and creation does not derive from God, but from these chaotic impulses and the self is the prolonged extremity of chaos.¹⁵

¹² Daniel W. Smith. *Essays on Deleuze*. “Klossowski’s Reading of Nietzsche: Impulses, Phantasms, Simulacra, Stereotypes.” Edinburgh University Press, pg. 325-339.

¹³ A phrase used by Foucault to describe his own work and most certainly an homage to Nietzsche.

¹⁴ See: *Twilight of the Idols*. “*What the Germans are Missing #2*” - Nietzsche’s comments about David Strauss’ book “The Life of Jesus” whose philosophy created a “beer hall gospel and a ‘new faith’” of the kind one might say is a form of vitalistic idiocy.

¹⁵ Daniel W. Smith. *Essays on Deleuze*, pg. 328.

A phantasmagorical myth is shot through with illusions, misleading appearances, a deceptive shape or shadow perhaps produced by a magical lantern.¹⁶ Interestingly enough, the phantasm of the madman who proclaims the “death of God” is carrying in his hands a lantern, yet in a peculiar way, he arrives with the light, while it is still light outside. It is no small point that Nietzsche’s “madman” may have been an allusion to the Major Arcana Tarot, posing himself as the Hermit card whose personage is often seen carrying a lantern in broad daylight. An indication that he is bringing an untimely message, out of step with his time. The Hermit also figures into the *Gay Science* 364 and 365 as an indication of Nietzsche’s view of himself as untimely, and not truly understood until he is long dead, as a “post-humous” phantasm, his philosophy still stimulating intense reactions long after his corporeal body has deceased, the intensities and phantasms left in his books can still spur new experiences, thoughts, and concepts, but only among those who are open to an “Overperson” mindset to take on the challenges of attempting to live an exceptional life.

When the young Nietzsche writes, “concepts are metaphors that do not correspond to reality,” and “truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power...” and that “One might invent such a fable,” only to later fall into the habit of true belief because we forget what the intellect is: “the intellect, as a means for the preservation of the individual, unfolds its chief powers in simulation; for this is the means by which the weaker, less robust individuals preserve themselves...” The people who wrote the Bible knew that they were writing a fable. Being remote from those people now, whose lives have been lost to time, and who have created a mythical set of super-human characters that seem larger than life, we have forgotten that they knew it was a fictional story, not to be taken literally. The fact that the news of God’s death has come too early, even though a century has passed since Nietzsche wrote these startling words, perhaps he was right to say that even a century later the world is still not ready to hear these words and therefore must comfort ourselves with “festivals of atonement” and the invention of “sacred games,”¹⁷ to secure the abyss of freedom as this discovery that God is Dead leaves a boundless “open sea”¹⁸ with limitless possibilities for myth-making awaiting us.

For example, the Adam and Eve story was a fable subject to interpretation like any other work of narrative storytelling sprung from human imagination, it was not a product of pragmatic tool-making, problem solving equation that was used to explain beyond a reasonable doubt the origin of the human species and the origin of the cosmos. It would be absurd to truly believe that those who wrote the book of Genesis thought they were reporting as if from a journalistic fact-gathering perspective, it is absurd because there

¹⁶ It is no small detail that the alleged ‘madman’ who bears the news that God is Dead comes bearing a lantern in hand at the break of dawn. Why he would need such a lantern at the break of day is of no small consequence, he is both bearer of light, bringer of a new dawn, and provoking a new set of phantasmagorical myths to emerge as the end of the ‘Greatest Stress’ passage in the *Joyful Science* implies. It should also be noted that the aphorism of the ‘Greatest Stress’ is told in the third person. The story is told second-hand and the ‘madman’ does not apply this monicker to himself. As is now common science with the Dunning-Kruger Effect, no one is aware of their own lack of mental ability, and we are all ready to criticize others, either to overestimate or underestimate the abilities of the others in accordance with our own levels of cognition. So, the labeling of the ‘madman’ as mad clearly has to be done from the perspective of someone who holds that “God is Dead” is a flawed opinion, and yet the irony is that in calling the ‘madman’ as such, the narrator shows an inability to form meta-cognition on the level of self-criticism of theological first principles. Nobody ever applies the term “madman” to himself.

¹⁷ GS §125.

¹⁸ GS §343.



cannot be any first hand accounts of the creation myth, unless you interviewed Adam and Even directly, however, the story begins prior to their existence. Which poses a serious credibility problem to the truth of the story, only if you take the story to be factual, it is crucial to remember that it is an illusion, a narrative, a fable like any other fable and was written under those pretexts.

