

Received: 1 October 2021 Accepted: 5 November 2021

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.33182/agon.v15i3.1955>

## Replies

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*Abstract*

*Replies to the comments on Nietzsche's Values by Tsarina Doyle, Robert Guay, and Paul Katsafanas.*

### Introduction

It's good form to begin by thanking one's critics for their remarks. I have extra reasons to thank mine for their especially thought-provoking comments--and for tackling such a very long book! I do very much appreciate their time and attention.

They focus on two large topics--two main features of the position I attribute to Nietzsche. Doyle treats its ontology, Guay and Katsafanas its metaethics. Both are main parts of my reading, and I'm glad for this prompting to think more about them.

### I. Tsarina Doyle

Doyle argues against (what she calls) the book's 'non-essentialist' account of Nietzsche's naturalism. She says that my 'neo-Darwinian' reading 'conflicts with Nietzsche's more essentialist side'. She initially puts the point rather tentatively--'it is not clear to me that it is quite right to interpret Nietzsche's account of power non-essentially'--but she goes on to argue more forthrightly that a number of passages and ideas express instead an essentialist alternative.

I confess that I am not as clear as I'd like to be just what Doyle means by her crucial 'essentialist'/'non-essentialist' contrast. I'll pursue this shortly. But of course I have a general idea, and will first make some general comments on this basis. Doyle is advocating, broadly, a more 'metaphysical' reading of Nietzsche: a reading of the kind famously inaugurated by Heidegger, that treats will to power as an 'essence' of all things, alive or not, and as the ultimate explainer of all things' interactions.

Now I do have some sympathy with such a reading. This sympathy has a nostalgic cast for me, because it's the interpretation of Nietzsche that I elaborated in my first book on him, *Nietzsche's System* (1996). I there ascribe to him a 'power ontology', which I call a

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'metaphysics', in the sense that it claims a systematic truth about 'essence'. Doyle doesn't mention this earlier book. But in it I assemble a great many passages in defense of this reading. So I am well acquainted with texts and notes pointing this way--or at least this earlier self of mine was.

I came to realize, though, that another kind of interpretation is also possible. Nietzsche explores an unparalleled variety of philosophical paths on all the topics he examines, including this central one. So he expresses, besides and contrarily, non-metaphysical and non-essentialist ways of understanding and justifying his will to power claims. In my second book on him, *Nietzsche's New Darwinism* [2004], I gather and organize his ideas along these different lines. I read him to mean that will to power is the predominant and decisive feature (only) of *living* things, by virtue of the way this aim has been 'designed' into them through natural (and in our case also social) selection.

I myself think that this non-metaphysical reading gives Nietzsche a more plausible position; some will agree. It gives him an explanation why will to power should be so prevalent and so effective, without leaving it a brute fact about the world, and without implausibly reading it into forces of nature. This 'power biology' also does better justice to Nietzsche's stress on our continuity with animals--on the ways there's an animal at the bottom of each of us--than does a third way of reading will to power, as a theory only about humans, a 'power psychology'. Giving will to power a biological scope also fits better with the huge role the idea of *life* plays in Nietzsche's thinking.

I have come to believe that a non-metaphysical reading also does better overall justice to what Nietzsche himself says. Whereas that 2004 book presents itself as developing a 'minority view' of Nietzsche's, I now think that this naturalistic line coheres better with more of his other views, and with the intellectual method that generates these views. Most broadly, it fits with a strong anti-metaphysical, skeptical, and empirical current in his thinking--with his allegiance to an 'honesty' that insists on exposing all the *a priori* leaps of the tradition before him. This had always made Heidegger's reading look at best partial--an imposition of a traditional ontology on a philosophical temperament crucially different.

