Will to Power as Affect

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Introduction – Affect/s as Will to Power

That Nietzsche identified affect/s with will to power seems clear especially from one much-discussed section of *Beyond Good Evil*. Here, Nietzsche proposes that we should attempt to understand the so-called mechanical or "material" world as a "more primal form of the world of affect/s, in which everything still lies concentrated in a powerful unity" (BGE §13.6). This "powerful unity", moreover, is infamously revealed by the end of the section as none other than will to power, which Nietzsche defines in terms of this world of affects "seen from inside, the world determined and designated in terms of its intelligible character" (BGE §13.6).1

Unpublished notes that Nietzsche wrote during this period, which are important insofar as they help elucidate *Beyond Good and Evil* §13.6, suggest a similar understanding of affect/s as will to power. These notes mention, for instance, a "morphology of affects" as well as a "reduction of these to will to power" (KSA 12: 6[26]), and likewise propose a "derivation of all affects from one will to power" (KSA 12: 10[57]). A later unpublished note, whose value for Nietzsche scholarship may seem more dubious, due to its lack of any clear connection to work actually published by Nietzsche, nonetheless seems to even clearer about this identification. In one such note, Nietzsche proposes,

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1KSA 5, p. 54.
2KSA 5, p. 55.

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under the title "psychology's conception of unity (Einheitsconception der Psychologie)," to consider "will to power psychologically" (KSA 13 14[121]). Nietzsche elaborates that in describing will to power psychologically, one needs to consider it, in part, as a "primal form of affect, such that all the other affects are only the particular ways that will to power has formed itself" (KSA 13 14[121]). In these related published and unpublished passages, Nietzsche thus consistently suggests that will to power is meant to be not just one affect among others, but rather the very unity behind their multiplicity.

In writing 'affect/s,' I thus refer throughout this essay to passages in Nietzsche's work where he uses the German term 'Affekt', which he also sometimes spells 'Affect', in both singular and plural forms. It is difficult to determine a single English term to use for translating Nietzsche's various uses of the German one. Something like 'emotion/s' or perhaps even the somewhat less specific 'feeling/s,' is, however, clearly suggested, at least by the following characteristic lines from GMIII.15: "But the distinction is fundamental: in the first case, it is being harmed further that one wants to avoid; in the other, one wants to numb a torturous, secret pain (Schmerz) that has become unbearable through a more chaotic emotion/feeling (Emotion) and at least for the moment to remove it from one's awareness, - for that one needs an affect (Affekt), an affect that is as wild as possible'3. My thesis in this essay is therefore that Nietzsche identifies will to power primarily with these affect/s, i.e. with feeling and emotion.

However, despite Nietzsche's own clear textual identification of will to power with affect/s, it is hardly a consensus among Nietzsche scholars that he does, or really should, in fact make it. Even among some notable Nietzsche scholars who defend or propose fairly robust accounts regarding the function of affect/s in Nietzsche's thought, moreover, there is not even any shared understanding regarding what Nietzsche thinks about will to power. While some among these scholars recommend more dismissive accounts regarding Nietzsche's will to power, others argue for more robust accounts of will to power's function in their interpretations of Nietzsche. What importantly unifies both sets of opposing positions on will to power, however, is
a sharp distinction, as opposed to an identification, drawn between affect/s and will to power.

This implicit consensus among scholars that there should be a sharp distinction between affect/s and will to power, especially paired with the notable lack of consensus among these same scholars regarding will to power itself, is perhaps surprising. For the implicit consensus clearly opposes the close identification between affect/s and will to power that Nietzsche makes in his texts. To consider this implicit consensus regarding the importance of such a sharp distinction, I first (in “1.”) will discuss some of the positions that share in it. Then, I intend (in “2.”) to argue on textual grounds, which I believe apply to all such positions discussed, that Nietzsche identifies affect with will to power in a manner that they do not acknowledge.

Recent Nietzsche Scholarship on Affect/s and Will to Power

The claim that Nietzsche identifies affect/s as will to power seems at odds with two major strains in Anglophone, essentially analytically oriented, Nietzsche interpretation on will to power. These strains, moreover, are in turn adversarial with one another over the meaning of will to power. In particular, my claim is at odds with the way that both strains, already incompatible among themselves, nonetheless depict the relation between affect/s and will to power in terms of an implicitly sharp distinction. On the one hand, the first of these positions that I consider, which is most identifiable in the work of Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, presents a rather robust account of the function of affect/s alongside a more dismissive account of will to power. On the other hand, the second strain, most identifiable in Peter Poellner and Paul Katsafanas, likewise presents a similarly robust account of the function of affects; but unlike the first strain represented by Clark and Leiter, this second strain combines the latter account with a less dismissive, and even a quite robust, account of will to power. Nonetheless, this second strain also depicts will to power for Nietzsche as something clearly, though implicitly, distinct from affect/s.