To be technical, it was spoken and passed down through oral tradition prior to being incarcerated by the written text. One of numerous hypotheses forwarded in Western (i.e. Heideggerian) metaphysics is that by making ‘the nothing’ (nichts) into the specter of being, you compel the nothing to be something that provokes anxiety, worry, and dread (hence, the statement by Heidegger ‘nothing noths’ nichts, nichts, befuddling as it is to logicians in the analytical tradition, this makes perfect sense in that the Nothing worries that which must take command of everything). In the Heideggerian reading of ontology as its inception with Parmenides famous poem of which we only retain a fragment, being tends to be ‘presence’ (a being that is here, now) and nothingness becomes little more than the shadow cast by the being of beings. For Parmenides there is only being and the being of beings. All being is derivative from a singular being and therefore there is no notion of nothingness.¹⁹

The Adam and Eve story probably dates back to the Lurianic Kabbalah myth of Adam Kadmon²⁰ who was supposedly the first being created by God. Adam was so large that his body was allegedly equal in size to the entire cosmos. It indicates that perhaps Heidegger was correct in asserting that Western Metaphysics takes a dreadful approach to the nothingness of being and must place something at the origin to ameliorate that feeling of dread. In fact, it is well known that the word “atom” when the Greek atomists were hypothesizing about the nature of things, and devising the theory of molecular particles they selected the word “Atom” because it resembled the Adamic notion that there was one unifying Being, created by God at the origin of all life. Moses Maimonides, in his *Guide for the Perplexed*, wrote that “The homonymous term Adam is in the first place the name of the first man, being, as Scripture indicates, derived from adamah, ‘earth.’ Next, it means ‘mankind’... it is also a third signification that it also signifies ‘the multitude,’ the ‘lower classes’ as opposed to those distinguished from the rest...”²¹

Trajectories of this narrative trope also cross-over into the Bible as some have theorized that Corinthians 15:45-50 reveal influence upon Pauline Christology about this myth. Of importance in its connection to Western Philosophy, the first to use the expression “original man” or “heavenly man” was Philo. Heavenly man is neither man nor woman and it would make sense that the Biblical version of Adam would be of this a-priori androgynous form of gender in that “Eve” is created from the rib of Adam. Not indicating an inferiority of the female form (as many misogynist readings have wrongly perpetuated) but that Adam contains both male and female (in the Tao it would be both yin and yang) prior to the ‘fall’ i.e. separating or missing the mark, which are typical translations of the Hebrew word for sin into English. The real original sin might be the creation of a false-binary that separates male and female out into categories whereby ‘good and evil’ are differentiated upon those grounds. The impact of which cannot be underestimated upon

¹⁹ Martin Heidegger. *Parmenides*.

²⁰ Adam Kadmon translates to “First Man”, “Primordial Man” or “Supreme Man.”

²¹ Moses Maimonides. *The Guide for the Perplexed*. Chapter XIV, pg. 45.

towering figures such as Plato whose idealism can be described by Arius Didymus by saying: "besides all individual men there is a certain conception of man...uncreated and imperishable."²²

What is crucial in Nietzsche's correct interpretation of this story is that it is a phantasmagorical myth. Phantasmagoria was a form of horror theater that projected frightening images such as skeletons, demons, and ghosts onto walls, smoke, or semi-transparent screens, having a fantastic or deceptive appearance, as something in a dream or created by the imagination. having the appearance of an optical illusion, especially one produced by a magic lantern. Notice that when Nietzsche's 'madman' declares the death of God he does so while carrying a lantern. The insinuation is clear. God is meant to be a horrifying image, but nothing more than a shadow cast upon the wall of a cave.

"The unfree will is mythology; in real life it is only a matter of strong and weak wills." (Beyond Good and Evil, §21) Where might we place Nietzsche on the issue of free will and determinism, or free will and destiny? While passages such as the aforementioned lines from *Ecce Homo* and *Beyond Good and Evil* draw a crystal clear vision of Nietzsche's atheist pelagianism, one has to remember the irony, absurdism, and the truth and lying in an extra-moral sense that Nietzsche recurrently evokes. Lines like: "These outcasts of society, these long-pursued, wickedly persecuted ones - also the compulsory recluses, the Spinozas or Giordano Brunos - always become in the end, even under the most spiritual masquerade, and perhaps without being themselves aware of it, sophisticated vengeance-seekers and poison brewers...not to speak of the stupidity of moral indignation, which is the unfailing sign in a philosopher that his philosophical sense of humor has left him." (BGE, §25) and remember, even Plato kept "under the pillow of his deathbed" a "volume of Aristophanes." (BGE, §28), but also being careful to note that "it was reported of the young Plato that he never laughed excessively."²³