In the book now under review, my third (and last--I promise!) book on Nietzsche, I present a fuller and (I hope) better version of this 'non-metaphysical' reading. I do not, however, spend any time defending this approach against the metaphysical alternative, which Doyle's comments now make me regret. I felt that there was more need to respond on the other flank, to that narrower, psychological conception of will to power, which limits it to humans. Doyle is perhaps responding to this inattention when she describes me as 'consistently deflect[ing] attention away from Nietzsche's causal essentialism', or when she says that I 'downplay the essentialism' in this book by contrast with my 2004 book. She also describes me as 'keen to push the idea that the will to power applies to biological life only'. I can only hope that pushing an idea means nothing more than articulating and defending it, which I indeed tried to do. Let me clarify now that my inattention to this other reading did not presume that it had been refuted. I simply felt that there was already too much to say, to return to this particular debate.

It's clear that Nietzsche does, sometimes and even often, think of will to power as the being or essence of us and the world. To take these thoughts as central or decisive in his thinking, and to organize his other ideas around them, is and will remain an important



option in Nietzsche scholarship. Doyle's own book is an admirable contribution to this project. On the other hand this metaphysical reading faces certain challenges. One main challenge is to show the difference it will make, in how we understand his other ideas. Will it help us to understand better how he means them, and what his reasons for them are? And does it give Nietzsche a more attractive or viable position?

I'll unfold some of my doubts on these points by returning now to my earlier question what Doyle means by her essentialist/non-essentialist contrast. Let's consider the difference she thinks it makes, to treat will to power as the 'essence' of things. We can glean these especially from the ways she says I err.

She says that my 'account of responsive towardness does not capture the *inherent* activity and intentional directedness of Nietzsche's drives and the manner in which that essential willing directedness is the basis of their modal dispositionality'. I take her to claim that Nietzsche understands will to power as an intentional directedness 'inherent' in all things, and that this willing is the ultimate causality, underlying even what we take to be cases of 'mechanism'. So whereas I analyze directedness as a kind of disposition, she thinks Nietzsche understands all dispositions as intentional. She cites GS.360 as attributing 'driving and willing to non-biological causes'; this is based on that note's reference to a match and powder keg. Now I think this reference is much better read as an analogy and not an instance of the purposive causality the passage goes on the address. But if she is right about what Nietzsche means, we would need to hear him as saying that the powder keg intentionally wills to explode, the match just serving as its occasion. I hope that Nietzsche *doesn't* mean this.

Putting aside the implications of attributing will to power to non-living things, what consequences does it have to treat it as *our* 'essence'? One result Doyle repeatedly takes it to have, is to introduce a strong fixity and unchangeableness into Nietzsche's picture of us. It seems, indeed, that for Doyle our essential will to power is something a bit like an uncaused cause. She says that 'contrary to Richardson, Nietzsche's causal essentialist account of the drives as will to power sees them, primarily, as shaping rather than shaped forces'. I would certainly like to see them as both. Nietzsche wants to understand what our drives and values do, but just as much to understand how they were formed.

Doyle thinks that a person's essence is not just to be a will to power, but to be a certain 'quantum' of power, such that this quantum is fixed. It is the person's 'fate'. So she attributes to persons (on Nietzsche's behalf) not just a general essence like will to power (or being-human), but an individual essence as well. Indeed this fixed essence seems to include not just being this 'quantum' of power, but being a certain configuration of drives. At least Doyle thinks that it belongs to one's essence that a particular drive is dominant; she disputes my suggestion that a dominant drive can be formed. It's also part of one's essence to be either 'high' or 'low', so that Doyle thinks I'm too optimistic about persons' prospects for 'ascent'.

Now I do agree that Nietzsche is often pessimistic about persons' capacity for reform and improvement. And he does tend to think that the original strength of a person's drives sets important limits on what's possible for them. But does he think that a certain strength and structure of drives is a person's 'essence', in the metaphysical sense that would mean it's impossible to alter it? This would introduce a kind of fixity into the world that seems at

odds with Nietzsche's rejection of 'being' in favor of 'becoming'. Everywhere that we think we see unchanging substances, he tells us, we are really looking at slow changes. Does he think that essences are exceptions to this flux?