First, it is clear that both Leiter and Clark do share a robust, albeit still ambiguous, account regarding the role of affect/s in Nietzsche’s philosophy. This is due to the fact that they both similarly identify affect/s closely with their interpretation of what they together stipulate as Nietzsche’s “perspectivism,” an epistemological position that they attribute to Nietzsche. According to this position, as Clark and Dudrick most succinctly put it, “our cognitive capacities are always directed by our interests and affects.” My interest here does not lie in the particularities of Clark and Leiter’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s remark that “there is only a perspectival seeing, a perspectival knowing,” i.e. in their interpretation of he call his “perspectivism.” Instead, it lies in the way that they similarly have conceived of affect/s in their related accounts of Nietzsche, which happen to be based on this epistemological interpretation.

On this point of interest, Clark actually seems to follow Leiter’s earlier interpretation of GM II.12, i.e. the section in which Nietzsche makes this remark about what they regard as “perspectivism.” In particular, it is clear that Clark’s own account of Nietzsche on affect/s depends on the way that Leiter earlier conceives of “affect” in his interpretation of GMII.12, namely as con-

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1In the German continental tradition, both Heidegger, whose work I discuss briefly below, as well as Mueller-Lauter, who was in dialogue with Heidegger, present two distinct interpretations of Nietzsche on will to power that ultimately may be more fruitfully juxtaposed with one another. However, it is notable that neither particularly emphasize affect/s in their interpretations of will to power, though both do acknowledge (unlike the Anglophone scholars that I consider) Nietzsche’s identification of will to power with affect: “For the understanding of the essence of will to power in the metaphysical sense, Heidegger summarizes a few determinations of will that one finds in Nietzsche’s work: will as the domination that reaches out beyond itself toward... will as affect (the attack of arousal), will as passion (the strong and wide-reaching pull of that which is), will as feeling (the state of having one’s own status) and will as command... Among these determinations that Heidegger mentions, the first one is my primary focus here,” Mueller-Lauter 1994. p. 47, fn. 64.

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2Clark and Dudrick 2012. p. 172
sistently equivalent to “interest”\(^3\). Clark, however, while seeming to retain Leiter’s basic identification of “affect” with Leiter’s “interest,” adds further ambiguity by defining affect, not only in terms of “interest”, but also as “emotion”, “feeling”, and “passion,” and in a way that does not distinguish between these further terms. Clark, and more recently Clark and Dudrick, have built upon this basic account of affect (particularly in terms of expanding its application to a further cultural dimension, beyond their initial framing of it in epistemological terms). However, they never elaborate or disambiguate this basic conception of “affect” as “interest,” which even Clark and Dudrick thus treat as roughly equivalent terms.

Clark and Leiter also share a more unambiguously dismissive view of will to power. Here it is Clark rather than Leiter who seems to have originated their shared account, particularly in her 1990 work, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* (full bibliographic information?). In this text, Clark presents an argument for the claim that Nietzsche’s “doctrine of life as will to power” is not meant by him to be true, but rather represents a mere “construction of the world from the viewpoint of his own ideal.”\(^4\) In the course of her argument, Clark admits that Nietzsche does offer a “detailed,” “clear and expanded argument”\(^5\) in BGE §36 for what she calls the “cosmological doctrine of the will to power”\(^6\) (i.e. “for interpreting the world as will to power”).\(^7\) However, Clark denies that Nietzsche actually accepts the premises of this argument, suggesting instead that the argument is merely in a “hypothetical form.”\(^8\) She thus insists that he need not accept its conclusion, i.e. that we should interpret the world as will to power, as true. Clark concludes that Nietzsche simply would not accept his own argument’s premises—premises which, according to Clark, he frames in hypothetical terms to signal distance from them.

Moreover, Clark attempts to argue on independent grounds that Nietzsche actually ought to reject such an account of will to power, insofar as it implies the psychological thesis that all behavior is motivated by some desire for power. The reason for this, she states, is there is no way that “this could be a plausible or interesting hypothesis about human behavior.”\(^9\) She goes on to suggest that Nietzsche’s account of will to power could be interesting “only if will to power is defined so that at least some possible motives are not instances of it.”\(^10\) This would be the case, for example, if the desire for power, which Clark defines circularly\(^11\) as a desire for efficacy at achieving whatever

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\(^1\) Schacht 1994, pp. 143, 144, 346, 347, and especially 350, where he most clearly identifies “affect” with “interest”.

\(^2\) As Clark is quoted from an earlier essay in Clark and Dudrick 2012, p. 172.