Plato in a way ruins the interpretive openness of philosophical inquiry, because the love of wisdom means that "he had to live in a way to become ever more appropriate for his ideal, there had to be a correspondence of identical mimesis between the subject and the object. Which creates this terrible momentum behind a tendency towards a very restrictive understanding of realism as the good end of philosophical inquiry. To find the thing and its qualities, the quid and the quale is to discover what it actually is in its identity, its truth has to do with how the idea of the thing in the mind faithfully represents the thing-in-itself with clarity.

However, if we take Nietzsche's anecdote at face value then the authenticity required by Plato is an ironic authenticity, the forms are a humorous irony that humans strive towards within this life, without any hope of obtaining the perfection of form because perfection is only accessible in the mind of the gods through 'anamnesis' (memory work and re-collecting the knowledge implanted by the Gods, but only accessible in subterranean regions of the mind, not in our conscious mind). One might take Nietzsche's point "truth is an illusion we have forgotten as such" to mean that the Church, in going with St. Augustine and taking the Platonic theory of forms as seriously informing the proper

²² Arius Didymus. *Epitome of Stoic Ethics*.

²³ Friedrich Nietzsche. Introduction to the Study of the Platonic Dialogues.



reading of Biblical texts, as forgetting the ironic playfulness and humor with which Plato created the conceptual personae of Socrates.

It is important that, rather than avoiding all political theological conversations, one rather keep an open-theological approach that is peppered with a strong sense of humor, focused on the absurdity of existence qua existence, rather than vengefulness, jealousy, and the mocking derision of resentment. In the aforementioned lines where Nietzsche casts himself in a way he rarely does, as a ‘theologian’ you see his analysis of God as drawing back, recoiling, and experiencing resentment when God created the serpent on the seventh day.

It was a result of God making existence too beautiful and therefore, ‘Crucifying’ himself, even the anti-Pelagian version of God was too scared to fully embrace the Dionysiac spirit as “the religious affirmation of life, life whole and not denied in part; (typical that the sexual act arouses profundity, mystery, reverence.)” (WP §1052)²⁴ rather than as a master morality of the Dionysiac joyous affirmations of the pleasures in life, the Christian God ‘crucifies’ all that brings joy, and shepherds its followers into being despisers of the body, yet Nietzsche is espousing a heretical set of views, meant to satirize and emphasize his thesis that “truth is a kind of error,” and “will to power is pathos.” One may produce (poiesis) new interpretations, not necessarily just to be flippant for its own sake, but to stretch the limits of ortho-doxical (right and wrong in the ordinary common sense way it is understood), to stretch truth into an extra-moral sense.

Perhaps we should stop using the term “class-system” and use the term “caste-system” to accurately describe the ways that the social and political order of capitalism operates. In many ways, Nietzsche’s seemingly bizarre admiration for the “Laws of Manu” in *The Anti-Christ*, and throughout his later works, perhaps gives us the resources necessary to accurately discuss contemporary capitalism. Not as a form of social upward mobility, but as a genealogical breeding process to create the new “Hyperboreans” - or, the myth of a utopian Garden of Eden that actually existed around the North Pole, which was a popular narrative in the genre of popular science and emerging genres of science fiction at the time Nietzsche wrote his last flurry of books in the latter part of the 1880’s. In fact, William Fairfield Warren, the first President of Boston University wrote a book in 1885 entitled *Paradise Found: The Cradle of the Human Race at the North Pole*, where he argues, in Warren argues that life began at the north pole and at one point was temperate and contained the Garden of Eden. This book contained themes that would become popular tropes in the early forms of speculative science fictional text similar to early science-fiction with its highly speculative realism of say, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s *Lost World*, where you have speculative science merging with the unknown to produce highly imaginative results. In the *Lost World*, Doyle takes his readers on a fictional expedition deep into the Amazon rainforest where no one from Europe had explored at that point, and his imagination runs