I think we can understand this relative fixity of persons without attributing to them such essences. Or rather, I think we can understand it better by understanding 'essences' themselves in a different, non-metaphysical way. As I tried to present in my book, Nietzsche thinks that the very way life changes builds a certain (relative) settledness into it. As it evolves and develops, past phases are not left behind, but deposited in levels beneath newer innovations. This process layers structures and capacities upon one another, so that new abilities use and depend on earlier, simpler ones. We employ capacities initiated by our animal and human ancestors. And for the most part, the further back an ability was deposited, the less alterable or dispensable it is for us now. Thus these 'deep' features have some characteristics of 'essence': they're (relatively) fixed, and other changeable traits are built upon them and presuppose them. Indeed I think something like this is true of will to power itself: it's the aiming and valuing on which all higher capacities are built.

If Nietzsche understands 'essences' in this way, he'll be able to place them in his world of 'becoming'; they themselves come to be, and they come to be for reasons we can hope to understand. This also lets us recognize how he treats the very *concept* of essence as something that becomes. Philosophical concepts and problems are themselves historical, Nietzsche stresses, and need to be addressed as such. He intends to play a large part in this development, by amending and improving the concepts he receives. So, for example, with the concept of freedom: his attacks on 'free will' don't lead him to abandon the idea of freedom, but to revise it. The attacks show how we need to revise how we conceive of freedom. And so too for the notion of 'essence'.

This suggests how at least some of Nietzsche's attributions of essence can be accommodated within a non-metaphysical reading. Such a reading has resources to explain many of the points Doyle thinks are inconsistent with it.

## II. Robert Guay

I thank Bob for his gracious words at the start, but as I read past them my heart sank. I was alarmed to hear that a central element in my account 'doesn't make sense'. It doesn't make sense philosophically, he argues; Guay sets aside the question whether Nietzsche does think this way. But since my aim was to organize Nietzsche's ideas into the most plausible and persuasive position I could, this would be a devastating result. Guay argues that my account of the priority I say Nietzsche claims for his values 'doesn't work, and that the project that depends on it fails'.

Let me point out first that not everything in the book depends on the metaethics with which it opens. Although I move outward from there to map Nietzsche's other ideas, most of those detailed discussions are compatible with different metaethical views--as they are with different ontologies. Again I hope that readers not convinced by the metaethics won't take this as a reason not to read further.

However I don't mention this because I don't think I have good answers to Guay's challenges. At issue is what grounds an internalist can give a person to revise their values.



I think Nietzsche has such grounds, and that he finds them in his study of us and our valuing. So, like that study, these grounds are distinctive to him, and not easily assimilable to any of the usual strategies. That makes them, I think, of special interest.

Nietzsche, I claim, is an internalist, in that he thinks that values are simply 'valueds', and dependent on valuing of them. But he also wants to advocate certain values to us: we 'should' value these things. What force can this 'should' have, in the absence of any external (or objective) values? It seems that a person either values something or doesn't; in the first case it's a good for them, in the latter case not. What grip can Nietzsche get, to say that the person should value differently?

Guay frames the issue with the vivid example of Saul, and the eclectic variety of things he values. He asks what reason Nietzsche can give Saul to change his values. It must be an internalist reason, and so must cite something--call it V--that Saul already values. But Nietzsche wants Saul to value V 'more' than he already does, and what ground can there be for that? Saul already gives V a certain value, relative to the other things he values. Why should he change? He just values what he does, end of story. Guay gives a forceful statement of these doubts.

He then proceeds to examine a series of 'strategies' he finds me offering to this point: possible grounds for privileging such a V--for Saul to give it more value or weight. Guay considers these points separately, saying: 'I do not think there is any disadvantage in doing so. Even if they are meant to be taken together . . . disentangling them will still allow us to see how helpful each might be.' He describes them as 'often appear[ing] in bunches'. But I think this understates the way in which they (and certain other points) are united in the overall strategy I attribute to Nietzsche. They indeed have little weight in isolation.