\(^3\) On the other end of the ambiguity spectrum, Heidegger 1991 more carefully distinguishes between affect, passion and feeling in Nietzsche, while giving a very different answer to what is (more or less) my own leading question in this paper, namely, “to what extent is will to power the original form of affect, i.e. that which constitutes the Being of an affect in general?”, p. 44. However, Heidegger does not attribute such conceptual distinctions to Nietzsche any more than Clark and Leiter do, as suggested by the following: “… the questions (what are affect, passion and feeling?) remain unanswered [by Nietzsche]. Nietzsche himself often equates the three; he follows the usual way of representing them, ways still accepted today. With these three words, each an arbitrary substitute for the others, we depict the so called irrational side of psychic life…”, Heidegger 1991, p. 45.

\(^4\) Clark 1990, p. 242

\(^5\) Clark 1990, p. 212.

\(^6\) Clark 1990, p. 218.

\(^7\) Clark 1990, p. 213.

\(^8\) Clark 1990, p. 212.

\(^9\) Clark, 1990. p. 210. Though Clark does not say so, it seems safe enough to assume that she would include affects (at least as she and Leiter broadly construe them in terms of “interest”), among these other “possible motives” that she claims are needed to account for human action, alongside will to power.

\(^10\) The reason I would identify Clark’s manner of thus defining power for Nietzsche as “circular” is that she appears to disregard how Nietzsche himself more interestingly proceeds to define “power” (Macht) in the Antichrist, not in terms of an “ability to do or get what one wants” (as Clark proposes), but rather (and also quite consistently) with his own conclusion about will to power, namely as “the feeling of power, the will to power”; see A §2, KSA 6, p. 170. Nietzsche makes this definition even clearer by using, as a synonym for power, the Italian word for “virtue”, “virtù”, which means both “excellence” and “power” and which
one desires, could be understood as (at most) a universal “second-order desire” for efficacy in attaining one’s desires (à la Harry Frankfurt, whom Clark even references in this regard). Clark thus ultimately concludes that Nietzsche should reject or modify his own conclusion, regardless of the merits behind any argument that he may be able to offer for it.

Most recently, Brian Leiter has persisted in defending Clark’s same decades-old conclusion. He thus maintains now that, although “Clark’s ingenious reconstruction is questionable at point[s] its central conclusion – that Nietzsche does not accept the strong doctrine of the will to power – wins support from the other considerations already adduced.” One of these “other considera-
tions”, however, just seems to be Clark’s own concern with what Leiter now would call the “strong doctrine’s” psychological implication that all behavior is motivated by power (which Leiter, akin to Clark, simply finds implausi-
ble and uninteresting). However, Leiter does adduce further and arguably
specious “textual” grounds for attributing to Nietzsche the view that “will to power is simply one among various characteristics of reality – alongside

specifically for Nietzsche refers to one’s own “apex of force/power” (Maximum von Kraft) (as he proposes in EH “Why I Am So Wise” §4; see KSA 6, p. 279). Notably, such definitions have nothing to do with second-order desires, or even with (first-order) desires at all, but rather only with peak efficacy, what Clark simply would call the “ability to do or get,” see Clark p. 211.

7Leiter 2019, p. 58

8Leiter himself finds the suggestion preposterous, for instance, that he may be motivated by will to power to perform the mundane personal and professional tasks of his everyday life. This leads him to ask only rhetorically, “do I manifest the will to power by showing up to teach my classes? By holding my office hours? Do I express a desire for power when I shop for groceries? Buy furniture for the house? Cook dinner?”, Leiter 2019, p. 59.

9The textual grounds for this point seem fairly weak, as Leiter 2019 chiefly adduces a passage from Ecce Homo without context wherein Nietzsche merely lists “the terrible aspects of reality (in affects, in desires, in the will to power)”, Leiter 2019, p. 58. Leiter perhaps wants to suggest with his own italicization that this mention of what is more honestly translated as reality’s plural “terrifying characteristics” (Furchtbarkeiten) is supposed to justify his own

conclusions about will to power. Leiter, however, seemingly ignores that Nietzsche, just prior in the same sentence from Ecce Homo that he only partially cites, does use a singular noun to refer to these parenthesized Furchtbarkeiten, which he frames in terms of an “econ-
omy of the whole” (Oekonomie des Ganzen), KSA 6, p. 368.

20Leiter 2019, pp. 56–57.

For Clark does admit that Nietzsche “accepts at least the last of [the premises in his BGE §36 argument], which he apparently calls ‘my proposition’ [i.e.]... will to power as the world’s ‘intelligible character’ Clark 1990, p. 213. This, however, just seems tantamount to accepting a conclusion regarding will to power that Clark would insist that Nietzsche really should have rejected. Even Leiter admits that Nietzsche “sometimes makes remarks suggestive of such a view”, even in his published works, and thus can claim only that “some” of these suggestions are compatible with his and Clark’s suggestion “that will to power is but one among other motives or tendencies,” a suggestion that both maintain that Nietzsche (contrary to his own words) should have affirmed as well; see Leiter 2019, p. 56.