²⁴ Obviously there was a recoiling effect with some theologians now rendering the serpent in Genesis 3:1 as ‘naked’ with the fig leaf being a necessary ‘concealment’ of the ‘animal vigor’ associated with the joy of creation and aesthetic pleasure, an anti-metaphysical urge to unity and enjoyment. Nietzsche’s Pelagianism as the ‘Anti-Christ’ is not some satanic propaganda, but a recognition that the arrival of the serpent as the evil-phallic signifier is the moment of God’s castration. Rather than ‘sin’ entering into the world the Garden of Eden myth is the moment when ‘shame’ enters the world. A completely different connotation with ‘original sin’ carrying an essentialist permanence to it, a transcendent a-priori when it is a slave morality that has infected all aspects of human moral conscience. This cautious God has infected the Logos, the resentment of a reflecting God who retracted the gift of connubial bliss in the prelapsarian utopia of eden.

wild, imagining that the forest contains dinosaurs, enormous gorillas, and all sorts of speculative creatures that now seem silly in hindsight that 'we know better' through science and such. The first successful expedition to the North Pole was not until 1926 when Roald Amundsen flew an airplane over the water at the absolute northernmost point on the globe, so in the late 1880's there was still the unknown aspect of what actually existed to the nether reaches of the northernmost stretches of the earth. With the unknown a sense of adventure was still possible.

Today, in the wee stretches of post-modernity, a book like *Lost World* will seem silly to the obtuse true-believer in the "burdensome serfdom to which the immense range of the sciences condemns every individual today is the main reason why natures with fuller, richer, deeper constitutions can no longer find any suitable education for educators." (TI § 8:3) - the blind faith in reified objectivism, that maps all truths, historical, geographical, scientific, as if we now know better. This "violent, headlong" rushing river, the torrent of scientific objectivism can only have the effect of destroying mystery, wonder, unknown dimensions of life, and with it the torrential river of science with its obnoxious desire for evermore progress, can only carry creative imagination along down the river with it. On the one hand, Nietzsche urges us to strip away all phantasmagoria myths (those thrust upon us by institutional religions like Christianity); but to be weary of scientific objectivism as the only replacement to the deconstruction of phantasmagoria myths. If "We" Hyperboreans trade myths for science we will exchange wonder for reified consciousness and that process will result in the obliteration of human imagination, our greatest gift. "We" Hyperboreans must approach Nietzsche's writings on the Laws of Manu in such a manner, as imaginative projections of phantasmic impulses into a seemingly horrifying vision of the Nietzschean-political-system, it is a critique of "kalokagathia."

Nietzsche's Criticism of "Kalokagathia"

We need to be reminded that Nietzsche's work is not "irrationalist" as he has been often cast by critics who do not closely read his work. Many people with unfavorable views about Nietzsche's philosophy have unfairly cast him as an "irrationalist"; but, the more accurate way I would describe Nietzsche's work, rather than 'irrationalism', remember that he has some provocative points against irrationalism in his criticisms of "saintly anarchists" among others is that he is not an 'irrationalist' - but, he takes the Greek triad - Logos, Pathos, Ethos and overturns the Platonic emphasis on Logos in favor of Pathos. This was my entire thesis in the Will to Power essay²⁵ where we see Nietzsche writing: "Will to Power is pathos" time and time again. Hence, what appears to logos as contradictory, and 'irrational' is actually the liberation of pathos.

The Platonic dialogues predominantly emphasize the Apollonian ideas as the basis of the pursuit of truth as practiced by Socrates in the Lyceum. The name of the school itself was taken from the virtues of Apollonian qualities - harmony, reasoning, balance, and therefore Logos. Socrates' school, the Lyceum allegedly garnered its name from the Apollonian Lyceum Deme where it was built. The territory was named after Apollo, and this gives us a clue as to the methods that Socrates imparted into his students. This is because Apollo was the god who personified the virtues of: "kalokagathia" - which are the virtues of

²⁵ Bradley Kaye, "Will to Power as Primitive Affective Form," *The Agonist: A Nietzsche Circle Journal*, Special Issue: Nietzsche and Affects.



harmony, balance, reasoning, moderation. One can presume that since Socrates decided to build his school in that area, and name it after the Greek God Apollo, that his philosophy is inspired by these Apollonian virtues.

Nietzsche's Freedom: anti- "animal taming"

I agree with Richard Rorty's assertion that Nietzsche's overtly anti-liberal thought: "seems adventitious and idiosyncratic - for the kind of self-creation of which Nietzsche and Heidegger are models seems to have nothing in particular to do with questions of social policy."²⁶ Rorty's position is that Nietzsche should be read as a kind of "liberal ironist" who at times deploys ironic distancing to political topics. A close reader should remain aware of Nietzsche's concept of freedom as a criticism of what he calls "Liberal institutions," of which, the actual implementation of the Laws of Manu should not be counted. Liberal institutions are bureaucratic monoliths which result in animal-taming and the reproduction of the problem the institution was created to solve. If the liberal institution actually ends the problem its established to solve then the liberal institution and those who work within it would be forced out of existence, therefore, all state institutions create a stasis of power rather than the forwarding of a truly progressive will to power.