To simplify the discussion, let's suppose that the V is 'power'. Nietzsche's values are far richer than this, but power is a kind of foundation or starting point for the rest. So he thinks that Saul *does already* value power, but that he *should* value it more or differently than he does. Three of the points Guay detaches play roles in Nietzsche's argument here: power is Saul's 'deepest' aim; it operates as a 'meta-value' that judges his other values, and it is valued by a 'part' of Saul that gives this value special authority. But these points are held together and clarified by other elements in Nietzsche's story that Guay doesn't treat.

The most important further ingredient is Nietzsche's unusually expansive conception of 'valuing'. We ordinarily suppose that our 'values' are all those principles, virtues, ideals etc. that we put into words, and refer to in choosing what to do. But Nietzsche insists that this is only the 'surface' of our valuing. Another kind of valuing operates all the time, largely without words or conscious awareness, in our body and drives. What these drives value--greatly to simplify--is power (or growth in capacity and control). They value this separately, but they also value this as the collective that is our 'great self', our body. This crucial level of valuing doesn't show up in Guay's story about Saul.

But then why should Saul prioritize this valuing in his unconscious drives? Because, Nietzsche thinks, their general aim at power is what motivates his more particular values. Those 'agential' values he has words for and awareness of, are interpreted by his body and drives as their path to power, and *this is why he holds* those values. Saul's body, the system of his drives, sees these values as its 'way ahead', its way to expand its role in the world, its

control over its environment. These values matter to Saul because of this implicit judgment about them.

But still, if Saul's 'deep' willing of power is already judging his agential values by this criterion, why should he revise those values? Whatever authority this power-willing has, it seems it's already exercising. Why should Saul change? As Guay acutely says of Saul: 'He has no reason to newly favor some values over others, or adopt different ones; if he has any authority-conveying values, they're already implicated in the whole set of values he holds.'

But, Nietzsche thinks, the body and drives, just like our agency, can *make mistakes*: they can *misinterpret* some agential values as their paths to growth. And this of course is what Nietzsche thinks is the case with our moral values. Some of these values are strongly hostile to the body and drives; still Nietzsche tries to show (for example in GM.ii) that even ascetic bad conscience is valued because it gives scope to the aggressive drives, which have been frustrated by social constraints. Moral values 'fool' the body into thinking that it progresses by them. In fact they are usually *hindrances* to such growth.

This shows another main part of Nietzsche's argument, the role it gives to *truth*. His internalism claims that Saul has reason, in what he now values *plus certain truths*, to change what he values. We do this all the time already in our everyday way of correcting our values: we value one thing as a means to something else, but then realize that it's not--it's not good for what we wanted it for. We replace this value with another that we take to be a true means to that further end. Our values are strongly tied up with one another by such means-ends motivations. These connections rather drop out of Guay's picture of Saul, with his mostly scattered and particular values. If values stood in isolation, they might indeed be unassailable. But we value things for reasons, and can discover that those reasons don't hold.

Our reasons for values include not only their being means to other values. We also typically suppose that our values are singled out and justified by some authority independent of us. Here too the truth will have an impact. If I value some V *only because* I think that God commands it, or that pure reason commands it, then if I see that these beliefs are false, I lose my reason for valuing V. The metaethical truth that values are merely valued can itself make a change in our values, though this effect is merely negative. But the argument we're considering has a more positive lesson. It removes reasons for some values--those that aren't means to power--but also shows how to look for values to replace them.

Now Guay recognizes that we have those everyday procedures for 'self-revision' of values. But he claims that 'they're rooted in some confidence that at least some of one's values are already authoritative', and that this isn't the case in the argument I attribute to Nietzsche. I agree that there's a big difference here. In ordinary cases we consider ourselves immediately aware of the motivating value. By contrast Nietzsche is claiming to reveal to us that our motivating value is something we have generally *not* been aware of, since will to power works mostly unconsciously. Saul will therefore need to be persuaded that power is what he ultimately wants. But I think that Nietzsche aspires to persuade his readers in just this way. Much of his psychology is an effort to expose the working of these drives and their will to power, and to bring his readers to see that this, and not their conscious motives, are their own real reasons for what they do.