Katsafanas, for instance, consistently criticizes Poellner’s interpretation of Nietzsche on this point, most recently in Katsafanas 2016, especially on pp. 131–132, but already in Kat-
safanas 2005.

affects and desires, rather than the essential core of them all.” What seems clear, at any rate, is that Clark and Leiter’s position dismisses Nietzsche’s own conclusions on will to power at the same time that it suggests an account of affect/s that distinguishes these from it.

In contrast to Clark and Leiter, Poellner and Katsafanas represent a different, second strain of current Anglophone Nietzsche scholarship on affect/s and will to power. This second strain notably combines a more robust account of will to power with an interpretation of Nietzsche on affect/s that nonetheless distinguishes affect/s implicitly from will to power. Poell-
ner and Katsafanas quite clearly differ both in their individual accounts of Nietzsche on affect/s, with regard to which they have been in dialogue, as well as in their accounts of will to power, with regard to which they appear not to have been. However, each nonetheless seems to ascribe to some more robust account of Nietzsche’s will to power. Thus, despite the significant differences in their individual interpretations of Nietzsche on both affect/s and will to power, the key similarity between their accounts would be that, while both Poellner and Katsafanas affirm a robust account of will to power, they
nonetheless propose accounts of Nietzsche on affect/s according to which affect/s are supposed to be distinct from will to power.

First, it is worth pointing out that Poellner’s account of affect/s, which he presents most clearly in his 2007 essay “Affect, Value, Objectivity,” is a strictly psychological one. In that essay, Poellner initially defines affect/s, or at least “certain kinds of affective states” (which he discusses there particularly with respect to the question of how Nietzsche would consider the objectivity of values), as “perceptual emotions.” What Poellner means with this formula for affect/s seems to be Nietzsche supposes these to be merely constitutive or creative of certain objective values. However, these are values that Poellner himself further qualifies as merely “phenomenologically objective,” in the particular sense that these values “are essentially dependent on emotions and other affective states, such as hedonic bodily sensations.”

From here, he goes on to elaborate that for Nietzsche affect/s may be more broadly construed in terms of “any mental episode which constitutively involves a pro- or con-attitude (or as I shall say, a favouring or disfavouring) with a distinctive phenomenology – some experience of attraction or repulsion.” Poellner goes onto suggest, as examples, “a feeling of shame, an occurrent desire for something absent, as well as a bodily sensation experienced unqualifiedly as painful or pleasant.” Such affect/s, moreover, according to Poellner do not actually “discover a realm of values capable of existing independently of them.” Presumably this is because Poellner’s own characterization of the values as “phenomenologically objective” should leave open the possibility that values do not correspond to anything real, i.e. if the affect/s that create or constitute them turn out to be nothing but “projections of world-independent subjective states (‘sentiments’).” Poellner thus concludes that “the metaphysical status of value”, and thus presumably also that of affect/s in their role as constituting or creating such value, should be a matter of “indifference.” As such, it seems that Poellner’s own interpretation of Nietzsche on affect/s is meant to be a strictly psychological/phenomenological account (as opposed to a metaphysical one) of what these affect/s and values really are.

Similarly, Katsafanas offers an interpretation of Nietzsche on affect that both draws upon and argues against aspects of Poellner’s. The chief difference between their accounts concerns the relation that each sees between affect and value. Whereas Poellner tends to identify affects and values consistently, such that all affect/s for Nietzsche are supposed by Poellner to create or constitute values, Katsafanas makes a separate distinction in his interpretation, namely between affects that are induced by a “drive (Trieb)” and those that are not. Katsafanas identifies only the former with values, thus making (compared to Poellner) a sharper distinction both among affects, values and drives, and also among different kinds of affect/s.

Though Poellner and Katsafanas differ in their interpretations of Nietzsche on affect/s and will to power, both provide an account of will to power that cannot identify it with affect/s. On the one hand, Poellner elsewhere in his scholarly work on Nietzsche attributes to the latter what he calls a “metaphysics of the will to power” as a “model of reality.” As such, Poellner’s account of Nietzsche’s will to power, which is thereby clearly metaphysical, would seem to imply that affect/s and values (at least on Poellner’s interpretation of them as having only “phenomenological objectivity”), would not be identifiable with will to power.