In *Twilight of the Idols*, the book written around the same time as *Antichrist*, where we glimpse Nietzsche's opinion on freedom as it pertains to "Liberal Institutions":

"My concept of freedom - Sometimes the value of a thing lies not in what we get by means of it, but in what we pay for it - what it costs us. I offer an example. Liberal institutions stop being liberal as soon as they have been established: from that point forward, there is nothing that harms freedom more severely and fundamentally than liberal institutions. After all, we know what they bring about: they undermine the will to power, they are the leveling of mountain and valley elevated into a morality, they make people small, cowardly, and pleasure-loving - with liberal institutions, the herd animal is victorious every time. Liberalism: in other words, herd-animalization." (II, Raids of an Untimely Man § 38)

By liberalism, Nietzsche has in mind the sprawling social institutions which result in an inertia of state power. Hence, the Laws of Manu should be read as a criticism of docile bodies and the apathetic "Last Man" precisely because Nietzsche was not intending for the implementation of a political policy that attaches itself to the state that would amount to a form of "animal taming."

Also in *Twilight of the Idols* you see some of his other references to the Laws of Manu. In "Those who 'Improve' Humanity" #3, 4, 5 - Nietzsche starts in with all this glorification of the Laws of Manu, which were the laws in India behind the Caste System - it seems bizarre what he says there, but if you read it, it becomes clear that he is saying that at least the Laws of Manu were honest about the hierarchy, they painted no rosy picture of freedom, people knew their roles, and because of it the progress among the Brahmin castes would progress much quicker through "breeding" within that caste. Rather than Christianity as a form of animal taming. Among the breeding of strength there is an unleashing of potential offered in the Laws of Manu, which exhilarates Nietzsche -

²⁶ Richard Rorty. *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pg. 99.

“Obviously we are no longer among the animal tamers here...” (II, ‘Improve’ Humanity § 3)

Ressentiment

What was Nietzsche’s critique of religion? In his view, religions seize upon resentment among the powerless. Nietzsche writes most clearly about this process when he writes of the slaves’ revolt in morality. Ressentiment festers over centuries, generations, eons. This process occurs: “when resentment itself turns creative and gives birth to values: the resentment of those beings who, denied the proper response of action, compensate for it only with imaginary revenge. Revenge which is cast upon an imaginary construct (i.e. God) as the juridical enforcer of vengeance - this mythical belief system festers in the souls of the chandala/slave-morality for generations. Ressentiment carries over from generation to generation creating perverse forms of repression and violent entanglements of desire in the memory, subconscious, and ultimately the corporeal physiology of the powerless chandala, manifest in neurotic powerlessness of mental nervousness and the uncertainty of an anti-natural morality. “All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards – this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his ‘soul’” (GM book 2 § 16) and this process is best described by Nietzsche in the first book of the *Genealogy of Morality*:

“The beginning of the slaves’ revolt in morality occurs when resentment itself turns creative and gives birth to values: the resentment of those beings who, denied the proper response of action, compensate for it only with imaginary revenge. Whereas all noble morality grows out of a triumphant saying ‘yes’ to itself, slave morality says ‘no’ on principle to everything that is ‘outside’, ‘other’, ‘non-self’: and this ‘no’ is its creative deed. This reversal of the evaluating glance – this essential orientation to the outside instead of back onto itself – is a feature of resentment: in order to come about, slave morality first has to have an opposing, external world, it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all, – its action is basically a reaction.” (GM, book 1 § 10)

Whereas all noble morality grows out of a triumphant saying ‘yes’ to itself, slave morality says ‘no’ on principle to everything that is ‘outside’, ‘other’, ‘non-self’; and this ‘no’ is its creative deed...” the slave morality, according to Nietzsche, “needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all, its action is basically a reaction.” (GM § 10)

In his later work, particularly *Anti-Christian* and *Twilight of the Idols*, he no longer uses the term “slave morality” and turns to more explicit uses of the Laws of Manu as he switches to use the word “chandala”; a class of people from Hindu society who were responsible for cremating the dead and ceremonially pouring the ashes into the Ganges River, the chandala were the handlers of dead bodies, and became the untouchables once the caste system went into effect. See “Those Who ‘Improve’ Humanity” #3 & 4 - the chandalas are those who were born within the caste system from mixed background, the untouchables, the chandala were the untouchables, the father of a chandala would be from the shudra caste (the laborers) and the mother would be from the brahman caste (the intellectuals, the highest caste, the priestly caste, the highly educated, noble, etc.) - therefore, it indicates Nietzsche’s idea that there is a resentment towards power by going



downwards, a second-guessing of power through enacting compassion towards the lower classes. Often, this aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy is considered highly controversial.