This brings us to another challenge Guay raises. I've just spoken of persuading Saul to recognize this aim in his drives. But as Guay points out, I claim that for Nietzsche 'there's really no subject or agent', and persons are just systems of drives. So who is the 'Saul' that this advice is addressed to? It seems that there's nobody there to hear advice or to put it into effect. I try to answer such questions in a later chapter on agency. The gist is that Nietzsche understands (what we call) agency as itself a drive *which misinterprets itself as an agent*. It is an unconscious disposition and striving to do certain things, which include having conscious thoughts and choices. The latter are all it sees of itself; it supposes that this is all it is. But its aims and its effectiveness lie largely beneath this visible surface. When we address an 'agent' we're really addressing this deep-rooted drive, *through* its conscious capacity. Nietzsche writes as he does with a view to this reconceived audience.

### III. Paul Katsafanas

I thank Paul too for his complimentary words. I've long felt a strong affinity between our understandings of Nietzsche. He has powerfully advanced the field on many of the topics most important to me, and my book tries to benefit from this. There's also a special advantage, in working out one's own view, to thinking through disagreements over (relatively) finer details or particulars. Of course we have some larger divergences as well.

Katsafanas raises four problems for my account of Nietzsche's metaethics. They're connected, and they also relate to the challenges by Guay that I just discussed.

1. Katsafanas points out that in my reading of Nietzsche, instead of basing claims about *reasons* on claims about *motives*, I base claims about what we *should value* on what we *do value*. He argues that this would limit or complicate Nietzsche's internalism, since it would make it hard for him to recognize the kinds of reasons for revising our values that we can have in our 'drives, affects, beliefs, and motivational states'. He illustrates the point with the case of a 'committed religious ascetic who thinks that sex is disvaluable', and who also has 'strong aversions to sex', expressed in feelings of guilt and defilement when thinking about it. If this ascetic has reasons to change his values, they lie not in his values, but, more broadly and complexly, in 'his attitudes (including his beliefs, desires, and affects)'.

I think we see here one result of a significant disagreement between Katsafanas and myself, regarding Nietzsche's idea of *value*. Katsafanas reads him as staying closer to our own application of the term--as applying it to (more-or-less) what we usually call our values. But one large claim of my book is that Nietzsche intends to extend the notion well beyond its usual use. He thinks that the valuing we're aware of, and put into words, is underlain by another kind of valuing taking place in our drives and affects. Drives *aim*, and their values are the signs they steer by in this aiming. Affects *feel* how well that aiming is going; they evaluate in this feeling. This extension requires a revised concept of valuing. I propose that for Nietzsche a value is a kind of sign: a sign that a will--a drive or a person--uses to steer by (i.e. aims towards or away from).

Katsafanas gives sophisticated and persuasive accounts of drives and affects, but doesn't treat them as valuing in their own right. Is this just a terminological difference? In my book I cite passages in which Nietzsche extends the term both to our drives, and to 'the organic'-to living things generally. I think the point is important to him. It is part of a broader insistence that we humans are not the kind of special case we suppose, in our pride in our

conscious and cognitive powers. The point works on both sides. First, humans are animals, and our drives operate largely as they do in other animals. But second, animals are also more like us than we suppose: they have sophisticated intentional powers that we had thought were unique to us. Values are a key part of this common intentionality.