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In Leiter and Sinhababu 2007, p. 228.
24 Poellner thus concludes, with regard to such phenomenologically-objective values, that “a world without such states would also be a world without value,” in Poellner, p. 227.
26 In Leiter and Sinhababu, p. 227.
27 In Leiter and Sinhababu, p. 228.
28 See Kail and Dries, p. 13ff, for Katsafanas’ distinction between “discrete affects”, which are not associated with drives or values, and “drive induced affective orientations”, which are associated with both drives and values.
30 At the very least, Poellner does not identify affect/s and values with will to power in his interpretation of Nietzsche. For Poellner clearly distinguishes between the former, which he
On the other hand, Katsafanas, in distinction to Poellner, does not provide a metaphysical account of will to power. Instead, Katsafanas interprets Nietzsche’s will to power in terms of a psychological account that considers human motivation. On Katsafanas’ interpretation, Nietzsche’s account of will to power implies that all human actions must be motivated psychologically both by what he calls a “higher-order aim” of “perpetually seeking and overcoming resistance” and also some other “first-order goal.” Katsafanas further supposes, particularly in terms of this “first-order goal,” that “all human actions are motivated by a distinctive kind of psychological state, the drive (Trieb).” According to Katsafanas, all human actions are thus motivated both by the “higher-order aim” of will to power and also by some other “first-order” goal that is supposed to be distinct from will to power. However, as discussed, Katsafanas also distinguishes carefully between drives and affects, and suggests here that only drives are essentially related to will to power. What Katsafanas elsewhere calls “discrete affects” therefore seemingly can exist independently of will to power on his account, even if certain “drive-induced affective orientations” cannot. It thus would appear that Katsafanas, like Poellner, cannot identify affects with will to power on his interpretation.

What I thus conclude in this section is that two current major strains of Nietzsche scholarship do not account for Nietzsche’s own identification of affects with will to power. Moreover, as these two strains seem representative of current Anglophone Nietzsche scholarship on affects and will to power, I would contend that Nietzsche’s identification of affects as will to power has gone undertreated in the present literature. I now seek to rectify the situation by developing a deeper textual interpretation of this identification.

Nietzsche on Affects and Will to Power

I thus intend to show that Nietzsche’s identification of affects with will to power is supportable on textual grounds, through a more complete survey of his writing on affects. My methodological assumption in shifting to an identification on deeper textual grounds is that the abovementioned scholarship uniformly ignores how Nietzsche came to write about affects and their relation to will to power. The importance of making such a case on textual grounds strikes me as speaking, not only to the antiquarian interest of having a more correct or precise interpretation of Nietzsche, but also to understanding Nietzsche’s account of affects more fully, so that we can assess its philosophical merits. For although we can assess the merits of Nietzsche scholars’ accounts of affects and will to power, this clearly is not necessarily, and here necessarily not, the same thing as assessing Nietzsche’s own account of affects as will to power.

While Nietzsche’s earlier work contains numerous references to affects, it appears that he began to consider writing explicitly about them only when he was composing Dawn. One of Nietzsche’s notes, dated to roughly the early part of 1881 (when he composed Dawn), accordingly features the following list of headings:

1. § The human being with knowledge, how such a being comes to be, and its horizons
2. § Primordial morality
3. § Christendom
4. § The morality of the times (pity)

asserts to have only phenomenalistic objectivity for Nietzsche, and will to power, which he sees as the basis of Nietzsche’s metaphysics. However, Poellner’s interpretation of Nietzsche on affects and values does leave open the possibility that perhaps “these should ultimately be interpreted realistically”, i.e. somehow metaphysically, Poellner, p. 228.

Katsafanas 2016, p. 249.
Katsafanas 2016, p. 250.
Kail and Dries, p. 34.
Dawn

Perhaps the second most viable candidate, after books comprising a table of contents that Nietzsche would have envisioned for the project that soon became *Dawn*. From this, it seems reasonable to understand the list as a possible intended the list initially as preparation for the project that soon became *Dawn*. One can infer, first, from the approximate dating of this note, that Nietzsche intended the list as a whole best thematically to the recent work for *Dawn*. What this shows is this list was more likely intended for *Dawn* than for another published work.

Second, to rule out (b), at least two things should be considered. First, if the heading titles on this list were intended for six individually enumerated sections of *Dawn*, they most likely would correspond, given the enumeration, to the first six. However, the first six sections do not seem to correspond thematically to the six heading titles on this list. In fact, all six of the first sections in *Dawn* seem to correspond best to the first heading title on the list. Second, and more compellingly, the most relevant final heading, the former. However, this particular list of headings, with its more specific focus on morality in the majority of its headings, arguably fits the themes of that work (which Nietzsche also first published with just four books, before expanding it to five years later), even less well than it does *Dawn*. Finally, it is worth noting that Colli and Montinari have categorized the note on which Nietzsche wrote this list as part of a collection that features mostly preparatory work for *Dawn*. What shows is this list was more likely intended for *Dawn* than for another published work.