Ressentiment - or, the vengeful morality of the weak and powerless who imagine revenge enacted on the strong and powerful through metaphysical forces like Gods, Angels, etc. because the meek are not in power, they enact revenge in their imagination and find comfort through the narratives offered by religion.

The resentment of the chandala finds its final conquest in socialism and the implementation of democracy as an equality of zeroes, those who lack a purposeful life are on equal footing with those who have loftier ambitions in life. The weight of the chandala always drags down the individual *Übermensch*, which I try to explain in Nietzsche's criticisms of Darwinist theories of evolution, modern society does not produce conditions where the rules is "survival of the fittest," rather, the weak become parasitic and burdensome on the strong, sapping all resources away through allegedly noble Christian virtues: compassion and charity, which for Nietzsche turn out to be shell games where the weak con the strong into giving away their power, through the self-negation of will to power: "ego has value depending on who uses it." (TI, Raids of an Untimely Man, § 33) and democracy leads to the weak believing they are free to become as the strong, this is the broken promise of the christian legacy which spins its yarns, selling the chandala on the myth of free will which results in the true-belief that their oppression is a choice, rather than a homeostasis of inescapable oppression. Hence, the brute honesty of Nietzsche's adoration of the Laws of Manu tears away any delusions of pulling oneself up by your bootstraps, and says bald-faced truth, that the powerful are born into their status as they always have been, if you are among the lower castes in the world, be honest about it, have no illusions, and by facing that reality, come to grips with the fact that the world is unequal, unfair, and therein lies the challenge of transvaluation.

Christian Free Will as Sirocco

Christian free will, with the idea of compassion as its ethical lynchpin, is too amenable to the weak and the botched to form itself into a cogent political vision other than one that resentfully proclaims "No!" to life. The warm winds of the sirocco represent a nihilistic compassion symptomatic of creeping Christian mediocrity, the love of the meek, the botched, and the endless forgiveness of mistakes that never drives a society to the fulfillment of a utopian vision, but maintains a perennial homeostasis of mediocrity as the best of all possible worlds, created by an all-powerful God who would not have the world any other way than the way things are; hence, no political progress can ever occur in a metaphysical belief system that posits the perfection of God as reigning supreme over the cosmos. Even the flaws of the mistaken sinner are shrugged off as indications of God's compassion by providing his flock with opportunities for moral learning and development; even though those developments would make a person no longer 'meek' per se, the only possible outcome of a Christian metaphysics is a world populated by docile meek little lambs. In other words, the apathetic, lazy and warm-hearted are the qualities of the compassionate slave-morality, we can no longer have the freedom to despise anything, even the devil!

Capitalism, as an extension of some of the worst aspects of the Christian faith, has created cultural impasses for the advancement and development of higher social evolution, because it forces all work into a trading of skills as a public utility whereby human life is

reduced to intelligent machines. (AC § 57) From Plato's Socrates in the *Euthyphro*, all the way through to Michel Foucault's work on 'care of the self', the development of 'trading skills' requires disciplinary power. Christian faith has forced the attention of the noble classes onto the 'chandala' castes who are told will one day inherit the earth, and therefore feel resentment in a world where that promise is yet unfulfilled.

Genealogy of the resentful lower classes and therefore becomes the sickly belief system of choice among the Chandala, which is the name that the Laws of Manu use derisively to describe someone bred from the shudra servant caste, and the brahmin intellectual aristocracy. In setting the caste system in line with the political system the breeding of brahmins among brahmins ensures that the most intelligent people reproduce with the most intelligent people and the evolution of exceptional nobility (i.e. an entire caste of *Übermensches*) is ensured. If you look into the ways that wealthy families find their partners, this is not so far fetched an idea, and Nietzsche's admiration towards the Laws of Manu derive from the perfect way that the caste system can push the noble classes into superior breeding and exceptional talents which stretch the will to power of these exceptional individuals to new heights.