Consider how this applies to the case of the religious ascetic. By the set-up, this person both 'disvalues' sex in the ordinary sense--'agentially', as I put it--and also feels a strong bodily aversion to sex. So how is there any way in which he 'values' sex, in either Katsafanas's sense or mine? And if he doesn't value it, how can Nietzsche have, on my reading, any internalist ground for criticizing this ascetic's view of it, which it seems Nietzsche might want to do? Katsafanas: 'Insofar as the aggressive drive, oriented at the ascetic ideal, is his ruling drive, Richardson's model seems to entail that he has reason to obey it. He has reason to be as ascetic as possible, to negate physical flourishing as much as possible, to orient himself entirely toward the otherworldly. But this seems problematic.'

Now I'm not sure that Nietzsche *would* argue against this asceticism; I think this would depend on further particulars of the case. (He is, after all, an ascetic himself.) Generally, it will depend on whether this hostility to sex furthers or hinders the ascetic's ultimate but largely unconscious aim at power and growth; this, and not any particular drive, is the ultimate authority. Does this ascetic's aversion and avoidance help this system of drives and affects to grow its capacities--to extend its control over itself and its environment? This is the will of his body, of his hierarchy of drives. Each of these drives wills its own power, but to the extent that the person is not akratic, those separate wills are subordinated to the overall project, and don't strike out independently against it.

Among the ascetic's drives is his sex-drive, which pursues its own growth, but is strongly opposed and suppressed by the ascetic's most dominant drives--perhaps his will to obey church teachings and God's commands. Now imagine two scenarios. In the first, that sex-drive is weak, and carries little weight in 'what he wants'. Then I think Nietzsche gives the person no reason to favor his sexuality. But there's another scenario that I think fits much better with the case Katsafanas describes. The very intensity of this ascetic's hostility to sex signifies the strength of this drive in him; his guilt and aversion are so powerfully felt because he is trying to stifle something especially potent in him. In Nietzsche's broad sense, he *does* strongly 'value' sex. To be sure, he values those other things more. But now the question arises whether suppressing so powerful a will in himself is indeed his best way ahead. It shows that he needs a more productive way to channel its strength, by recognizing its valuing.

2. Katsafanas turns next to my analysis of Nietzsche's idea of 'power', and to my argument that he means not just the 'overcoming of resistance' that Reginster proposes, but a certain kind of growth, which that overcoming is only a sign of or means to. I call this 'growth in control', and present it as control over other wills, which are thereby 'incorporated' into one's own project. Katsafanas points out that the stricter Nietzsche's definition of power is, the harder it will be for him to persuade us that we *do already will* such power. He also raises some more direct issues with my analysis. He argues that overcoming some obstacles--e.g. in climbing a mountain--doesn't seem to involve or result in controlling any opposing wills. Similarly with the accomplishment involved in acquiring a skill. Isn't my analysis of power too narrow to include what it should?





As I've just said of my account of 'value', here too my account of 'power' is an effort to state what I think Nietzsche considers its primary form: the way it is willed in the aggressive, competitive, and even *consumptive* stance that living things have been 'designed' to take towards one another. Deeply, they understand themselves in a struggle against other wills; they grow, in the primary case, by consuming other life. Other forms of power are secondary and derivative: approximations or analogies to such 'incorporation'. Nietzsche sees his own will to truth as an effort to consume and incorporate, 'spiritually', other viewpoints.

When the mountaineer conquers her peak, I imagine her imagining it, obscurely, as resisting and willing against her; she feels her achievement as mastery of its contrary force. (Note, by the way, that if Doyle is correct and Nietzsche thinks of all things as wills to power, that mountaineer's way of imagining the mountain might even be correct.) Let me also point out that such achievements, as well as acquired skills, do clearly rest on something else that Nietzsche would surely count as a mastery of other wills: controlling opposing drives in oneself. The mountaineer very likely has strong drives for ease or comfort or enjoyment that will need to be controlled to a degree far beyond what's required in ordinary life. This kind of superior self-control is plausibly what she crucially wants, and prides herself in, in the achievement.