First, to rule out (a), I claim that the list as a whole best fits thematically with *Dawn* (which purports to concern “thoughts on moral prejudgments”). Perhaps the second most viable candidate, after *Dawn*, would be *The Gay Science*, since the latter is the major work that Nietzsche published directly after "initially was conceived by Nietzsche as a further expansion of *Dawn*; for evidence of which they adduce the January 29, 1882 letter of Nietzsche’s to Peter Gast, where he writes of completing Books VI-VIII of *Dawn* and of planning to write two further books for it; see KSA 14, p. 240. Colli and Montinari further propose that a shift in thematic focus for the entire newer work, i.e. from seeing *The Gay Science* as an expansion of *Dawn* to a work deserving of its own new title, only came with Nietzsche’s thought of the eternal return of the same, which he first wrote about in a crucial note, KSA 9 if[41], around this same period. If this view is correct overall, then *The Gay Science* may be more accurately seen as, at least partially and in respect to any thematic similarity, a continuation of *Dawn*. In other words, my claim is that these six sections all correspond best to the first heading title on the list that I have been discussing, i.e. “the human being with knowledge, how such a being comes to be, and its horizons.” The first heading title, for instance, proposes the origin of “rationality” (*Vernunftigkeit*), and its origin in unreason (“ihre Abkunft aus der Unvernunft”); the second proposes the “prejudgment of the scholars (Gelehrten);” the third, some mistakes in supposing that humans have ever obtained “deep insight” into the meaning of existence; the fourth, a warning “not to see the world more cacophonously as it is”; the fifth, the “greatest achievement of previous humanity” for which we owe gratitude; and the sixth, a distinction between science and “sleight of hand” (*Taschenspieleri*), wherein Niet...
“aphorisms on affects,” especially does not seem to fit the heading of any individual section at all, let alone the sixth (which instead features an analogy that Nietzsche uses to depict scientific understandings of “causality”) (D.6). Instead, the heading title seems to refer clearly to some collection of aphorisms, such as one would find, for instance, in one of Dawn’s books, rather than in any of its individually-enumerated sections.

Lastly, to rule out (c), the most compelling alternative view mentioned above, there are two conjoined reasons to consider. First, there is the already-noted thematic relationship between the first heading on this list and at least the first few sections of the published Dawn, which also arguably continues for both the rest of this first book as well as for the remaining four books that comprise the full work.39 Second, although there is clearly no sixth book in Nietzsche’s Dawn,39 many aphorisms in the work’s five books do exhibit a strikingly more specific focus on affect/s as such40 than Nietzsche’s immediately preceding multivolume Human, All Too Human4 (as well as, perhaps more surprisingly, his major follow-up work, The Gay Science, where affect/s are rarely discussed explicitly).41 There is thus reason to believe this list, and its sixth heading, “aphorisms on affect,” probably relates to Nietzsche’s plans for Dawn.

It is crucial for my purposes here that Nietzsche first evinces a plan to write a section of his work more extensively on affect/s while composing Dawn. For this period of writing is also when Nietzsche begins to formulate

Nietzsche, at least based on what I am arguing, would have considered as his collection of “aphorisms on affect”. However, though the numbering and timeline both fit in a satisfying way, and there are key sections of The Gay Science’s First Book that concern affect/s (most notably for my purposes its §13 “On the Doctrine of the Feeling of Power”), there seem just as many (if not more) sections in this Book without any particular thematic focus on them. Moreover, Nietzsche never refers to affect/s literally in the First Book of The Gay Science, and only rather sparingly in the other Books comprising it in comparison to Dawn.

Aside from D.34, wherein Nietzsche notably defines affects in terms of certain “inclinations and disinclinations,” Dawn also features the first section in Nietzsche’s work chronologically considered with a heading mentioning affect, i.e. D.38 “Christendom and the Affects”, which Nietzsche opposes both to “virtue” (Tugend) and “reason” (Vernunft), describing affect/s rhetorically here “in their most extreme intensity and splendor… as love of God, fear before God, fanatical belief in God, in blind hope for God”; see KSA 3, p. 59.

My claims based on the fact that, while there are indeed a few sections mentioning affect/s explicitly in both volumes Human, All Too Human (as well as many others touching on them implicitly), there are, unlike in Dawn, no sections in this work that have their explicit focus on affect/s.

There is, however, a large folio of notes from this period that contains many sustained reflections on affect/s, e.g. KSA 9 (110, 73, 103, 127, 128, 182, 193, 220, 226, 241, 301, 314, 316, 319). Colli and Montinari suggest that the folio contains most importantly “sketches for The Gay Science,” perhaps on the basis of its inclusion in KSA 9(141), which again features Nietzsche’s initial 1880 sketch of the thought of eternal return. However, given the proximity of Nietzsche’s plans for Dawn and The Gay Science, perhaps it is also plausible to see these notes as plans for the never completed “aphorisms on affect.”
his conception of will to power.45 Aside from one stray reference in a notebook that seems to have been used mainly for early preparations for *Human, All Too Human*,44 subsequent references to will to power appear among collections of notes related to his preparations for *Dawn*.45 One thus may read some passages closely related to these notes in *Dawn* as Nietzsche’s first implicit references to will to power46. Moreover, just as Nietzsche’s references

40As I did with Nietzsche on affect/s. I base this surmise on the first chronological appearance of references to ‘will to power’ in his writing. Admittedly, Nietzsche evinces interest in the closely related theme of power much earlier in his work, as noted by Anglophone scholars writing on will to power since at least Walter Kaufmann, who first draws attention to Nietzsche’s early unpublished essay “Homer’s Contest” in this regard. However, even Kaufmann traces what he calls Nietzsche’s “discovery of the will to power” to *Dawn*. See: Kaufmann 1974, p. 193ff.