There are studies showing that wealthy families wind up marrying within their social network all the time, through college social events like sororities and fraternities, secret societies, debutante balls, workplace connections, family social gatherings among the wealthier classes, the infamous Social Register which began in the 1880's in the United States during the Gilded Age as a way for the burgeoning aristocratic class to ensure that their choice of spouse would maintain their social stature, which in recent years has waned in its prestige. As Nietzsche notes, "The problem lies exactly here. - At a certain point in the evolution of a people, the class within it of the greatest insight, which is to say, the greatest hindsight and foresight, declares that the series of experiences determining how all shall live - or can live - has come to an end." (AC § 57) ushering in a new era of experimental empiricism as a backlash against the cosmic fatalism underpinning the caste system, he is describing the iron cage of rationalism as a new form of political control, trading one repressive regime for another, "The object now is to reap as rich and as complete a harvest as possible from the days of experiment and hard experience. In consequence, the thing to be avoided above everything is further experimentation - the continuation of the state in which values are fluent, and are tested, chosen and criticized ad infinitum." (ibid.) Because by tearing away this cosmic scale of justice underpinning the social order with fear and anxiety, the floodgates of mediocrity fly open and the new snare of democracy emerges where the Chandala strip the higher nobler classes of their greatness through the chicanery of pervasive slave-morality that creates cultural constructs which force the aristocrats to feel guilty and ashamed for their drive to conquest through reversion into atavism, which cannot be outstripped because of the will to power only emerges as the unconcealment of the primal drives themselves, once there is no struggle, the mind loses its ability to think and the body loses the tension necessary for self-enhancing power.

Even though, "all the values on which mankind now fixes its highest aspirations are decadence values." (AC § 6), and Nietzsche sees the role of the priestly class as something to be ousted because its goal is to remove the struggle necessary to compel the will to power, there is a sense that as "man, relatively speaking, has become the most botched of



all the animals, and the sickliest, and he has wandered the most dangerously from his instincts,” (AC § 14) there is an admiration in this long genealogy of self-alienation whereby we as a species have become strangers from ourselves, at the same time “he remains the most interesting!” (AC § 14) In remaining true to his thesis in *Beyond Good and Evil*, that it is only dawning on a few mortal souls that physics is merely an exegesis (BGE § 14), he continues that the reaction of science in the modern era against this religious wandering from instinct is to snap empiricism back into the view that all biological functions are merely “machina”, starting from Descartes view of animals as such, with humans understood by science to be merely one animal among others, we would also be one “machina” among others as well, which according to Nietzsche with his brilliant insight, means that in the eyes of science the horrifying realization is that human life is not too special at all. If you take away the mechanics of the body in its biological functions then the “pure spirit” of human essence means nothing at all, and yet, the Christian metaphysical legacy as the western counterpart to the scientific empiricism that searches for “machina”, creates a morality that has no point of contact with actuality.²⁷ Whereas, the Laws of Manu ground the metaphysics of justice within the natural cosmos, and yet, there are similarities with this setting of cosmic order in the mind of man as if it were an extension of natural laws in the realm of political laws.

Nietzsche’s Critique of Sanghas and the “Spirit of the Priestly Order”

Even though Nietzsche admires the Laws of Manu, it seems strange that he is so highly critical of what he calls the “Spirit of Priestly Order” which in Vedic and Tathagata traditions amounts to the Sanghas, or the monastic orders of monks. Why would he take such a strange stance? It is because the priestly class tends to placate the slave-morality of the lower classes and shields them from the truth and can quell the tension of struggle in a creative homeostasis.

Many of the Greek philosophers who traveled with Alexander the Great as he entered into Asia, as he conquered, recollected in their writings that there was no such thing as a Sangha at that time. Anacharsis the Scythian, who was so revered by the Greeks that he was considered one of the seven sages of antiquity, once said something that could just as easily be applied as an observation of the Laws of Manu as any form of constitutional law, or democratic form of governance: “Written laws are like spider’s webs; they will catch, it is true, the weak and poor, but would be torn in pieces by the rich and powerful.”²⁸ While none of the writings of Anacharsis the Scythian survive today, in the time leading up to Nietzsche’s life, there was a popular book written in the late 18th century that created a sort of speculative fictional account of the travels of Anacharsis, entitled *Travels of Anacharsis the Younger in Greece* by Jean-Jacques Barthelemy, published in french in 1788 the book was a success and spawned many sequels and imitations in the speculative travel journal genre during the next century.