Katsafanas attributes to me a 'True Self' view, in which there's a subpart that's 'really me' whose values should have priority. But (very much later in the book) I spend a chapter on Nietzsche's notion of the self, and argue that rather than thinking of it as a kind of core to us, he thinks of 'the self' as arising in the activity of *reflexivity*. So I don't think that that 'True Self' view can be quite applicable. Nevertheless, I do think that Nietzsche prioritizes a part of us, a 'ruling part', and claims that its values should have priority. This is not, however, the 'ruling drive' Katsafanas here speaks of, but the 'body and its great will', which I take to be the whole set or system of the person's drives and affects--its collective will to power. Nietzsche does often think that this set's overall growth will be best served if there's a single dominant drive. But such a ruling drive isn't an ultimate authority; it's judged as a means to overall growth. Here I think my position is closer to Katsafanas's than he supposes.

3. Katsafanas's account of constitutivism shows me that here I'm closer to his position than I had supposed. What I objected to in constitutivism, as an account of Nietzsche's metaethics, was a coercive force it seemed to me to claim: since it's a 'condition of the possibility' of agency, one *must* will power. As Katsafanas notes, in a later chapter I argue that Nietzsche intends generally (and not just in his metaethics) to replace Kant's immutable possibility-conditions with evolving existence-conditions. But this wouldn't bear against Katsafanas's version of constitutivism, since he understands it non-Kantianly, as simply a way of establishing 'the universality and immutability' of (in this case) will to power: that we always do and will will power. It doesn't involve a transcendental argument, and doesn't make will to power a condition for all possible kinds of agency.

This version of constitutivism would give Nietzsche two points I do claim he needs in his validation of will to power: that this will operates in all of us, and that it can't be avoided or dispensed with. But I think he also needs a large additional point which I'm not sure constitutivism can supply. He needs it to be the case not just that we do and can't help but will power, but that this aim motivates our other aims and values: we adopt and pursue

them as signs or means to power. It's this that licenses Nietzsche's critique of moral values: they are not the path to power we (unconsciously) took them to be. They don't give us what we want them for.

How can Nietzsche support this further point? He tries to do so first with his biology, and its account of living things as designed to will power. He adds to this his psychology, which persistently shows the ways our conscious thoughts and values are motivated in our drives' efforts at power. And he also expects, I think, that when our attention is called to this largely-unconscious motivation, we will grow better aware of it, and recognize at first hand its importance in us. His diagnoses of attitudes such as guilt and pity can help us become conscious, as we feel them, of drive-motives we had overlooked.

4. Katsafanas turns finally to my claim that Nietzsche distinguishes two layers of drives in us: our naturally-evolved 'animal' drives, and the more distinctively-human, 'agential' drives that developed historically in societies. I claim that Nietzsche is broadly approving of the former, but suspicious of the latter on the general ground that societal norms principally function against our own interest, to 'herd' us into social groups. Katsafanas finds this dichotomy 'too stark', and points out that Nietzsche presents the individual, capable of a genuine selfishness, not (in Rousseauian fashion) as preceding social formation, but as something that must be specially created as a later exception to it.

Now I certainly agree that the 'individual' is a later achievement; in the chapter on the self mentioned before I examine just what this involves. Still, I think there's a kind of selfishness that Nietzsche attributes to our 'animal' system of drives: the selfishness of their joint will to power, of the 'great self' that is the body. This power-willing in the drives had to be constrained in order for life in society to progress, and this constraint produced the great suffering Nietzsche diagnoses (again in GM.ii). That bodily self accepts these constraints because they seem its way ahead. From the start, what can it do but engage with others on these terms? And some of these moral values can ease that suffering, Nietzsche thinks. However they also sicken and divide the person and hinder growth. So the body's acceptance of moral values is misjudged. Nietzsche wants us to see this, not just in our superficial consciousness but in our drives themselves, where this recognition can be properly effective. Our drives themselves need to see their better way to power.

Once again I thank my commentators for their reflections. They raise crucial questions that merit much fuller responses than I've given. But 'briefer' is my new motto, after this book!