41See KSA 8 23[63], p. 425. Both Kaufmann and Volker Gerhardt, who have different views about the subsequent references, agree that this note does not concern Nietzsche’s will to power as usually understood, “not as the basic force of a monistic metaphysics but as one of two cardinal psychological phenomena: [here Kaufmann quotes from the note] ‘Fear (negative) and will to power (positive) explain our strong consideration for the opinions of men’ Kaufmann (1974), p. 179; Gerhardt goes a bit further, in my view too far, suggesting that for Nietzsche here, we are only interested in power as a “mark of freedom [Zeichen der Freiheit]” as our “pleasure in power is only explicable from the displeasure of our manifold dependence,” Gerhardt (1994), p. 170.

42These are KSA 9 4[239], p. 159, where Nietzsche reduces the affect/s of ‘boredom (Langeweile)’ to will to power, KSA 9 7[206], p. 360, where he states that the ancient Athenians were more forthcoming in their discussion of will to power, and KSA 9 9[14], pp. 412-413, which concerns the confusing idea of a ‘renunciation (Verzicht)’ of will to power and also bears a closer relation to *Dawn*. See also KSA 9 11[346], which admittedly may relate more closely to *Dawn*, given its discussion of the will to power behind the “scientific human being” p. 573.

43I make this claim based on the fact, pointed out by Colli and Montinaro, that the aforementioned note KSA 9 9[14] was part of a manuscript for *Dawn* itself; see KSA 14, p. 28, 643. I am not sure, however, to which passages in *Dawn* this note, which in a variant noted by the editors more clearly concerns the affect/s of “obedience (Gehorsum)” as a “negation of will to power,” most closely reflects. D 191 or D 215 seem like the best candidates, the former for its peculiarly-similar contrast between ‘world-abscinding Entweltlichung’ with a “power of willing (Macht des Willens),” and the latter for the explanatory suggestion it draws to affect increase in his notes during the completion of *Dawn* and *The Gay Science* (in order to turn his attention to subsequently published and related major works, namely *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and *Beyond Good and Evil*), so too do his references to will to power.47 This suggests he became more preoccupied with the theme of affect/s as he concentrated more on his conception of will to power.

This raises questions, however, concerning what happened to Nietzsche’s plan to write this section (“aphorisms on affects”) after he completed *Dawn*, and such a plan has to do with this budding preoccupation with will to power. While there are also copious references to affect/s in Nietzsche’s notes and published works following *Dawn*, there is no obvious section in any of these works to which this heading would refer most fittingly. What is most noticeable about Nietzsche’s references to affect/s is how diffuse they are in his writings, both published and unpublished. There ths emerges not only the difficulty of determining what happened to Nietzsche’s plan to write a section in one of his books that would feature these aphorisms on affects, but also that of determining what Nietzsche would have written about affects in these aphorisms. Lacking, as we seem to be, a clear singular locus where Nietzsche specifically sets out to write about affect/s as such, we are thereby left to piece together an interpretation of Nietzsche on affect/s from various passages in his published works and unpublished notebooks.

between obedience to a powerful person or to God and the vicarious “feeling of their/His power (Gefühlt seiner Macht) that this engenders in the obedient.

44That is to say, the majority of Nietzsche’s explicit references both to affect/s (in 227 unique passages in his published and unpublished writing, according to the KSA) and will to power (in 196 unique passages) are datable after the period in which he publishes the first edition of *The Gay Science* in August 1882. While affect/s are never once mentioned explicitly as such in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the published work wherein Nietzsche first introduces will to power by name, a plethora of notes for this work’s composition dated between 1882 and 1884 clearly show an interest in affect/s particularly related to Zarathustra’s themes, though none of these draws an explicit connection to will to power. It is thus only with his work on *Beyond Good and Evil* that Nietzsche begins to make this connection explicit.
At the same time, I would contend that this indication of Nietzsche’s plan to write this set of aphorisms on affects nonetheless serves as an important temporal indicator to direct our interpretation toward the connection between affect/s and will to power. Clearly enough, the setting down of an intention to write such a set of aphorisms shows that, at least around the time that he penned this note, Nietzsche had begun to consider more seriously both what he wanted to say about affect/s as such, and also that he wished to say this about affect in the particular form of aphorisms. And there do appear to be many more references to affect/s from this point forward, including within the context of what are unmistakably aphoristic forms of writing. These explicit references, moreover, are mostly not in Dawn; and there are few in The Gay Science, and none in Zarathustra. Instead, they are most abundant in his notebooks from the period of these published works’ composition, i.e. 1881-1885. As for the point about aphoristic form specifically, it appears that Nietzsche began to assemble various collections of unmistakable aphorisms in his notes from this period, particularly while working on Zarathustra.