In many ways, much like how Nietzsche was influenced by his time in the Franco-Prussian War to write his critique of romantic nationalism in the *Untimely Meditations*, the *AntiChrist* has elements of these speculative fictional genres that attempt to recast the conceptual persona of Yashua/Jesus in a more accurate light, rather than romanticize him as if he

²⁷ Anti-Christ. § 15.

²⁸ Quoted by Diogenes Laertius. *Lives of the Ancient Philosophers*.

were a God among humans, the atavism of the figure of Christ relies on the projection of resentment outwardly onto an external object as if it were an extension of Christian-Love. What Nietzsche reveals is that the Christian faith is a transmutation of the ways that Greek Gods personified natural phenomena and the appropriation of phantasms of vengefulness circulating among the slave-classes. The figure of Christ is a literary construction equal to any other literary construction deriving from antiquity, the gospels might as well be on the same level as the alleged travel journals of Anacharsis, or Nietzsche's own attitudes towards the Laws of Manu, Mohamaddism, and any other religion that he only read about in books, because the basis of authority for any of these religions are the allegedly sacred books that one is supposed to read with focused diligence, when scholars lob bombs on Nietzsche calling him a "eurocentric" thinker with allegedly "Orientalist" racist views, the problem is that there is an underlying presumption of bias that somehow the critiques posed by Nietzsche are not allowed to be taken seriously, the idea is, exactly as the problem was posed by Nietzsche, when questioning religions, the questioning is only allowed to go so far, then the questioner puts his or her life in jeopardy. In blocking any line of questioning against religions from the East by utilizing ad hominem attacks against Nietzsche as if he were an "Orientalist" it gives the presumptive bias that there is somehow a religious sanctity, unquestionable by those outside the sacred borders of national boundaries, even though these religious beliefs were nomadically created, shared and propagated by conquering armies to begin with, rather than claiming the sanctity of Hinduism, one should know that the use of the term Hinduism in the modern sense does not correspond with its original meaning.

In 325 BC, when Alexander the Great crossed the River Sindhu he renamed it Indus because it was easier for the Greek tongue to pronounce. Subsequently, the Greek forces in Alexander's army called the lands east of the river India. Later, Muslim conquerors also referred to the Sindhu River as the Hindu River, because in the Parsee language the Sanskrit *s* converts into an *h*, and therefore the river became synonymous with the lands beyond it, and its religious practices were spoken of as Hindu by the Muslims and the areas beyond the river were referred to as India by the Greeks.²⁹ However fashionable it is to think that somehow no one can gain knowledge of a religion through books, if anything, we can read the aforementioned passages (from *The Anti-Christ* § 45) in the context of Nietzsche's writings as revealing exactly the opposite truth, in the bizarre passages from the Gospels that drip vengeance and violently from the mouth of Yashua/Jesus, we see that Jesus was in fact not a peacemaker.

In Christianity, these extend from the personification of the natural environment in the early Church Patristics who took the genre of magical writing that predominated Ancient Greek myth-building at the time, the myth of Zeus sending thunderbolts from Mount Olympus, the idea that Yashua/Jesus could calm stormy waters with the foisting of his hand, by characterizing this natural phenomena as ordered by a cosmic deity, rather than a tending towards form through sound, ala the Chladni sound forms³⁰ mentioned ever so briefly in *On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense*, the "attempt to discover an intelligible order was based on an illusion, the illusion that there is an order to be discovered existing

²⁹ Pandit Rajmani Tiganait. *Seven Systems of Indian Philosophy*. Himalayan Institute. Pg.5.

³⁰ Steve Lydon. *Nietzsche's Interpretation of Chladni Sound Figures*. Maynooth Philosophical Papers, volume 8, 2016.



independent of man.”³¹ Which this intelligible natural order allegedly created by God(s) then becomes embodied by the figure of the actual priest/monk who carries the rules and laws immanent within his mind, body, and soul. Which sickens the creative spirit in which someone like Siddhartha Gautama or Jesus of Nazareth transvaluated the values of their time, and the Spirit of the Priestly Order, the Sanghas of the Christian faith manifested their death knell on the transvaluation of values once possible in the Christian faith, by organizing the Church around the understanding of “Original Sin” rather than Pelagianism (i.e. that Jesus in the gospels provides believers with tools to sharpen the spiritual will to power to overcome sin, rather than a pathway to salvation through faith in the Roman Catholic Church and its dogmas).

³¹ Catherine H. Zuckert. *Postmodern Plato's: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Gadamer, Strauss, Derrida*. “Nietzsche’s Rereadings of Plato,” University of Chicago Press, 1985. Pg. 14.