This still leaves open the question, however, as to whether any of these collections of aphorisms contain even a draft for a work Nietzsche would have wanted to designate as his aforementioned aphorisms on affect. Some of these collections were given other headings, and thus at the very least no longer could have been for Nietzsche his “aphorisms on affects” by the point in time that he so titled (or retitled) them.® There is, however, one notable collection of aphorisms that is clearly related to the composition of Zarathustra and to which Nietzsche did not appear to give any heading. The first of its aphorisms, moreover, quite familiarly reads as follows: “Will to life? I

found in its stead always just will to power.”® Moreover, though affect/s are rarely mentioned explicitly in this collection®, the majority do seem to concern what reasonably could be construed as affect/s, at least in the broader sense of their relating to human feelings or emotions. For instance, the second aphorism concerns what could be called “fiery ambition (Feuereifer)”, the third more clearly concerns the nature of love, and the fourth a sort of deeply felt, the third more clearly concerns the nature of love, and the fourth a sort of deeply felt “delusion of grandeur (Groessenwahn)”, down to the last aphorism, the 273th, which touches intriguingly upon the social dimension of human affect/s in shaping even more radical forms of subjectivity, such as that of the Uebermensch”, that seek to resist such influence: “At first I was in my place among the herd; now the herd is still in place within me.”® Based on the thematic connection alone, I would not go so far as to claim that this particular collection is directly identifiable as Nietzsche’s “aphorisms on affects”. However, the collection does appear to make more clearly what I consider to be an important connection between affect/s and will to power insofar as

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®Nietzsche assembled one such, according to Colli and Montinari, in 1882, to which he seems to have titled variously “On High Seas”, “Redolent Speech” and even “Beyond Good and Evil” (!), with the consistent subtitle of a “Book of Sentences” (Sentenzen-Buch); see KSA 10 §[i] pp. 53-107.

®KSA 10 §[i] no. 1, p. 187. The familiarity is with passages from Z II “Of Self-Overcoming,” where Zarathustra similarly proclaims, “Only where there is life is there also will, though not will to life, but rather – so I teach it to you – will to power!” While Clark dismisses this proclamation as merely Zarathustra’s, claiming it “articulates Zarathustra’s cosmological vision, which may or may not also be Nietzsche’s” (Clark 1990, 210), the fact that a similar aphorism appears at the beginning of a large collection of unpublished aphorisms (expressing views that are more obviously Nietzsche’s own), ought to prompt some reluctance to accept Clark’s suggestion.

®That is not to say, however, that they are not mentioned at all; they are in four aphorisms, including in two, nos. 16 (“For someone who is much troubled by their own rationality, affect is a respite insofar as it isn’t rational” KSA 10 §[i], p. 189), and no. 58 (“The will to overcome an affect is in the end only the will of another affect” KSA 10 §[i], p. 194), which speak to key tenets of the psychological views that Nietzsche came to develop.

®Though not mentioned by name in this aphorism, Colli and Montinari refer to a similarity with another note in which this “I” is so clearly identified: “The I first in the herd. The opposite of that: in the Uebermensch, the you of many I’s across millennia is made one…” KSA 10 41(188), p. 166.

®KSA 10 §[i] no. 273, p. 220.
Nietzsche, in the aphorisms comprising it, seeks to understand the affect/s described there as essentially just forms of will to power. It is on this basis that I would propose the stronger claim that Nietzsche, either by the time either of writing or at least assembling these aphorisms into a collection, already had begun to think of affect/s in terms of will to power.

However, what I really wish to conclude here goes beyond these suggestions about textual correlations indicating how Nietzsche's interests in affect/s and will to power may be related. For I wish to contend that, especially as Nietzsche became more preoccupied with affect/s in his writing, he tended ever more clearly to identify affect/s with will to power. My conclusion is thus that Nietzsche came to see affect/s just as will to power, perhaps already around the time that he wrote *Dawn*, or maybe only as late as he began work on *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, but at any rate certainly, as I think I've demonstrated pace both Clark and Leiter, as well as Poellner and Katsafanas, by the time that he composed *Beyond Good and Evil* §36.

**Works Cited**


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39As Colli and Montinari point out, at least some of the aphorisms comprising the collection are from manuscripts dating to the period where Nietzsche was working on *The Gay Science*, KSA 14. p. 6/7.